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Abstract
Individuals often need to make decisions as a group on different levels, ranging from a family unit, to profes-
sional organizations, to larger political and economic units. Societies choose their leaders, while companies
gain business insights and develop marketing strategies using aggregation methods. These decisions are
highly resource-intensive and have important implications for the quality of life, safety, and self-expression
in public life. Therefore, it is extremely important to aggregate individual preferences correctly.
The area of theoretical Social Choice provides us with bearish answers that a consensus may be unob-
tainable and that any group choice may be impugnable. Even worse, the choice of the best option may
depend on the choice of the aggregation procedure. Nevertheless, the analysis of real-world data routinely
argues against these theoretical predictions: the outcomes of aggregation procedures in real-world data sets
agree remarkably well. This contradiction has puzzled researchers for decades. To solve this puzzle I propose
a Generalized Multi-peaked model of preferences.
The Multi-peaked model is consistent with the predictions from the theoretical literature on Social Choice
and with the novel empirical evidence. I model the structure of group preferences by assuming that, first,
people share a limited number of points of view and, therefore, form subgroups on the basis of similar
preferences. Thus, the distribution of preferences of the group is a mixture of the preferences of these
subgroups. Second, within a group, people deviate slightly from a typical point of view and thereby provide
a variety of opinions.
I capture these two assumptions by introducing modes, i.e., true/typical points of view of a group, and
Kernel functions, i.e., deviations from the modes, into the model. I show that Kernel functions bear all the
responsibility for the high rates of consistency among aggregation methods, as well as the rarity of cyclical
social preferences in real-world data.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Individuals often need to make decisions as a group on different levels, ranging from a family unit, to
professional organizations, to larger political and economic units. Aggregation methods play a crucial role
in the ways societies choose their leaders or companies may gain business insights and develop marketing
strategies. These decisions are highly resource-intensive and have important implications for the quality of
life, safety, and self-expression in public life. Therefore, it is extremely important to possess a correct and
sophisticated understanding of the processes of aggregating individual preferences.
In this dissertation I present a sequence of manuscripts that address various issues in theoretical and
behavioral Social Choice: The first three manuscripts look at incongruities between theoretical predictions
of Social Choice and empirical observations in various environments. The subsequent two papers explicate
the reasons behind the mismatch between theory and the empirics.
In the first manuscript, in collaboration with Michel Regenwetter, published as Regenwetter and Popova
(2011), we bridge the gap between individual and social choice research by applying behavioral social choice
concepts to individual decision-making. We investigate variability in choice behavior within each individual
in repeated choice experimental setup. Within this paradigm, we look for evidence of counter-intuitive
outcomes of aggregation, such as Condorcet cycles and disagreements between the Condorcet and Borda
aggregation methods. We also illustrate some methodological complexities involved with likelihood ratio
tests for Condorcet cycles in paired comparison data.
In the second manuscript, in collaboration with Nicholas Mattei and Michel Regenwetter, published
as Popova et al. (2012), we discuss what behavioral Social Choice can contribute to computational Social
Choice. As is the case in computer science, data collection and reasoning systems are increasingly moving
toward distributed and multi-agent design Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2009); this design shift prompts the
need to aggregate the (possibly disjoint) observations and preferences of individual agents. Using a small
sub-collection from the Netflix Prize dataset, we illustrated the importance of two notions. First, we discuss
inferences one can make about social choice outcomes based on limited, imperfect, and highly incomplete
observed data. Second, we outline the dependence of predictions and conclusions of behavioral Social Choice
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upon modeling assumptions about the nature of human preferences. We highlight the key role that inference
and behavioral modeling can play in the analysis of sparse data, such as Netflix ratings.
In the third manuscript, in collaboration with Sergey Popov and Michel Regenwetter, conditionally
accepted as Popov et al. (2014),1 we investigate social choice paradoxes for seven social choice methods:
Condorcet, Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality, Single Transferable Vote, Coombs, and Plurality Runoff. We rely
on Monte Carlo simulations for theoretical results and on twelve ballot data sets from presidential elections
held by the American Psychological Association for empirical results. In direct contrast to predictions taken
from the classical social choice literature, we find that competing aggregation methods agree remarkably
well, especially on the overall best and worst options. The agreement is also robust under perturbations of
the preference profile via resampling, even in relatively small pseudo samples.
The first three manuscripts set the stage for the addition of the following two papers, which attempt
to reconcile theoretical and empirical Social Choice by providing a generalized framework that incorporates
theoretical predictions and empirical findings as special cases. In the fourth paper, I introduce a diagnostic
tool, the Saari ratio, which builds up on a decomposition of an electoral profile proposed by Donald Saari
Saari (2000a), and use that tool to analyze the properties of popular theoretical and of real-world electorates.
I propose an algorithm to compute the Saari ratio, which is applicable to a wide variety of data formats; it
also is easy to use for anyone interested in the paradoxes of aggregation methods in real-world data sets. I
illustrate the way in which the Saari ratio can serve as a reliable predictor of rates of agreement between
various aggregation methods. The results of this analysis suggest that there is a need to develop new models
of electorates. These results also hint at possible dimensions into which these models can be extended.
In the fifth paper, I propose a Generalized Multi-peaked model of electorates that explains agreement
among voting rules in real-world electorates, as well as the potential for mismatch among outcomes of
various voting rules in popular domains in theoretical Social Choice. I model a real electorate by assuming
that, first, voters share a limited number of opinions and, therefore, form groups on the basis of similar
preferences. Thus, the distribution of preferences of the electorate is a mixture of the preferences of these
groups. Second, within a group, voters deviate slightly from a typical opinion of this group and provide
a variety of preferences. I capture these two assumptions by introducing modes, i.e., true/typical opinions
of a group, and Kernel functions, i.e., deviations from the modes, into the model. I show that Kernel
functions bear all the responsibility for the high rates of agreement among rules and the rarity of Social
Choice paradoxes in real-world data.
To familiarize the reader with the main concepts and trends of Social Choice, I will first introduce them
1The research underlying this paper was featured in Science, 327, 942, 2010, Monitor on Psychology, 41, 12, 2010.
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and then discuss the relevant literature.
1.1 Theoretical Social Choice
The goal of this Section is to introduce a reader to the fundamentals of Social Choice theory. I provide a brief
introduction of the main concepts of Social Choice on a set of simple and transparent examples constructed
for a small hypothetical electorate.
Theoretical Social Choice works with normative axioms and uses rules of mathematics and logic to derive
normative conclusions from them. Arrow’s and Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s impossibility theorems elegantly
demonstrate that democracy can be incoherent and that voters cannot always be motivated to provide
sincere information about their preferences. The mathematical proofs of these impossibility theorems are
unquestionable. Nevertheless, it is still an open question on whether it is possible to have a single best
rational choice in real life.
To ascertain that an aggregation procedure selects the best option, scholars often appeal to this pro-
cedure’s properties. However, different voting rules are based on different mathematical assumptions and
violate different ‘fairness’ criteria (see, among others, Arrow, 1951, Fishburn, 1979, May, 1952, Saari, 1994,
1995, Tideman, 2006). Because of this discrepancy, it is almost impossible to compare voting rules with
one another, or to compare the results of the aggregations in terms of their legitimacy. Still, a significant
strand of literature is dedicated to comparisons of rules’ characteristics per se (see, among others, Brams
and Fishburn, 1984, Gibbard, 1973, Goodman, 1954, Tideman, 2006). The tone of this literature is overly
pessimistic. It highlights the potential caveats and paradoxes of voting rules. Firstly, voters may not re-
veal their sincere preferences. Secondly, any preferences, even the sincere ones, can be corrupted by the
aggregation procedure. Depending on what procedure is applied in each case, the distortion can be different.
Because it is difficult to decide which rule has better properties and therefore should be used in each
case, it is reasonable to check whether rules relying on different mathematical truths lead to different results
of aggregations. The classical literature gives a pessimistic answer to this question. It is always possible to
create an artificial electorate such that two chosen voting rules disagree with each other (Saari, 2001a,b). The
natural conclusion one can make is that the election outcome depends heavily on the method of aggregation.
There are ubiquitous examples of disagreements among voting rules on theoretical electorates (see, among
others, Arrow, 1951, Mueller, 2003, Riker, 1982, Saari, 1994, 2000a, Sen, 1970). For illustration purposes, we
can consider a small hypothetical electorate of 13 voters and only 3 options - A, B, and C. Writing X  Y
when a voter strictly prefers an option X to an option Y , let us consider the individual preference rankings
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of the 13 voters in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Hypothetical preference profile of 13 voters for three options, A,B, and C.
Individual preference ranking Number of voters
(from best to worst) who have that preference
A  C  B 3
B  A  C 5
B  C  A 1
C  A  B 3
C  B  A 1
For illustration purposes I apply four well-known voting rules to our hypothetical profile. My choices
would be the Borda, Plurality, Single Transferable Vote, and Condorcet rules, as each of these rules is heavily
studied and widely used. According to the Borda rule (Borda, 1770), the first ranked option of each voter
scores two points, and the second ranked option scores one point. Therefore, the Borda rule provides the
social order A  B  C, with a 14 : 13 : 12 point tally. The best option is option A. Despite its long history
and relative popularity in the academic practice, the Borda rule is criticized for its many disadvantages, one
being that it is widely acknowledged that this rule is susceptible to strategic voting.
Let me apply another voting rule, the Plurality rule. This is the most common contemporary aggregation
method, known and popular for its simplicity and transparency. According to the Plurality rule, the first
ranked option of each voter scores one point, and the rest score zero. Therefore, according to Table 1.1
the Plurality social order is B  C  A, with a 6 : 4 : 3 tally. However, the Plurality rule is criticized for
not fully utilizing the preferences provided by the voters. In addition, the Plurality winner is not always
supported by more than half of the electorate. In our example, the best option according to the Plurality
rule is option B. Nevertheless, more than half of voters - 7 out of 13 - prefer someone else.
The next voting rule, called the Single Transferable vote (STV), eliminates the problem that arises when
more than half of the electorate does not approve of the Plurality rule’s best option. This aggregation
method is heavily promoted on all levels of government in the United States, and adopted by a variety of
professional, political, and commercial organizations 2. It is a general multistage procedure for a multi-seat
election. In the Social Choice literature, a special case of the STV rule for a single-seat election is also known
as the Hare system, or the Alternative vote. For a single seat election, STV chooses the Plurality winner
if more than half of the electorate elects this option. Otherwise, an iterative elimination process proceeds
as follows. The option with the smallest Plurality score is eliminated, and the remaining options are then
2In the media this rule is also called Instant Runoff (see, e.g., http://www.instantrunoff.com/). In academic circles, this
aggregation method is known as the Hare system (Hare, 1857) or the Alternative vote. The more general case is called the
Single Transferable vote (STV) where an organization seeks to find a prespecified number of choices, such as a committee.
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re-ranked. A new Plurality score is computed, and the process continues until only one option is left. In our
hypothetical example, option A is eliminated and option C is the STV winner.
As we can see, three major aggregating procedures provided us with three different winning options.
Therefore, the result of an election on this hypothetical profile depends heavily on the selected voting
rule. One way to respond to the inconsistencies in the rules is by implementing the most reasonable and
mathematically rigorous of all the rules, the Condorcet rule (in the Social Choice literature it is also called
the Majority rule) suggested by the Marquis de Condorcet (Condorcet, 1785).
The Condorcet rule declares that the winner option must beat any other option in a pair-wise election,
making this option the most desirable for more than half of the population. Unfortunately, though math-
ematically beautiful, this rule fails to provide the best option in some electorates because it creates cycles.
This problem has its own line of inquiry in the Social Choice literature and is called the Condorcet Paradox
(see, among others, Arrow, 1951, 1963, Gehrlein, 1981, 1983, Kuga and Nagatani, 1974, Lepelley, 1993). In
theoretical Social Choice, it is a common practice to view rational preferences as linear orders, that is, when
each voter ranks all candidates in a transitive manner. In order to have transitive preferences, a voter who
prefers candidate A to candidate B and candidate B to candidate C must prefer A to C. The Condorcet
rule, when aggregating these transitive preferences, can end up with an intransitive or a cyclical social order.
The danger of this situation is that no matter which option is labeled the “best” one, there is always more
than half of the electorate who prefers some other option. This makes it impossible to choose the objectively
best one. The discovery of the possibility of a Condorcet cycle had a major impact on the Social Choice and
Political Science literature, generating hundreds of publications on the topic.
In the hypothetical electorate in Table 1.1, the Condorcet rule indeed provides an example of the famous
Condorcet cycle. Option B is preferred to option A by more than half of the electorate (7 voters prefer B to
A, whereas only 6 voters prefer A to B). Similarly, A is preferred to C by more than half of the electorate,
and C is preferred to B, hence yielding an intransitive social preference.
Examples like this hypothetical profile lead to rather gloomy predictions about the methods of aggregation
of individual preferences. Indeed, in this example the aggregation methods appear to be inevitably incoherent
and therefore useless. As a clear and unambiguous winner is unattainable, it can seem that the democratic
idea of society being capable of agreeing on important questions is chimerical. I summarize the outcomes of
four Social Choice rules in Table 1.2 to illustrate the issue.
The sensitivity of the aggregation results toward the choice of a voting rule is a problem that is hard
to underestimate. And the result of an election that is sensitive to the choice of a voting rule is always
questionable. A problem of this scope could not remain unaddressed in the literature on Social Choice for
5
Table 1.2: Social Choice outcomes for the preference profile in Table 1.1.
Consensus method Borda Plurality STV Condorcet
Winner A B C None
Loser C A A None
Social Order A  B  C B  C  A C  B  A Cycle
long. Renowned political scientist William Riker launched the criticism of voting rules and democracy on
a new level. He founded the school of “Positive Political Theory” and argued that populist or classical
majoritarian principles of democracy are unreliable and should be fundamentally revised. Based on Ar-
row’s findings, Riker emphasized that the construction of accurate preference aggregation is impossible and
therefore society should rely on different political mechanisms to obtain a unique best option: “Outcomes
of voting cannot, in general, be regarded as accurate amalgamations of voters’ values [...] Hence we cannot
expect fairness either [...] Outcomes of any particular method of voting lack meaning because often they are
manipulated amalgamations rather than fair and true amalgamations of voters’ judgements and because we
can never know for certain whether an amalgamation has been manipulated” (Riker, 1982, 235-236).
Such recommendations from an influential scholar had a powerful impact on the areas of Social Choice,
Political Science, and Economics. Naturally, they led to the conclusion that democracy is impossible and that
democratic principles are doomed from the outset unless specific institutions are created to protect them.
Moreover, these conclusions evolved to practical policy recommendations to caution against the use of the
Condorcet rule in real electorates. Kenneth Shepsle and Mark Bonchek note in their popular political science
textbook, “In general, then, we cannot rely on the method of majority rule to produce a coherent sense of
what the group wants, especially if there are no institutional mechanisms for keeping participation restricted
or weeding out some of the alternatives” (Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997, 54). It should be highlighted that the
arguments of Riker and other defenders of positive political theory hinge on the possibility of conundra and
paradoxes. Thus, it is instructive to explore when and how Social Choice paradoxes occur.
In Sections 1.1.1–1.1.3, I discuss briefly the concepts that I use later in Popova (2013b) and Popova
(2014). In Section 1.1.1, I describe properties of the voting rules in regard to ‘fairness’ criteria of Arrow’s
and Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s impossibility theorems. Next, I explore the properties of two famous theoretical
distributions - Cultures of Indifference and Single-Peakedness. Lastly, in Section 1.1.3, I report on conditional
and unconditional Condorcet Efficiency and highlight that it is necessary to calculate both statistics to obtain
a good description of a rule’s ability to match the Condorcet winner in different environments. I provide the
unconditional rates of agreement between winners for four voting rules, in order to illustrate the pessimistic
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predictions of theoretical Social Choice.
1.1.1 Impossibility Theorems
In this Section, I discuss two cornerstones of the theoretical Social Choice - the two famous impossibility
theorems put forward by Kenneth Arrow, and by Allan Gibbard and Mark Satterthwaite, respectively.
In Section 1.1, while trying to find the best option for the hypothetical electorate in Table 1.1, we applied
the Borda, Plurality, STV, and Condorcet voting rules. Unfortunately, the different aggregation methods
provided us with different winning options, and the Condorcet rule provided a cycle. Now, in order to find
the best voting rule and, consequently, the objectively best option, we shall refer to properties of the rules
and choose the rule with the best set.
Kenneth Arrow presented a set of reasonable criteria that a good voting rule should possess, and proved
that it is not possible for an aggregation procedure presenting societal preferences as a linear order to
satisfy all of these criteria simultaneously (Arrow, 1951). For this and other work on the same subject,
Arrow received a Nobel Prize in Economics in 1972. His work made a major impact on Social Choice,
Political Science, Economics, and many other fields. Another Nobel laureate, Paul Samuelson, wrote in
1977: “Men have always sought ideal democracy - the perfect voting system [...] What Kenneth Arrow
proved once and for all is that there cannot possibly be found such an ideal voting scheme: the search of
the great minds of recorded history for the perfect democracy, it turns out, is the search for a chimera,
for a logical self-contradiction” (Samuelson, 1977, 935, 938). Arrow’s theorem is shocking in its pessimistic
implications for democracy, as it points out that the properties of voting rules are incompatible. For decades,
scholars interpreted the theorem repeatedly, focusing on the necessity of conditions and their interpretation.
Nevertheless, investigation of what properties each particular rule is missing is not a widespread line of
inquiry. Thus, assuming that individual preferences do take the form of linear orders, I concentrate on
properties of the rules for linear order domains.
Arrow formulated the doctrines of citizens’ sovereignty and rationality in the set of following fairness
criteria:
1. Unrestricted domain/universality: The aggregation procedure should be able to create a complete social
order of all ranked options for any set of individual preferences. The order should be deterministic
and provide the same social order for the same set of individual preferences. This formulation replaced
a weaker condition in the 1961 version of the theorem, namely, that some individual preferences are
inadmissible.
2. Non-imposition/citizen sovereignty: The aggregation procedure should be able to obtain any possible
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social order. This means that any possible social order should be achievable by some set of individual
preferences.
3. Non-dictatorship: A voting rule should represent preferences of many voters, not just of a single one.
In other words, a voting rule should not be dictatorial.
4. Independence of irrelevant alternatives: The social order of a voting rule for a fixed set of alternatives
should be independent of alternatives outside of this set. In particular, social preferences between
candidate A and candidate B should depend only on individual preferences regarding those two can-
didates.
5. Monotonicity/positive association of social and individual values: The voting rule’s social order should
respond adequately to changes in individual preferences. If one or many voters rank a particular
candidate higher, then the new social order should never place this candidate lower than earlier.
In the second edition of the theorem, Arrow substituted monotonicity and non-imposition with the Pareto
condition (Arrow, 1963).
The Pareto condition states that if every voter prefers candidate A to candidate B, then A will be ranked
ahead of B in the social order.
Several years later, after a multitude of extensive analyses and interpretations of the Arrow theorem,
Gibbard and Satterthwaite proved the eponymous theorem. This is an important fundamental that followed
the Arrow theorem (Gibbard, 1973, Satterthwaite, 1975). The idea behind this theorem is that no environ-
ment can motivate voters to report their sincere preferences when a non-dictatorial voting rule is applied
for more than two options within a universal domain. In other words, a voting rule can never satisfy the
following three criteria simultaneously:
1. Unrestricted domain/universality: The aggregation procedure should be able to create a complete
social order of all ranked options for any set of individual preferences. In particular, any individual
preference ranking can be admissible.
2. Non-dictatorship: The voting rule should represent preferences of many voters, not always choose one
order from the pool of voters.
3. Strategy-proofness: The aggregation procedure should not be susceptible to strategic voting. There
should be an environment where a voter who possesses full knowledge about the electorate profile and
the voting rule applied in each case, should have no incentive to distort her preferences.
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There are several proofs of this theorem (see, among others, Dummett and Farquharson, 1961, Green
and Laffont, 1979, Reny, 2001, Schmeidler and Sonnenschein, 1978, Sen, 2000). However, it is important to
note that, just like Arrow’s theorem, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem hinges on the possibility of cycles.
In order to gain a better understanding of the two impossibility theorems, it is a useful exercise to
check which rules violate which criteria. In addition, I will also briefly discuss the consequences of such
violations. So far, we have applied the four classical voting rules to the hypothetical profile. Now, let us
check which properties those rules are missing. We will also discuss the potential for strategic behavior
and some important qualitative characteristics of the rules. These include transparency, computational
complexity, information intensity, and ease of usage.
The Borda rule is one of the earliest voting rules presented as an alternative to the Condorcet rule. Several
properties make this rule attractive. Particularly valuable is monotonicity. The Borda rule is capable of
working with any electorate profile without restriction, as well as of incorporating all preferences that the
voters report. Unfortunately, the Borda rule can lead to ties and violates the property of independence of
irrelevant alternatives. Nobel Laureate William Vickrey first noted in 1960 that this property is intrinsically
connected with the concept of strategic voting. If the independence criterion is violated, then the voting rule
is not immune against strategic misrepresentation of preferences. In other words, when voters know that the
Borda rule is the mechanism of aggregation, they always have a motivation to report insincere preferences.
Let us assume that 3 voters in Table 1.1 know in advance that the Borda rule will be used (line 4 in
Table 1.1). We can also assume that these voters favor candidate C and believe that candidate A could
be the winner. In these circumstances, these voters have an incentive to increase the distance between
candidates A and C by reporting preferences C  B  A instead of true preferences C  A  B. This
behavior changes the outcome of the elections, and the Borda social order becomes B  C  A instead of
A  B  C with a 11 : 16 : 12 tally versus 14 : 13 : 12. A potential for such manipulation always exists
whenever the rule violates the independence criterion. To demonstrate another example of strategic voting,
let us add one more option, candidate D, which all voters prefer the least. Our new electorate is presented
in Table 1.3.
The Borda social order ranks these four candidates as A  B  C  D. Now let us assume that the
last voter knows that the Borda procedure is being used (line 5 in Table 1.3). This voter strictly prefers
candidate B to candidate A. She also knows that candidate C is not likely to win and that candidate D
is the least favorable option for the electorate. Then, instead of her genuine preferences, she can report
preferences B  C  D  A. Thus, candidate B, the voter’s second best choice, wins over candidate A, and
the Borda order becomes B  A  C  D. Such a strategy allows the voter to make sure that option A,
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Table 1.3: Hypothetical preference profile of 13 voters for four options, A,B,C, and D.
Individual preference ranking Number of voters
(from best to worst) who have that preference
A  C  B  D 3
B  A  C  D 5
B  C  A  D 1
C  A  B  D 3
C  B  A  D 1
which she likes less than option B, will not become the winner. Even though candidate A is not necessarily
worse than candidate D for this voter, she has an incentive to move option A to a lower position in her rank.
There is a third possibility of strategic manipulation: Assume that 5 voters with preferences B  A 
C  D (line 2 in Table 1.3) decide to secure the victory of their favorite candidate B by switching candidates
A and D. Then candidate B becomes the Borda winner. Other, “irrelevant” alternatives such as D do not
play a significant role in the electorate in Table 1.3. Therefore, the group of supporters of candidate B can
eliminate his closest rival, candidate A, at the expense of promoting a candidate who is almost certain to
be defeated in the elections.
These three examples provide an overview of potential manipulation strategies, and do not exhaust all of
the possibilities for strategic voting. Moreover, the number of strategies increases along with the number of
options. Most of these strategies employ a simple idea of increasing the distance between the most preferable
candidate and his closest rival. Thus, they are easy to implement even in a large-scale election. The Borda
rule, therefore, has very low resistance to strategic behavior.
Regarding its qualitative characteristics, the Borda rule is transparent because it can easily accommodate
any number of candidates in an election. The procedure is well-defined and easy to understand. Therefore,
the Borda rule is moderately easy to use. As any rule based on rankings, it demands a ranking from
each voter and thus possesses high information intensity. The computational complexity of this rule is also
moderate. For example, it is more difficult to calculate the Borda score than the Plurality score, yet, to
calculate the Borda score is certainly easier than to compute an outcome of a multistage rule such as STV.
Now let us examine the second rule we used - the Plurality rule. Unlike the Borda rule, the Plurality
rule satisfies the criterion of independence of irrelevant alternatives. Since all options that are not ranked
first are tied at the bottom and receive no votes, the voter has no incentives to shuﬄe these options. For the
same reason, this rule is not subject to most types of strategic voting. The only manipulation available to
a voter under the Plurality rule is the so-called direct hoisting. Under direct hoisting, a voter votes not for
her most favorite candidate among all options, but for the most favorite candidate among the options that
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can win. Such distortions can lead to a situation where the outcome of an election is nobody’s first choice.
In addition, the Plurality rule can lead to ties. Therefore, it lacks the property of unrestricted domain,
and that is its biggest limitation. Most troublesome is the fact that the plurality rule only takes into account
the option that is ranked first and ignores the rest of the information available. To avoid this problem, it
is possible to treat the plurality rule as a function of an unrestricted domain, where all voters report their
complete preferences and the voting rule only takes into account the top ranked candidate. Nevertheless,
under this assumption, the Plurality rule can produce some other unpleasant artifacts. In our electorate in
Table 1.1, the Plurality winner is candidate B. It is worth noting that even though option B is elected, more
than half of the electorate - 7 versus 6 - prefers someone else other than option B. Furthermore, if we look
at pair-wise comparisons, candidate C beats candidate B by 7 voters to 6. The Plurality rule also violates
positive responsiveness criterion in the sense that no movement, except the movement of the option to the
first place, has any effect on the social order.
In respect of its qualitative characteristics, the Plurality rule is as simple as a voting rule could be. It is
transparent, since a voter only needs to select one best option out of the set. It is also extremely easy to use,
no matter how many options are present. For the same reason, it has very low computational complexity
and information intensity. The Plurality rule’s popularity is hard to match, mostly because of its simplicity.
The next rule we applied in Section 1.1 to our original profile in Table 1.1 is the STV rule. The STV
rule violates the monotonicity criterion. For demonstration purposes, let us look at another theoretical
electorate in Table 1.4. In the original electorate presented in the second column of Table 1.4, candidate
A is eliminated at the first stage and candidate C is the STV winner. However, if a voter in the second
line were to move candidate C upward by changing her preferences from B  A  C to C  A  B; and
a voter in the third line were to do the same by promoting candidate C to the first rank via changing his
preferences from B  C  A to C  B  A, then candidates A and B both have the lowest Plurality score
equal to 4. Now, if candidate B is eliminated, then candidate A beats candidate C by 8 votes to 7, and A is
the STV winner. The distribution of voters’ preferences after promotion of candidate C is presented in the
last column of Table 1.4. Even though two voters improve the rank of candidate C, this improvement leads
to the defeat of this candidate at the second stage.
Similarly to the Borda rule, the STV rule does not possess the property of independence of irrelevant
alternatives; yet, it is famous for its non-susceptibility to strategic voting. As I demonstrate in the example
in Table 1.4, it is possible to change the outcome of the election by reporting distorted preferences. For
elections with 3 candidates and two stages, the strategy would be to give enough first ranks to the least
preferable option and place last the undesirable option that is likely to win. It must be recognized that
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Table 1.4: Hypothetical preference profile of 15 voters for three options, A,B, and C.
Individual preference ranking Number of voters Number of voters
(from best to worst) in original electorate after promotion of C
A  C  B 4 4
B  A  C 5 4
B  C  A 1 0
C  A  B 3 4
C  B  A 2 3
because the aggregating procedure has several stages, after each elimination ballots are rearranged, strategic
voting would be difficult to implement. Further, because an option can be eliminated at any stage, the
strategy against STV is especially difficult to implement in large-scale elections.
Regarding its qualitative characteristics, the STV rule is less transparent than the Borda rule or the
Plurality rule. It is more difficult to analyze because of its complex multistage structure, and that is
the reason why the STV rule is less susceptible to manipulations. The STV rule has high computational
complexity, especially for larger sets of candidates, because it requires a ranking from each voter.
The last rule we used in Section 1.1, Table 1.1, is the Condorcet rule. In this example, the Condorcet
rule failed to provide a unique winner and created a cycle instead. Nevertheless, let us look at its properties
irrespectively of this fact. The Condorcet rule does not possess the properties of independence of irrelevant
alternatives and strategy-proofness. Even though the Condorcet rule satisfies these criteria for each pair-wise
election, the overall outcome of an aggregation (the social order) and the existence of the Condorcet winner
can be corrupted when a cycle is introduced. Examining the structure of the aggregation process closely, we
will notice that if a cycle does not exist in the electorate profile, the only strategy that would allow us to
impact the election outcome would be to create this cycle. Let us demonstrate this using a simple example.
The winning option must dominate any other option. Therefore, there is always an incentive to rank the
most preferable option above all others. If there are three candidates and option A is the Condorcet winner,
this means that option A beats both options B and C. Therefore, we can state A  C and A  B at the
population level. Let us also assume that candidate B is the runner-up, therefore B  C, and the social
order is A  B  C. A voter who favors candidate B can use the burying strategy and intentionally switch
the popular candidate A with candidate C. This does not change the social preference A  B, but it does
promote candidate C to a higher position. As a result, the only change in social order that can happen in
this case is the switch from A  C to C  A. Keeping in mind that B  C, we indeed obtain the cycle
C  A  B  C. Once again, the failure of the Condorcet rule to provide an unambiguous winner, as well
as its susceptibility to strategic voting, hinges on the possibility and ease of creating cycles in the electorate.
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With respect to its qualitative attractiveness, the Condorcet rule is easy to use because the concept of
pair-wise elections is straightforward and agrees with general intuition that the best option must beat any
other option. The Condorcet rule is transparent because the procedure of pair-wise comparisons remains
the same for any number of candidates. The Condorcet rule is computationally complex, because defining
the social order based on pair-wise elections is a nontrivial task. Further, the Condorcet rule has moderate
information intensity. It does not require a ranking of candidates (as the Borda rule does) and can work
with pair-wise comparisons of candidates as well as with rankings.
I summarize the discussed properties of the four voting rules in Table 1.5.
Table 1.5: Properties of voting rules.
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Borda low high moderate moderate high
Plurality medium high easy low low
STV high low difficult high high
Condorcet high high easy high moderate
The hypothetical example described in the previous Section demonstrates that voting rules that satisfy
different properties can provide outcomes that disagree with one another. The theoretical framework of the
impossibility theorems explains that this disagreement has an underlying reason - different voting rules stand
on different mathematical truths. In addition to the criteria listed in the impossibility theorems, there are
other important qualitative characteristics of the voting rules that can be taken into account. We summarize
all previously discussed properties in Table 1.5
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Table 1.5 shows that there is no best voting procedure that would completely dominate others. Each has
its own disadvantages and can be manipulated in different ways. Therefore, examining the properties of the
rules does not answer the question of what the best voting rule is.
Instead, these properties provide axiomatic guidance as to what we can possibly expect when each of
these rules is used. To get an understanding of how different rules perform in general, one needs to go
beyond particular data sets or sets of properties of the rules, and examine the performance of voting rules
in a wide variety of theoretical environments. In the next Section, I discuss the most popular environments
in the theoretical Social Choice literature.
1.1.2 Two Knife-Edge Distributions
In this Section, I explore the properties of two famous theoretical distributions - Cultures of Indifference and
Single-Peakedness.
One of the cornerstones in the discussion of rules’ properties is the ability of a voting rule to provide a
winning option in any environment. In the theoretical Social Choice literature, two types of artificial envi-
ronments prevail - Cultures of Indifference (such as the Impartial Culture (IC) and the Impartial Anonymous
Culture (IAC)), and the opposite extreme distribution which satisfies Value Restriction conditions. Both
classes are knife-edge distributions. Furthermore, neither of them is observed in real electorates. Nev-
ertheless, researchers agree that these artificial distributions provide valuable information about potential
problems with election systems (Gehrlein and Lepelley, 2004, Sen, 1999). To understand the results and
usefulness of recommendations of this literature, I discuss both types of environments in detail in this Section.
The first, and undoubtedly most popular, type of artificial domains is the Culture of Indifference. It is
a class of distributions with a particular balance of ballots. Let us look into two examples of this class - the
Impartial Culture and the Impartial Anonymous Culture.
The Impartial Culture (IC) is a uniform distribution over all possible preferences. According to the IC
assumption, each preference has the same probability to appear in the electorate (for the discussion of IC see,
among others, Black, 1958, DeMeyer and Plott, 1970, Fishburn and Gehrlein, 1980, Gehrlein and Fishburn,
1976b, Klahr, 1966, Niemi and Weisberg, 1968, Tangian, 2000, Van Deemen, 1999). For three candidates, A,
B, and C, the IC over linear orders has a distribution in which each linear order has the same probability.
Since there are six possible linear orders for three candidates, the probability is one-sixth.
PABC = PACB = PBAC = PBCA = PCAB = PCBA = 1/6.
More recent publications acknowledge that the IC assumption is unrealistic (Gehrlein and Lepelley, 2004,
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Regenwetter et al., 2009b). Yet, the vast majority of calculations for the probability of a Condorcet cycle, as
well as some policy recommendations, are still being made under this assumption. The theoretical literature
reports on how ubiquitous the Condorcet cycle is and on how often different voting rules disagree on winners.
Most results are obtained for an infinitely large electorate and for 3, 5, or 7 candidates.
Another famous theoretical distribution, the Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC), was developed by
Kuga and Nagatani (1974) and Gehrlein and Fishburn (1976a). According to the IAC assumption for a fixed
number of voters in the electorate, each electorate profile is equally probable. The IAC is “Anonymous” in
the sense that the information about any particular voter’s preferences is not known. Instead of individual
ballots we obtain the frequency of each preference in the electoral profile.
Both the IC and the IAC are examples of Cultures of Indifference. This means that any two candidates are
majority-tied at the population level. For example, for any two candidates x and y from a set of candidates
{A,B,C} the following always holds:
Pxy = Pyx ∀x, y ∈ {A,B,C}
For any two candidates, the number of voters who prefer candidate X to candidate Y is the same
as the number of voters who prefer Y to X. I want to emphasize this structural balance in the Cultures
of Indifference. The symmetry that makes these distributions mathematically beautiful and interesting
for analytical derivations also makes them the worst-case scenarios for the abundance of cycles. As a
consequence, the outcomes of the different voting rules mismatch. Regenwetter et al. (2006a) conjecture
that any deviation from IC leads to a reduction in the frequency of cycles.
Even though the Cultures of Indifference are not observed in real-world electorates, there are several
reasons to use them when developing probability representations of frequencies of the Condorcet cycle and
of disagreements between voting rules. A good summary of these reasons is provided in Gehrlein and Lepelley
(2004). I believe that the most important reasons to utilize the Cultures of Indifference are the following:
• Closed form solutions allow researchers to develop asymptotic properties of the Social Choice conundra;
• The outcomes of voting rules are directly reproducible and verifiable through mathematical analysis;
• The environment is completely controlled and therefore there is no additional noise in the results (e.g.,
errors of the voters);
• If Social Choice conundra are unlikely under conditions that maximize such paradoxes, then they are
even more unlikely in real electorates.
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The Cultures of Indifference provide an interesting and useful perspective on the performance of voting
rules. However, we should keep in mind that Cultures of Indifference represent utopian electorates that are
not likely to appear in reality and should not be used as a basis for policy recommendations.
Another important branch of theoretical Social Choice literature concentrates on the extreme case dis-
tribution that is the opposite of the Cultures of Indifference. This branch is dedicated to restrictions on the
domain of electoral profiles. It began with Duncan Black’s concept of “single-peakedness” of voters’ pref-
erences (Black, 1958) and two conditions proposed by Benjamin Ward (Ward, 1965). Later, all three cases
were generalized in Amartya Sen’s “value restriction” condition (Sen, 1969, 1970). Sen’s value restriction is
a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for avoiding cycles.
To get an idea of a value-restricted domain, let us examine the graph in Figure 1.1. On this graph
there are 3 candidates (A, B, and C) and 5 voters, all distributed along one dimension. We can assume
that the voters consider closer candidates to be more preferable. Then, the candidate in the center of this
spectrum (candidate A) is never ranked worst by any of the voters in an electorate like this one. Therefore,
the preferences that rank candidate A in the last place can never appear in the electorate, and that is why
it is called a value-restricted domain.
Figure 1.1: An example of a Single-Peaked distribution of preferences
There can be three types of value restrictions. To provide a formal definition, let us assume that we
select triplets of alternatives out the set of candidates. These alternatives satisfy the Never Best condition
if and only if one of the alternatives is never ranked best by any of the voters in the electorate. Similarly,
this triplet of alternatives satisfies the Never Middle and the Never Worst conditions if and only if one of the
alternatives is never ranked second and never ranked last by any of the voters. Sen’s value restriction holds
if and only if every triplet of alternatives satisfies the Never Best, Never Middle, or Never Worst condition
for at least one alternative. This domain restriction is a sufficient condition for the absence of cycles. Black’s
single-peakedness holds if every triplet satisfies the Never Worst condition. Ward’s restrictions include the
Never Best and Never Middle conditions. In this way, Black’s and Ward’s conditions are special cases of
Sen’s value restrictions.
Despite their popularity in the theoretical Social Choice literature, these conditions narrow the possible
electorate domain too much. They imply that not all of the possible rankings can appear in the election
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ballots. As a consequence, these assumptions are almost always violated in large-scale data sets. For this
reason, Sen’s value restrictions, similarly to the Cultures of Indifference, are not likely to be observed in real
electorates.
Just like Cultures of Indifference, electorates that satisfy value restriction assumptions are intensely
studied in the Social Choice literature (see, among others, Feld and Grofman, 1986, Inada, 1964, 1969, Sen
and Pattanaik, 1969). Feld and Grofman (1986) expand the concept of value restrictions into the “net value
restriction,” additionally, they introduce the concept of “net preference majority.” They demonstrate that
the Condorcet voting rule can still provide a transitive social order even if all possible preference rankings
are present in the electorate on the level of voters. The net value restriction utilizes the concepts of net
preferences and of positive preference ordering. For a pair of rankings over three candidates, e.g., A  B  C,
the opposite ranking is C  B  A, the net preference is the difference between the number of voters with
ranking A  B  C and the number of voters with ranking C  B  A. The preference ranking A  B  C
is called a positive preference ordering when this difference is positive. The net value restriction holds
when the positive net preference orderings satisfy Sen’s conditions. The net preference majority condition
is satisfied when more than 50% of the electorate reports the same preference ranking after canceling out
all opposite rankings. Regenwetter et al. (2006) extend this concept to the probabilistic context and prove
that the net value restriction and the net preference majority are necessary and sufficient conditions for the
absence of cycles. By construction, every real electorate that does not yield a cycle satisfies at least one
of these two conditions. However, similarly to Sen’s restrictions, those conditions do not yield probabilistic
predictions about voting rules’ outcomes. Therefore, by themselves they are not useful for understanding of
how frequently cycles appear or how often voting rules agree with each other.
So far this Section concentrated mainly on the incidence of the Condorcet paradox, leaving aside the
issue of agreement and disagreement between different voting rules. The reason is that the Condorcet rule is
often used as a theoretical benchmark, and the ability to reproduce the Condorcet winner is often viewed as
an additional virtue of a voting rule (this ability has a special name of Condorcet Efficiency). I think that it
is necessary first to examine the behavior of the benchmark rule and only then to proceed to the analysis of
agreement among the rules, especially because the occurrence of cycles in the Condorcet social order plays
an important role in the rates of this agreement in general.
Firstly, the presence of the Condorcet cycle on top of the social order automatically creates the case
when the objectively best alternative does not exist. Therefore, any voting rule that provides a single best
alternative disagrees with the Condorcet rule. Secondly, the famous notion of the conditional Condorcet
Efficiency carries the probability of cycles in it. In the next Section, I will evaluate and compare the
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Table 1.6: Theoretical Condorcet Efficiency of four major consensus methods.
Source Our Simulation Nurmi (1992)
Consensus Unconditional Unique Winner Conditional Conditional
Method Condorcet Proportion Condorcet Condorcet
Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency
Condorcet 0.748
Borda 0.634 0.989 0.854 0.86
Plurality 0.428 0.962 0.593 0.58
STV 0.601 0.887 0.903 0.89
Note: I report the unconditional and conditional Condorcet efficiencies, as well as the proportion of times
a unique winner existed, in 10,000 simulated profiles, for 5 candidates and 999 voters, under the assumption
of an Impartial Culture. Popov, Popova, Regenwetter (2013)
conditional and unconditional Condorcet Efficiencies.
1.1.3 The Condorcet Efficiency
In this Section, I evaluate the conditional and unconditional Condorcet Efficiency for the rules presented in
Section 1.1.
The theoretical literature of Social Choice puts the main emphasis on the so-called conditional Condorcet
Efficiency of a voting rule. The conditional Condorcet Efficiency is the rate of agreement between the voting
rule’s winner and the Condorcet winner (the two rules agree when a winner according to one rule coincides
with a winner according to the second rule), conditioned on each rule providing an unambiguous winner. Even
though the question of conditional agreement is important, it is necessary to keep in mind that the answer
depends heavily on the probability of a Condorcet cycle. Therefore, the notion of conditional Condorcet
Efficiency intertwines two different questions. One is, “How likely is the rule to agree with the Condorcet
rule?” The other is, “How likely is the Condorcet rule to provide a unique winner?” As I highlighted earlier,
the second question is nontrivial and can add unnecessary ambiguity to the understanding of Condorcet
Efficiency.
To decouple those two questions, I shift the focus toward the unconditional Condorcet Efficiency. This
is the total rate of agreement between the voting rule and the Condorcet rule. I again want to highlight
that it is important to calculate both statistics in order to get a good description of a rule’s ability to match
the Condorcet winner in different environments. I report and compare the conditional and unconditional
Condorcet Efficiency in Table 1.6 for four major voting rules we discussed in the previous sections.
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 1.6 report the simulated conditional and unconditional Condorcet Efficiency
for 5 candidates and 999 voters under the assumption of an Impartial Culture. In addition, column 3 reports
the probability that a unique winner exists. The simulated results closely match those reported by Nurmi
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(1992), presented in column 5. The rate of existence of an unambiguous Condorcet winner in column 3 also
agrees with the asymptotic result reported by Riker (1982), in which only 74.9% of profiles have a unique
Condorcet winner. The ubiquity of the Condorcet cycle, 25%, induces a substantial difference between
the values of conditional and unconditional Condorcet Efficiency. This difference varies depending on the
assumptions about the electorate. It increases along with the prevalence of the Condorcet paradox.
Regenwetter (2006, 2009) and Goodin (2001) proved that even a slight deviation from the assumption
of an Impartial Culture leads to dramatic changes in the frequency of Condorcet cycles and, consequently,
in the Condorcet Efficiency. In the theoretical cultures with unique and identical winners, both conditional
and unconditional Condorcet Efficiency converge to 100%. Therefore, for a better understanding of the rate
at which any other two rules agree on winners in general, and of Condorcet Efficiency of any given rule in
particular, it is important to distinguish three possible scenarios. In the first scenario, both rules provide an
unambiguous and identical winner. In the second scenario, one of the rules fails to provide an unambiguous
winner. In the last scenario, both rules provide unambiguous winners that do not match. Considering solely
a high value of the conditional Condorcet Efficiency as a characteristic of a rule, without analyzing all three
possible scenarios, can be misleading. For example, under the assumption of an Impartial Culture, the
conditional Condorcet Efficiency of the STV rule is 0.903, while the unconditional Condorcet Efficiency is
only 0.601. In the same environment, the conditional Condorcet Efficiency of the Borda rule is 0.854, while
the unconditional Condorcet Efficiency is 0.634. Hence, if one is interested in applying a rule that has a
higher rate of agreement with the Condorcet rule in a given environment, regardless of the reason why the
two rules may disagree, one could contemplate using the Borda rule as it has a higher rate of agreement
with the Condorcet rule than STV.
Similarly to the unconditional Condorcet Efficiency, we can calculate unconditional rates of agreement
for any pair of voting rules. I report the rates of agreement for four rules, for 5 candidates and 999 voters,
under the IC and the IAC assumption in Table 1.7. It is worth noting that the rates of agreement are low.
This corresponds to the overall pessimistic tone of the theoretical literature. Moreover, this fits in well with
the example of the hypothetical electorate that we discussed in the previous sections.
1.1.4 Conclusion
I have discussed the main trends and concepts in theoretical Social Choice pertaining to the properties of
voting rules. I illustrated potential caveats and paradoxes of Social Choice by applying four well-known
and heavily used voting rules to a hypothetical electorate. In this hypothetical example I demonstrated
that aggregation results can be extremely sensitive toward the choice of a voting rule. This agrees with
19
Table 1.7: Beyond Condorcet Efficiency: agreement between winners.
Impartial Culture Assumption
Condorcet Borda Plurality STV
Condorcet 0.748
Borda 0.634 0.989
Plurality 0.428 0.540 0.962
STV 0.601 0.619 0.489 0.887
Impartial Anonymous Culture Assumption
Condorcet Borda Plurality STV
Condorcet 0.748
Borda 0.636 0.996
Plurality 0.459 0.558 0.987
STV 0.648 0.667 0.576 0.962
Note: I report the unconditional rates at which two rules yielded unique and identical winners, in 10,000
simulated profiles, for 5 candidates and 999 voters, under the IC assumption (top panel) and the IAC
assumption (bottom panel).
The diagonal entries (given in italics) show how often a unique winner existed. Popov, Popova, Regenwetter
(2013)
the overall pessimistic tone of the theoretical Social Choice literature which suggests that democracy is
inevitably incoherent; and that even if voters do report their sincere preferences, the results of the elections
can be corrupted by the aggregation procedure. Depending on what procedure is applied in each case, the
outcome of the aggregation can be different.
Examples of these distortions, ubiquitous in the axiomatic literature, are illustrating that the result of an
election susceptible to rules’ manipulation is always questionable. Moreover, by appealing to impossibility
theorems and properties of a particular voting rule, we demonstrated that voting rules satisfying different
properties are incomparable with each other.
As the observed behavior of voting rules in real electorates does not match the predictions that the
popular theoretical models provide, in order to gain an insight into rates of occurrence of Social Choice
conundra in real-life we need a theory-driven model which can describe a real electorate in a more complex
and sophisticated way.
In Popova (2014), I bring important ideas developed in the area of Multidimensional Scaling and demon-
strate the way they can be employed to extend the standard core of the Social Choice models. In the next
section I provide a brief overview of these ideas.
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1.2 Combinatorial Data Analysis and Social Choice
The fields of Marketing, Psychology, Operational Research, and Statistics have, for a long time, been ex-
pressly interested in preference analysis in regard to types of combinatorial structures that may represent a
given data set. The immensity of the literature on combinatorial data analysis precludes me from giving a
thorough overview of its methods and applications. An excellent overview of the methods of combinatorial
data analysis can be found in Arabie and Hubert (1992) and Hubert and Arabie (2001). In this section,
I discuss several strands of literature that I find the most useful for solving the puzzles of Social Choice.
Within this extremely broad area, I build upon the ideas from at least three different directions of inquiry:
studies of individual differences, object classification, and studies of internal group structure. While all three
directions are addressed in detail in the literature and bring important insights to the area of Social Choice,
I will discuss the first direction separately and then address the other two, as I find them closely intertwined.
Individual differences in dissimilarity judgments.
Scholars have approached the analysis of individual preferences from a variety of angles, and have provided
solutions that work well in the areas of continuous domains of individual differences in dissimilarity judgments
— such as auditory, visual, and color perception — and interpersonal relations. Nevertheless, none of these
methods were specifically designed to accommodate data and to answer the questions of Social Choice. In
this section, I briefly discuss the most relevant methods in the literature that address individual differences
in dissimilarity judgments. I also discuss the way to apply these methods to the domain of Social Choice.
The first strand of literature that I would like to address starts with probabilistic, multidimensional
models of pairwise choice data, originally proposed in “vector model of preferences” by Slater (1960) and
Tucker (1960). In this model, subjects (people) and objects (options) of choice are represented in a continuous
space of attributes (features or characteristics of objects), with a limited number of continuous dimensions.
The observed frequencies of the choices made by the subjects are ‘combined’ with the data on the distances
between the objects of choice (in the space of observed attributes), in order to determine the relative
importance of the attributes and their effects on the perception of objects by the subject.
The probabilistic version of the vector model was proposed by Carroll (1980) and De Soete and Carroll
(1983), to be later generalized by De Soete and Carroll (1986). In this generalization, the vectors of subjects
are not deterministic; instead, they are drawn from the multivariate normal distribution. Then, each subject
prefers option A to option B with the same probability pA and prefers option B to option A with probability
1 − pA. There are two versions of this model: the wandering vector model and the wandering ideal point
model. The first two methods differ only as to the metric of distance in the space of attributes. While the
wandering vector model uses a projection of an object point on a vector of a subject, the wandering ideal
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point model employs Euclidian distance to the vector.
Both versions rely on two main assumptions: 1) Subjects are assumed to have identical probabilities to
choose one object over another for a given pair of objects. 2) Attributes of the objects are observable and
continuous. Thus, the probabilistic wandering vector model is applicable to populations in which we observe
attributes of the choice options and have a reason to assume homogeneity of preferences by the subjects.
Usually, in the domain of Social Choice both of these assumptions are problematic. First, subjects
(voters) are not identical, and it would not be natural to assume homogeneity of their preferences. Quite the
contrary, voters differ significantly and may have opposite opinions on the merits of the candidates. Second,
the standard way of using these models would require measuring additional variables that reflect information
regarding attributes of the objects. Even though qualitative information regarding attributes of the objects
(candidates) is indeed available, it would require additional ad hoc assumptions in order to transform it into
a quantitative format.
Another special case of the probabilistic version of the wandering vector model, the latent class approach,
was proposed by De Soete (1990). Unlike the first two cases, the latent class approach treats subjects as
non-homogeneous. It assumes that there are M homogenous latent classes (groups), and that each class is
described by the wandering vector model in the space of observed and continuous attributes. The intuition
of this model fits the nature of heterogeneous electorates, in which voters may support different parties
and where different groups can have drastically different preferences. The common way of using the latent
class model involves measuring additional variables (i.e., attributes of objects) that help estimate class
membership. If such information is available, the latent class model can facilitate our understanding of the
structure of electoral preferences.
Another strand of relevant literature is the “points of view” analysis (PVA) of Tucker and Messick
(1963) and its generalizations, including the extension of the model proposed by Tucker (1972), INDSCAL
put forward by Carroll and Chang (1970), their subsequent IDIOSCAL Carroll and Chang (1972), and other
related models.
The PVA approach employs a two-step procedure, the first of which is to perform a principal component
analysis of dissimilarity matrices of N subjects regarding K objects. The outcome of the first step gives
principal component scores in S dimensions, where S is the number of points of view. The second step is
to analyze each principal component (the projection of the subjects’ dissimilarity matrix onto each point
of view) separately, by applying multidimensional scaling in a general space of attributes. Generalizations
of the PVA approach (e.g., INDSCAL) analyze all points of view simultaneously in a common space of
attributes instead of applying multidimensional scaling separately to each point of view.
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This class of models can help elucidate the structure of the preferences of a population by grouping
subjects who have the same “point of view.” Even though the PVA approach allows subjects to support
different points of view, this method is not interested in the internal structure of the group; instead, it
focuses on the interpretation of the dimensional properties that enable the variability of points of view.
Additionally, the PVA method typically uses continuous similarity scores of objects expressed by the
subjects, and utilizes data on the attributes of the objects. In the domain of Social Choice, continuous
scores are rare: most of the time, the data are either ordinal or dichotomous. Pruzansky et al. (1982)
emphasizes that the method of grouping observations into classes should take into account the nature of the
data at hand. While spatial representations with Euclidean distances work for continuous domains, they
may not perform well in discrete domains. Thus, in order to apply standard cluster analysis in discrete space,
the second step of the PVA approach would need to be modified, or a transformation should be suggested
to translate the discrete domain into a continuous one.
Even though the existing models of individual differences in dissimilarity judgments were not designed
specifically for the domain of Social Choice, they do provide a valuable intuition regarding the properties
of a good model that explores individual and group preferences. First, the model should be probabilistic
and should address the issue of heterogeneity of subjects (voters) in the group. Second, the model should
accommodate ordinal and dichotomous data formats. Finally, a good model of electoral preferences should
be testable on available data, which is often restricted to solely the preferences of subjects with regard to a
set of objects in one dimension only.
Classification and internal group structure.
Clustering of binary/dichotomous data is a strand of literature particularly relevant to the area of Social
Choice. One branch of this literature studies discrete structures to solve problems of classifications, such as
additive trees models, partitions, and dendrograms (see among others Barthe´lemy et al., 1986, Day, 1986a,b,
De Boeck and Rosenberg, 1988, Mirkin, 1979). Most of the work in this area is applied to data that are
deterministic in nature; for this reason, this approach is widely used in genetics, biology, and axiomatic
group choice. Another extensive strand of literature devoted to combinatorial data analysis, known as
“mixture models,” goes hand in hand with the distribution-based cluster analysis approach that I build
upon in Popova (2014). Mixture models are probabilistic models that take into account the existence of
homogeneous subpopulations in a group (see among others MacLachlan and Peel, 2000, Titterington et al.,
1985). Each subpopulation is usually represented by a parametric continuous (e.g., Gaussian) or discrete
(e.g., Poisson) distribution. The parameters of the model are estimated by the maximum likelihood criterion,
for example using the Expectation-Maximization algorithm Dempster et al. (1977). These models possess
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some properties that make them especially attractive for the Social Choice domain. First, mixture models
are versatile and provide information about both the internal group structure and the number of groups.
Second, they benefit from the probabilistic nature of the data: Each subject does not necessarily need to
be assigned to one specific group. Finally, when I modify this approach to address properties of the Social
Choice domain (ordinal or dichotomous data), this approach can be used to study the structure of available
Social Choice data. I discuss modifications and additional assumptions I make in detail in Popova (2014).
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Chapter 2
Consensus with Oneself:
Within-Person Choice Aggregation in
the Laboratory
Abstract
Unfortunately, the decision sciences are segregated into nearly distinct academic societies and distinct research
paradigms. This intellectual isolationism has allowed different approaches to the decision sciences to suffer from
different, but important, conceptual gaps. Following earlier efforts to cross-fertilize individual and social choice
research, this paper applies behavioral social choice concepts to individual decision making.
Repeated individual choice among identical pairs of choice alternatives often fluctuates dramatically over even
very short time periods. Social choice theory usually ignores this because it identifies each individual with a single
fixed weak order. Behavioral individual decision research may expose itself to Condorcet paradoxes because it
often interprets a decision maker’s modal choice (i.e., majority choice) over repeated trials as revealing their “true”
preference. We investigate variability in choice behavior within each individual in the research lab. Within that
paradigm, we look for evidence of Condorcet cycles, as well as for the famed disagreement between the Condorcet
and Borda aggregation methods. We also illustrate some methodological complexities involved with likelihood ratio
tests for Condorcet cycles in paired comparison data.1
Key Words: Behavioral social choice, Borda score, Condorcet paradox, consensus among consensus meth-
ods, voting paradoxes, weak stochastic transitivity.
2.1 Introduction
The decision sciences are segregated and include two nearly distinct academic constituencies: Social Choice
theorists and individual decision researchers. Unfortunately, these two groups engage in very little interaction
and cross-fertilization. They meet at separate meetings and publish in separate journals. Yet, each of these
1This chapter is published as Regenwetter, M. and Popova, A. (2011). “Consensus with oneself: Within-person choice
aggregation in the laboratory.” In Herrera-Viedma, E., Garca-Lapresta, J., Kacprzyk, J., Fedrizzi, M., Nurmi, H., and Zadrozny,
S., editors, Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, volume 267.
25
research groups has much to offer to the other (see, e.g., Regenwetter et al., 2007a, for a related discussion).
For example, Social Choice theorists take it for granted that preferences vary across individuals and
they agonize over the possibility or impossibility of aggregating such preferences. Yet, behavioral decision
research aggregates individual choices as a matter of routine. The most frequent choice made among a
pair of objects, is called the modal choice. Much influential work in behavioral decision research tests
theories of individual decision making by focusing on the modal choices among multiple decision makers (e.g.,
Brandstaetter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig, 2006; and to some degree even the seminal work of Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979, and Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). By routinely testing individual decision theory against
interindividual modal choice behavior, behavioral decision research may expose itself to aggregation artifacts
such as the famous Condorcet paradox (Condorcet, 1785). Many researchers in individual decision making
have highlighted that even a single individual can fluctuate substantially in her choice among the exact same
choice alternatives when asked to make the same choice repeatedly, even over a short period of time. Some
of these researchers then proceed to aggregate an individual’s choices by majority rule, i.e., they focus on
the decision maker’s modal pairwise choices, apparently unconcerned about within-respondent Condorcet
paradoxes (e.g., the influential work of Tversky, 1969).
At the same time, by assuming that each individual has a fixed weak order preference, Social Choice
theory may unnecessarily create its own problems. When individual preferences are probabilistic, ballots
become random variables. This raises important issues of statistical confidence in election outcomes. The
problem is exacerbated when ballot casting is error prone (as examplified prominently in the 2000 Florida
recounts). With the exception of spatial model fitting and some econometric analyses, statistical issues
in the analysis and interpretation of empirical data, such as goodness-of-fit, hypothesis testing, inference,
confidence, and statistical replicability of Social Choice outcomes have essentially been a nontopic in Social
Choice theory.
A closely related major distinction between Social Choice theory and individual decision research is that
the latter has developed a full-fledged behavioral program that compares and contrasts rational choice theory
with actual choice behavior (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 2000). Such a program in Social Choice is still
in its infancy, with very few scholars systematically studying Social Choice procedures in the laboratory, on
survey data or on real ballot data. In addition, much early behavioral Social Choice research circumnavi-
gated the nontrivial methodological problems that are associated with behavioral research, such as the use
of statistical concepts and tools that permit scientifically sound inferences from empirical data (see, e.g.,
Regenwetter, 2009, Regenwetter et al., 2006a, 2009b, for a discussion).
In the empirical part of this paper, we show two applications of Social Choice concepts to individual
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decision research. First, we look for Condorcet cycles in data aggregated within a given person who made
repeated choices among gambles in the laboratory. This also illustrates a major methodological hurdle for
maximum likelihood based testing of Condorcet cyles. Second, we consider the famed disagreement between
Condorcet and Borda (going back to Borda, 1770, Condorcet, 1785), again on choice data aggregated within
each person.
2.2 Basic Concepts
Definition. Let C be a finite collection of choice alternatives. A binary relation R on C is a collection of
ordered pairs of objects in C, that is, R ⊆ C × C. Let IC = {(x, x) x ∈ C}, let R−1 = {(y, x)|(x, y) ∈ R}, and
let R¯ = (C × C) \R. A binary relation R on C is
asymmetric if R ⊆ R¯−1,
complete if R ∪R−1 ∪ IC = C × C,
strongly complete if R ∪R−1 = C × C,
transitive if RR ⊆ R,
negatively transitive if R¯R¯ ⊆ R¯.
A weak order is a transitive and strongly complete binary relation, and a strict weak order is an asymmetric,
and negatively transitive binary relation. A strict linear order is a transitive, asymmetric, and complete
binary relation.
In models of preference, it is natural to write (x, y) ∈ R as xRy and to read the relationship as “x is
preferred to (better than) y.” For related definitions and classical theoretical work on binary preference
representations, see, e.g., Fishburn (1979), Krantz et al. (1971), Roberts (1979).
Throughout this paper, we consider binary paired comparison data from psychological decision making
experiments (see Regenwetter et al., 2009a, 2010, Regenwetter and Davis-Stober, 2009, for a full description
of the experimental paradigms). Participants in these laboratory experiments make hundreds of decisions,
many of which are repetitions of a small set of pairwise choices, spread out over time throughout the
study. Each individual pairwise decision observation is called a trial of the experiment. In some cases, the
experiment uses a two-alternative forced choice paradigm, where the decision maker is offered two choice
alternatives on any given trial and asked (i.e., “forced”) to choose one of the two offered alternatives. In
some cases, the experiment uses a ternary paired comparison paradigm, where the decision maker is offered
27
two choice alternatives on any given trial and can either choose one of the two, or indicate indifference.
For simplicity and tractability, in this paper, we only analyze data from participants who never used the
indifference option in the ternary paired comparison paradigm. In all experiments, each pair of choice
alternatives was offered equally many times to the decision maker over the course of the experiment. Hence,
in all cases, we observe frequencies Nxy with which a person chose x over y, where Nxy +Nyx = N , the total
number of times that each pair was presented to the participant.
2.2.1 The Empirical Sample Space
We now review the statistical assumptions we make about the empirical sample space. We assume that, for
each individual, there exists an unkown probability Pxy that the individual chooses x over y at any given
moment. All the experiments we analyze have used decoys between related pairs of choice alternatives so
as to minimize the participants’ ability to recognize or remember earlier decisions. The decoys allow us
to assume that the observed binary choices among nondecoys are statistically independent. Because the
experiment typically takes only an hour or two, we further assume that the binary choice probabilities do
not change over time. As a consequence of these two assumptions about the data generating process, i.e.,
as a consequence of independent and identically distributed (iid) sampling assumptions, the quantities Nxy
form a system of independent binomial random variables, each with a known number N of repetitions and
with an unknown probability Pxy of choosing x over y.
2.2.2 The Condorcet Criterion
Definition. Consider a finite set C of choice alternatives and a system of probabilities Pxy for distinct
x, y ∈ C. A choice alternative x ∈ C is strictly majority preferred (i.e., strictly Condorcet preferred) to a
choice alternative y ∈ C, y 6= x, if and only if Pxy > 12 . A choice alternative x is a strict Condorcet winner if
and only if
Pxy >
1
2
, ∀y ∈ C, y 6= x. (2.1)
A strict Condorcet cycle occurs when Pxy > 1/2, Pyz > 1/2, Pzx > 1/2, for some selection of distinct
x, y, z ∈ C.
This definition of majority rule and of a Condorcet cycle is consistent with the more general framework
developed in Regenwetter et al. (2002c).
In Social Choice theory, where individual preferences are routinely assumed to be deterministic (strict)
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weak orders, treating Pxy as the probability that a randomly selected voter prefers x to y, the existence of
a Condorcet cycle is commonly referred to as a Condorcet paradox because individual decision makers have
transitive (weak order) preferences, whereas the aggregate preference relation is intransitive. This is often
interpreted to mean that rational individuals can make collectively irrational decisions.
2.2.3 What Can Social Choice Theory and Individual Decision Research
Teach Each Other About the Condorcet Paradox?
Suppose that C = {A,B,C}. Denote the strict linear order {(A,B), (B,C), (A,C)} by ABC and do likewise
for all other strict linear orders. Write ABCA for the cyclical binary relation {(A,B), (B,C), (C,A)}. Figure
2.1 gives a geometric illustration of the Condorcet paradox using the unit cube of joint Binomial probabilities
(PAB , PAC , PBC) ∈ [0, 1]3. In the upper left and bottom displays, the vertex labeled ABC with coordinates
(PAB , PAC , PBC) = (1, 1, 1) denotes the degenerate distribution where all probability mass is concentrated on
the linear order ABC. We consider first a situation in which we are sampling individuals from a population,
and where Pxy denotes the probability that such an individual prefers x over y. From that point of view, each
of the vertices ABC, BCA and CAB corresponds to a degenerate distribution where the entire electorate
is unanimous. The shaded triangle is the convex hull of these three vertices, and this is the collection of
all possible joint Binomal probabilities that can occur when the only possible individual preferences are the
linear orders ABC,BCA, and CAB.
The upper right display of Figure 2.1 shows the collection of joint Binomials that lead to the Condorcet
cycle ABCA. Geometrically, they form a half-unit cube attached to the vertex marked ABCA. Behavioral
decision researchers have discussed the possibility that individual decision makers may have cyclical prefer-
ences, themselves (e.g., Tversky, 1969). If, contrary to standard Social Choice theoretic assumptions, the
entire electorate had the unanimous cyclical preference ABCA, then the joint Binomials would be located
at that vertex. In that case, the Condorcet cycle would not be a voting paradox, since it would then be
representative of the population’s unanimously cyclical preferences.
The bottom display of Figure 2.1 shows the standard example of a Condorcet paradox, where one third
of the population has strict linear order ABC, one third of the population has preference BCA, and another
third has preference order CAB. This yields a Condorcet cycle, because PAB = PBC = PCA =
2
3 : Indeed,
the center of gravity of the vertices ABC,BCA,CAB lies in the interior of the half-unit cube associated
with the Condorcet cycle ABCA.
29
Figure 2.1: In each subgraph, (x, y) denotes the Binomial probability Px,y for distinct x, y ∈ C = {A,B,C}. Up-
per left: Binary choice probabilities if all voters have preferences ABC,BCA, or CAB, i.e., all possible binomial
probabilities consistent with probability distributions over {ABC,BCA,CAB}. The vertices ABC,BCA,CAB de-
note the three cases where voters are unanimous. Upper right: Binary choice probabilities that yield the majority
cycle ABCA. Bottom: Classical Condorcet paradox. The star denotes the binary choice probabilities induced by
a uniform distribution on {ABC,BCA,CAB}. This point, which is the center of gravity of the vertices marked
ABC,BCA,CAB, lies inside the half-unit cube associated with the majority cycle ABCA.
30
Figure 2.2 turns the Condorcet paradox on its head. Here (upper left), the population is made up entirely
of voters who either have preference orders BAC, ACB, or the cyclical preference ABCA. The Binomial
probabilities where Condorcet yields the linear order ABC are indicated on the upper right. The star in
the bottom display shows a special case of the upper left, where each of BAC,ACB,ABCA is held by one
third of the population. Here, the aggregate Condorcet outcome is the linear order ABC, a preference held
not even by a single individual. Arguably, one could label this situation a voting paradox.
While these observations may have some implications for Social Choice theory, we concentrate on the
important implications for behavioral individual decision research. Consider the fact that the choices of
a single individual fluctuate over repeated decisions. Tversky (1969) set out to show that some individ-
ual decision makers sometimes have intransitive individual preferences. Writing Pxy for the probability
that the individual chooses x over y on any given experimental trial, Tversky tackled variable choice data
from individual decision makers by identifying transitivity of individual preferences with “weak stochastic
transitivity,” which we define next.
Definition. Weak stochastic transitivity (see Block and Marschak, 1960, Luce and Suppes, 1965) is the
Null Hypothesis in the following test:
 H0 : ∀ (distinct) x, y, z ∈ C : [(Pxy ≥ 1/2) ∧ (Pyz ≥ 1/2)]⇒ (Pxz ≥ 1/2)HA : ∃ (distinct) x, y, z ∈ C : (Pxy ≥ 1/2) ∧ (Pyz ≥ 1/2) ∧ (Pxz < 1/2). (2.2)
In other words, by this criterion, preferences are transitive if modal choices are transitive. Up to the
difference between strict and weak inequality signs, the Alternative Hypothesis in this test states the exis-
tence of a Condorcet cycle in the individual choice probabilities. Figure 2.1 shows how a single individual,
who fluctuates in his preferences, could generate a Condorcet cycle, and, in fact, a Condorcet paradox.
Regenwetter et al. (2009b) gave an example of a decision maker who satisfies Cumulative Prospect Theory
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), but whose probability weighting function and utility function fluctuate.
This decision maker has a uniform distribution over instantaneous preference relations ABC, BCA, and
CAB. The decision maker’s preferences are strict linear orders, but her modal choices form a Condorcet cy-
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Figure 2.2: In each subgraph, (x, y) denotes the Binomial probability Px,y for distinct x, y ∈ C = {A,B,C}.
Upper left: Binary choice probabilities if all voters have preferences BAC,ACB, or ABCA, i.e., all possible binomial
probabilities consistent with probability distributions over {BCA,ACB,ABCA}. The vertices BCA,ACB,ABCA
denote the three cases where voters are unanimous. Upper right: Binary choice probabilities that yield the majority
order ABC. Bottom: “Reverse” Condorcet paradox. The star denotes the binary choice probabilities induced by
a uniform distribution on {BAC,ACB,ABCA}. This point, which is the center of gravity of the vertices marked
BAC,ACB,ABCA, lies inside the half-unit cube associated with the transitive majority order ABC.
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Figure 2.3: In each subgraph, (x, y) denotes the Binomial probability Px,y for distinct x, y ∈ C = {A,B,C}. Upper
left: Joint Binomial choice probabilities consistent with weak stochastic transitivity. Bottom right: Joint Binomial
choice probabilities violating weak stochastic transitivity.
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Figure 2.4: In each subgraph, (x, y) denotes the Binomial probability Px,y for distinct x, y ∈ C = {A,B,C}. Upper
left: The half-unit cube of joint Binomial probabilities that yield Condorcet social order ABC. Upper right: The
convex polytope of joint Binomial probabilities that yield Borda social order ABC. Bottom: The convex polytope of
joint Binomial probabilities that yield both Condorcet and Borda social order ABC. This polytope is the intersection
of the two polytopes above.
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Figure 2.5: In each subgraph, (x, y) denotes the Binomial probability Px,y for distinct x, y ∈ C = {A,B,C}. Upper
left: The convex polytope of joint Binomial probabilities that yield Condorcet winner A. Upper right: The convex
polytope of joint Binomial probabilities that yield Borda winner A. Bottom: The convex polytope of joint Binomial
probabilities that yield both Condorcet and Borda winner A. This polytope is the intersection of the two polytopes
above.
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cle. Figure 2.3 displays weak stochastic transitivity for the case where C = {A,B,C}. The Null Hypothesis
is displayed on the upper left, the Alternative Hypothesis is shown on the lower right.
Tversky (1969) and many scholars after him have operationalized individual intransitivity of preferences
as a violation of weak stochastic transitivity. Loomes and Sugden (1995) and more recently, Regenwetter
et al. (2010) and Regenwetter et al. (2009a), have pointed out that violations of weak stochastic transitivity by
individuals could be due to Condorcet paradoxes within respondents, and not necessarily indicate intransitive
preferences in those respondents. For more than a hundred data sets that use a two-alternative forced choice
paradigm, Regenwetter et al. (2010) and Regenwetter et al. (2009a) provided quantitative evidence for a
model according to which each individual’s preferences follow a (unknown) probability distribution over strict
linear orders. Most of these data sets were from experiments that were designed to demonstrate intransitive
preferences in individuals. This analysis boils down to testing whether Binomial probabilities are consistent
with the 10-dimensional convex polytope formed by the convex hull of the 120 vertices that correspond to
linear orders of the five choice alternatives. Likewise, Regenwetter and Davis-Stober (2009) showed that the
individual choice behavior of 30 respondents in a ternary paired comparison task is consistent with a model
according to which each individual’s preferences follow an (unknown) probability distribution over strict
weak orders. We will check some of these data for Condorcet cycles here. Should we find such evidence, this
could be evidence for within participant Condorcet paradoxes, not for individual intransitive preferences.
2.2.4 The Borda Score
Definition. Consider a finite set C of choice alternatives and a system of probabilities Pxy for distinct
x, y ∈ C. The Borda score of x ∈ C is
Borda(x) =
∑
y∈C
y 6=x
(
Pxy(T )− Pyx(T )
)
(2.3)
The Borda winner is the choice alternative with the highest Borda score. The Borda order is the overall
ordering of the choice alternatives by decreasing Borda score. This definition is in line with the general
definition in Regenwetter and Rykhlevskaia (2007) that built on an axiomatization by Young (1974).
Figure 2.4 shows the relationship between the Condorcet and Borda social orders in three dimensions.
The upper left display shows the joint Binomials that yield the Condorcet order ABC, whereas the upper
right shows the joint Binomials yielding that Borda order. The lower polytope is the intersection of the two
polytopes in the top. This is the collection of joint Binomials that yield ABC both by Condorcet and by
Borda aggregation. Figure 2.5 shows the same information, but focussing only on the winner (option A),
36
rather than the entire social order.
2.3 Behavioral Social Choice
Individual and Social Choice research areas generally engage in limited cross-fertilization. While Social
Choice theory has relied systematically on individual rational choice theory, e.g., through its wide use of
weak orders or of strict weak orders as descriptions of individual preferences, little work has incorporated
behavioral approaches. One of the rare fertile areas with active interaction between normative and descriptive
approaches is fair division and justice (Balinski and Young, 1982, Brams and Taylor, 1996, Kahneman et al.,
1986, Konow, 2008, Schokkaert and Devooght, 2003, Schokkaert and Lagrou, 1983).
2.3.1 The Condorcet Paradox
Much of Social Choice theory has focussed on the abstract axiomatic structure of aggregation methods
(e.g., Arrow, 1951, Black, 1958, Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1976b, Mueller, 2003, Riker, 1982, Saari, 1995, Sen,
1970, Tangiane, 1991). In particular, much of that literature has suggested that Condorcet cycles should be
ubiquitous (e.g., DeMeyer and Plott, 1970, Gehrlein, 1983, Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1976b, Jones et al., 1995,
Lepelley, 1993, McKelvey, 1979, Riker, 1982, Van Deemen, 1999).
Various scholars, including Feld and Grofman (1992) and Mackie (2003) questioned whether these pre-
dictions had empirical support. Regenwetter et al. (2006a) and its component predecessor papers developed
tools to evaluate the mathematical properties of Social Choice procedures on empirical behavioral data,
with a special emphasis on the Condorcet paradox. That project, as well as Regenwetter et al. (2007a)
and Regenwetter et al. (2007b) searched a broad range of empirical data sources for evidence of Condorcet
paradoxes. The only cases where they could not rule out the paradox were situations with statistical identi-
fiability problems or where statistical replicability was questionable. List and Goodin (2001), Regenwetter
et al. (2006a), Tangian (2000) and others also considered theoretical conditions that would eliminate the
paradox. Dryzek and List (2003) and List et al. (2007) suggested deliberation among decision makers as a
tool to avoid the paradox.
2.3.2 The Incompatibility of Consensus Methods
The theoretical Social Choice literature has highlighted impossibility theorems and the mutual incompati-
bility of Social Choice procedures that are based on different principles of consensus formation (e.g., Arrow,
1951, Mueller, 2003, Riker, 1982). Saari (1999, 2000a,b, 2001b) designed mathematical tools for constructing
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profiles with nearly any prespecified pattern of disagreements among consensus methods, when mathemati-
cally possible. Tangian (2000) discussed theoretical conditions that allow Condorcet and Borda to agree.
Empirically, Felsenthal et al. (1993), using 37 election data sets, provided evidence that a range of com-
peting Social Choice methods yielded very similar outcomes. Hastie and Kameda (2005) found dramatic
agreement among multiple consensus methods in computer simulations of a hunter-gatherer society. Re-
genwetter et al. (2006a) and its component papers, Regenwetter et al. (2007a), Regenwetter et al. (2007b),
and Regenwetter et al. (2009b) compared the outcomes of competing Social Choice procedures against each
other using a range of quantitative methods. In all cases, they found striking agreements between rival Social
Choice methods, especially near perfect consensus among Condorcet and Borda winners, as well as between
Condorcet and Borda losers (these were elections with five candidates). In some cases, these authors used
bootstrap methods to evaluate statistical confidence and usually found the statistical replicability of the
agreement to be very high.
2.4 Consensus with Oneself
For the rest of this paper, we will concentrate on aggregation within persons. Tversky (1969) studied eight
individuals who made pairwise choices among five lotteries. Each individual was offered each of the 10
distinct nonordered pairs 20 times over the course of the experiment, with repeated choice being separated
by decoys to avoid memory effects. Tversky interpreted a decision maker’s modal choice on a given pair of
lotteries as indicating that person’s “true” binary preference for that pair. He reported that the pattern
of modal choices was intransitive for six of the eight participants. We reanalyze Tversky’s data using a
quantitative maximum likelihood test of weak stochastic transitivity that redresses some methodological
problems faced by Tversky (1969) in his original study.
We repeat the same type of analysis for 54 data sets from 18 participants in three experimental conditions
of Regenwetter et al. (2010) and Regenwetter et al. (2009a), where, like in Tversky’s study, the respondent
had to make each decision 20 times in a two-alternative forced choice paradigm. Finally, we include an
analysis for 28 data sets from 13 different participants in Regenwetter and Davis-Stober (2009), where
each respondent had to make each decision 45 times over the course of the experiment, using a ternary
paired comparison paradigm. Here, we analyse only participants who never used the “indifference” option
in the ternary paired comparison task. For the data from Regenwetter et al. (2010) and Regenwetter and
Davis-Stober (2009), we also compare Condorcet and Borda outcomes for each individual. Here, we use a
bootstrap method similar to that of Regenwetter et al. (2009b) to quantify our confidence in the agreement
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or disagreement among Condorcet and Borda outcomes.
2.4.1 Likelihood Ratio Test of Weak Stochastic Transitivity
We now discuss the evaluation of Condorcet cycles in a full-fledged maximum likelihood framework. Figure
2.3 shows that neither the Null nor the Alternative Hypothesis is a convex set. Furthermore, both are full-
dimensional in the empirical outcome space. This means that a maximum likelihood test of weak stochastic
transitivity, and hence a maximum likelihood test of Condorcet cycles, is anything but a routine endeavor.
Writing ~N = (Nxy)x,y∈C,x6=y for the frequency vector of the number of times each x is chosen over each
y in N trials, and ~P = (Pxy)x,y∈C,x 6=y for the vector of binary choice probabilities, the likelihood function
Lik ~N,~P is
Lik ~N,~P = κ×
∏
(x,y)∈C×C
x6=y
PNxyxy , (2.4)
with κ a constant. (Note that we always have Nxy +Nyx = N and Pxy + Pyx = 1.)
Figure 2.3 displays the joint Binomials for three choice alternatives A,B,C. When there are five choice
alternatives, we are considering 10 Binomial parameters, i.e., the empirical sample space is a 10-dimensional
unit hypercube. Weak stochastic transitivity is a full-dimensional nonconvex union of 10-dimensional hy-
percubes of length 12 located at those vertices whose coordinates directly translate into linear orders (see
previous figures for 3D examples).
This insight goes back to Iverson and Falmagne (1985), who showed that the log-likelihood ratio test
statistic, G2, in a test of weak stochastic transitivity fails to follow an asymptotic χ2 distribution, because
point estimates typically lie at the boundary of the parameter space (namely on a face of a half-unit hypercube
inside the unit hypercube.) Tversky (1969) was aware of this problem, but lacked the technical tools to fix
it. Using a custom designed conservative test, Iverson and Falmagne (1985) concluded that all but one of
Tversky’s violations of weak stochastic transitivity were statistically nonsignificant.
Recently, general Bayesian and frequentist methods have become available to deal with such so-called
“order constrained inference” problems (Davis-Stober, 2009, Myung et al., 2005). Table 2.1 shows our
analysis summary of Tversky’s data for 8 respondents. Tversky (1969, Table 3, p. 36) reported that five
participants had p-values below .05. Using the algorithm of Davis-Stober (2009) we find three individuals
who violate weak stochastic transitivity significantly. This reflects that the algorithm of Davis-Stober (2009)
is not as conservative as that of Iverson and Falmagne (1985) who only found one significant violation. The
tests of Iverson and Falmagne (1985) and Davis-Stober (2009) accommodate the nonconvexity of H0 and
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HA, as well as the boundary problem, by leveraging the geometric shape of the parameter space around the
maximum likelihood point estimates. This implies that the goodness-of-fit statistic, G2, has an asymptotic
χ¯2 distribution that is a mixture of χ2 distributions. We include that distribution in Table 2.1 for our
analysis for each participant.
Regenwetter et al. (2010) found that all but Respondent 3 were consistent with a probability distribution
over linear order preferences. This means that Respondents 1 and 6 provide statistically significant evidence
for within-participant Condorcet paradoxes. These individuals’ choice proportions are consistent with linear
order preferences and with a within-respondent Condorcet cycle. Respondents 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8 are consistent
with linear order preferences and with linearly ordered modal (Condorcet) outcomes. Respondent 3 violates
the linear order model, but the technique of Regenwetter et al. (2010) and Regenwetter et al. (2009a) does
not allow us to infer that this person’s preferences were intransitive. In other words, we cannot tell, at this
point, whether we are dealing with a “reverse” Condorcet paradox like the one illustrated in Figure 2.2. As
Regenwetter et al. (2009a, 2010) discuss in detail, there are some complications in interpreting Tversky’s
data from a perspective of statistical significance, because Tversky (1969) collected data only on 8 out of
18 participants. The remaining 10 respondents were excluded from the experiment because they did not
appear to act sufficiently “intransitively” in a pretest.
Table 2.2 summarizes our reanalysis of the data collected by Regenwetter et al. (2010). That study
had three intervowen experimental conditions: “Cash I” was a replication of Tversky’s cash gamble choice
options, but with dollar amounts updated to contemporary equivalents, “Cash II” was a variation in which
all gambles had equal expected value, whereas “NonCash” denoted a condition with noncash prizes (for
details, see Regenwetter et al., 2010). We find a perfect fit of weak stochastic transitivity in 44 out of 54
cases. The column marked “Condorcet Paradox?” indicates whether we have evidence for a Condorcet
paradox in the sense that weak stochastic transitivity was violated while choices were nonetheless consistent
with linear order preferences: “No” means no evidence at all (because both weak stochastic transitivity
and the linear ordering model fit perfectly), whereas “n.s.” indicates statistically nonsignificant evidence
for a violation of weak stochastic transitivity. “No*” means that there was no evidence for a Condorcet
paradox, but that it is possible a (nonsignificant) “reverse Condorcet paradox” occured, because the linear
order model was nonsignificantly violated. “Reverse?” indicates a case where weak stochastic transitivity
holds but the linear order model is significantly violated, hence allowing for a potential “reverse Condorcet
paradox.” “Maybe” denotes unconclusive cases where weak stochastic transitivity is significantly violated,
but the linear order model is also (significantly or nonsignificantly) violated.
Note that this study did not prescreen participants as Tversky (1969) did. Hence, two significant vio-
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lations of weak stochastic transitivity out of 54 data sets, with a significance level of 5%, is just about the
number of violations we expect by Type I error. In other words, we have no reason to believe that weak
stochastic transitivity was violated in this study. Regenwetter et al. (2009a) analysed the same data with a
slightly different algorithm for determining the appropriate χ¯2 distributions and found one more significant
violation of weak stochastic transitivity.
Table 2.3 shows a similar analysis of the ternary paired comparison data collected by Regenwetter and
Davis-Stober (2009), concentrating only on data where respondents did not use the “indifference” option.
That paper used similar choice options as Regenwetter et al. (2010). Here, we find no significant violations
of weak stochastic transitivity at all. Overall, for all studies combined, because of the extremely infrequent
significant violations of weak stochastic transitivity, the evidence of any within-person Condorcet paradoxes
is, consequently, very weak.
2.4.2 Bootstrap Analysis: Within Person Consensus between Condorcet and
Borda Winners/Losers
Bootstrap methods provide a convenient tool for evaluating, through computer simulation, how a quantity
computed from empirical data would behave if small perturbations were to occur in the data (see, e.g.,
Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). This is particularly useful for intractable statistical problems. We use a
nonparametric bootstrap, in which we sample with replacement from the observed data. For each pair of
choice alternatives, we sample the same number of simulated observations as there were observations in the
actual experiment. We then recompute the Social Choice outcomes by Condorcet and by Borda. We use a
bootstrap with 1,000 simulated data sets for each participant. For brevity, we concentrate on unique winners
and unique losers under Condorcet and Borda.
We do not report on a bootstrap of Tversky’s original data. Recall that three respondents led to significant
violations of weak stochastic transitivity. In these data sets, there often is no unique Condorcet winner (due
to either an intransitivity or a tie) or no unique Borda winner (due to a tie). The same occurs for the losers.
Tables 2.4-2.6 summarize our analysis of the agreement among Condorcet and Borda outcomes in the
data of Regenwetter et al. (2010). Likewise, Tables 2.7-2.9 summarize the corresponding analysis for the data
of Regenwetter and Davis-Stober (2009). In all these tables, the first column lists the respondent ID. The
next column, marked “C.W. = B.W.” reports whether Condorcet and Borda yielded unique and identical
(Condorcet and Borda) winners. The column marked “C.L. = B.L.” reports whether Condorcet and Borda
yielded unique and identical (Condorcet and Borda) losers (by a loser, we mean a choice option that loses
against all other candidates). Boldfaced entries are cases where we observe a disagreement among Condorcet
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and Borda. Sometimes the data did not contain a unique winner (or loser) for one or both methods. We
indicate with “CC” when a Condorcet cycle prevented the existence of a unique Condorcet winner (or loser)
and with “CT” when there was a tie among more than one Condorcet winner (or loser). Likewise, “BT”
indicates a tied outcome for Borda for the winner (or loser). The column entitled “Confidence of agreement”
gives the bootstrap results for matching unique winners (losers). It reports the proportion of samples in
which the two outcomes in question matched (even if the outcomes did not match in the data). For example,
in the two-alternatives forced choice paradigm of Regenwetter et al. (2010), Respondent 1, Cash I, yielded
unique and identical winners in 91% of bootstrapped samples. Respondent 2, Cash II, yielded unique and
identical losers in 72% of bootstrapped samples (even though the observed Condorcet loser and Borda loser
did not match in the experiment). The last four columns show whether the winner by either consensus
method ever coincided with the loser by the other method. Throughout all our analyis, we never observed
the winner by one rule to match the loser by the other rule, either in the original data or in the tens of
thousands of bootstrapped samples, hence our confidence of disagreement is 1.0 throughout.
Notice that some violations of weak stochastic transitivity in Table 2.2 do not involve the winner or
loser, i.e., go hand in hand with agreement between Condorcet and Borda for the winner (loser) here. For
example, Respondent 4 shows a violation of weak stochastic transitivity in Cash I in Table 2.2. But there
is a unique Condorcet winner, the cycle involves only the other four choice alternatives. Hence, Table 2.4
shows a unique winner that matches the Borda winner, and a Condorcet cycle that prevents a unique loser
from existing in the data.
2.5 Conclusion
Tversky (1969) reported, what he believed to be statistically significant violations of weak stochastic tran-
sitivity within individual decision makers, and he concluded from those results that his Respondents 1 - 6
had intransitive individual preferences. There are two important caveats. 1) Decision makers who violate
weak stochastic transitivity could, nonetheless, have transitive preferences. This would mean that these
decision makers generate a Condorcet paradox within themselves. 2) Weak stochastic transitivity leads to
order constrained inference, where the log-likelihood ratio test statistic does not obey a χ2 distribution.
Regenwetter et al. (2009a, 2010) discuss this problem in detail. After revisiting the literature on intransitive
preferences and analyzing large amounts of individual decision making data, they conclude that individual
preferences do not appear to be intransitive.
We have considered weak stochastic transitivity from a Social Choice perspective, but within each person.
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Our results and those of Iverson and Falmagne (1985), as well as Regenwetter et al. (2009a), suggest that
violations of weak stochastic transitivity occur at a rate smaller than permitted by Type I error. In other
words, outside Tversky’s (1969) study with pre-selected participants, statistically compelling evidence for
violations is lacking. As an immediate consequence, the evidence for Condorcet paradoxes (where the
decision maker acts in accordance with linear order preferences, but also generates a cycle by modal choice)
is statistically weak. However, we would warn the reader not to misinterpret this to mean that modal choice
reveals the true (deterministic) preference of individual decision makers. Many of our respondents vary
substantially in their choices, often choosing one choice alternative over another only on, say, two thirds of
occasions.
We have further concluded that Condorcet and Borda yield the same unique winner and the same unique
loser with high statistical confidence, as established through a nonparametric bootstrap procedure. The
winner of Condorcet and the loser by Borda coincided not once in our 82,000 bootstrapped samples. The
same holds for Condorcet losers and Borda winners. As far as we can tell from these 82 data sets from our
laboratory, the famed disagreement among Condorcet and Borda does not appear to occur for choice data
that are aggregated within a person.
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Table 2.1: Reanalysis of all eight respondents in the first experiment of Tversky (1969). For each respondent, we
give the log-likelihood ratio (G2), the χ2 distribution and the p-value that Tversky (1969) originally reported in
his Table 3. We also provide the asymptotic χ¯2-distribution according to Davis-Stober (2009), the log-likelihood
ratio (G2) at the maximum likelihood estimate, and the p-value resulting from Davis-Stober’s state-of-the-art order
constrained test. Significant violations at a 5% significance level are marked in bold.
Tversky (1969) Using Davis-Stober’s (2009) method
Resp. G2 Asym. χ2 p-value G2 Asymptotic χ¯2 p-value
Distr. of G2 Distribution of G2
1 11.82 χ3 < .01 9.33 0.13 + .39χ
2
1 + .37χ
2
2 + .11χ
2
3 < .01
2 7.84 χ3 < .05 4.46 0.07 + .24χ
2
1 + .37χ
2
2 + .26χ
2
3 + .06χ
2
4 .125
3 6.02 χ2 < .05 6.03 .25 + .49χ
2
2 + .26χ
2
3 < .02
4 15.94 χ3 < .01 2.63 .13 + .37χ
2
1 + .35χ
2
2 + .15χ
2
3 .20
5 5.18 χ2 < .10 4.66 .06 + .27χ
2
1 + .37χ
2
2 + .25χ
2
3 + .06χ
2
4 .11
6 7.36 χ1 < .01 7.26 .12 + .38χ
2
1 + .37χ
2
2 + .13χ
2
3 .02
7 0.4 χ1 < .75 0.20 .22 + .51χ
2
1 + .27χ
2
2 .58
8 0 - perfect fit 0 - perfect fit
Table 2.2: Likelihood ratio test of weak stochastic transitivity for the two-alternative forced choice data of Regen-
wetter et al. (2010) using the algorithm of Davis-Stober (2009) to determine the asymptotic χ¯2 distribution of G2.
Significant violations at a 5% significance level are marked in bold. See the text for explanations.
Cash I (Tversky Replication) Cash II Noncash
Resp. G2 p-value Condorcet G2 p-value Condorcet G2 p-value Condorcet
Paradox? Paradox? Paradox?
1 0 perfect fit No 6.03 .04 Maybe 0 perfect fit No
2 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No*
3 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No*
4 7.91 < .01 Maybe 0 perfect fit No* 0 perfect fit No
5 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No
6 0.2 .53 n.s. 1 .45 n.s. 0 perfect fit No
7 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No*
8 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No
9 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No
10 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No* 0 perfect fit No
11 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No* 0 perfect fit No
12 0.4 .61 n.s. .2 .32 n.s. 0 perfect fit No
13 0.6 .68 n.s. 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No
14 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No*
15 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No
16 0 perfect fit Reverse? 2.63 .13 Maybe 0 perfect fit No*
17 2.42 .31 n.s. 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No
18 0 perfect fit No 3.03 .23 n.s. 0 perfect fit No*
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Table 2.3: Likelihood ratio test of weak stochastic transitivity for ternary paired comparison data of Regenwetter
and Davis-Stober (2009) using the algorithm of Davis-Stober (2009) to determine the asymptotic χ¯2 distribution of
G2. Blank cells are omitted cases, where the respondents used the “indifference” response category once or more.
Cash I Cash II Noncash
Resp. G2 p-value Condorcet G2 p-value Condorcet G2 p-value Condorcet
Paradox? Paradox? Paradox?
1 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No
2 0 perfect fit No .78 .50 n.s. 0 perfect fit No*
3 0 perfect fit No*
6 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No
7 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No
8 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No
10 0 perfect fit No
11 0 perfect fit No
12 0 perfect fit No
13 0 perfect fit No 0 perfect fit No
17 0 perfect fit No
19 .22 .87 n.s.
23 0 perfect fit No*
24 0 perfect fit No
27 0 perfect fit No
28 0 perfect fit No
29 .02 .45 n.s. 0 perfect fit Reverse? 0 perfect fit No
Table 2.4: Bootstrap analysis of the agreement among Condorcet and Borda for two-alternative forced choice from
Cash I of Regenwetter et al. (2010). See the text for explanations.
Resp. C.W. Confidence C.L. Confidence C.L. Confidence C.W. Confidence
= of = of = of = of
B.W. agreement B.L. agreement B.W. disagreement B.L. disagreement
1 Yes 0.91 Yes 0.78 No 1.0 No 1.0
2 Yes 0.96 No 0.72 No 1.0 No 1.0
3 Yes 1.00 Yes 0.99 No 1.0 No 1.0
4 Yes 1.00 CC 0.58 No 1.0 No 1.0
5 Yes 1.00 Yes 0.99 No 1.0 No 1.0
6 Yes 0.93 CC 0.70 No 1.0 No 1.0
7 Yes 0.98 Yes 0.97 No 1.0 No 1.0
8 Yes 1.00 Yes 0.95 No 1.0 No 1.0
9 Yes 0.82 Yes 0.81 No 1.0 No 1.0
10 Yes 0.94 Yes 0.99 No 1.0 No 1.0
11 Yes 1.00 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
12 CC 0.82 Yes 0.79 No 1.0 No 1.0
13 CC 0.82 BT 0.73 No 1.0 No 1.0
14 Yes 1.00 Yes 0.99 No 1.0 No 1.0
15 Yes 0.82 Yes 0.91 No 1.0 No 1.0
16 Yes 0.98 Yes 0.91 No 1.0 No 1.0
17 CC 0.64 CC 0.71 No 1.0 No 1.0
18 Yes 0.73 No 0.85 No 1.0 No 1.0
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Table 2.5: Bootstrap analysis of the agreement among Condorcet and Borda for two-alternative forced choice from
Cash II of Regenwetter et al. (2010). See the text for explanations.
Resp. C.W. Confidence C.L. Confidence C.L. Confidence C.W. Confidence
= of = of = of = of
B.W. agreement B.L. agreement B.W. disagreement B.L. disagreement
1 CC 0.79 No 0.60 No 1.0 No 1.0
2 Yes 0.99 Yes 0.83 No 1.0 No 1.0
3 Yes 0.98 Yes 0.90 No 1.0 No 1.0
4 Yes 0.98 Yes 0.82 No 1.0 No 1.0
5 Yes 0.98 Yes 0.95 No 1.0 No 1.0
6 CC 0.79 CC 0.71 No 1.0 No 1.0
7 Yes 1.00 Yes 0.88 No 1.0 No 1.0
8 Yes 0.99 Yes 0.99 No 1.0 No 1.0
9 Yes 0.90 Yes 0.80 No 1.0 No 1.0
10 Yes 0.89 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
11 Yes 1.00 Yes 0.97 No 1.0 No 1.0
12 CC, BT 0.70 Yes 0.80 No 1.0 No 1.0
13 CT 0.71 CT 0.71 No 1.0 No 1.0
14 Yes 1.00 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
15 Yes 0.99 CT 0.72 No 1.0 No 1.0
16 CC, BT 0.73 CC 0.74 No 1.0 No 1.0
17 Yes 0.92 Yes 0.89 No 1.0 No 1.0
18 CC 0.65 CC 0.68 No 1.0 No 1.0
Table 2.6: Bootstrap analysis of the agreement among Condorcet and Borda for two-alternative forced choice from
NonCash of Regenwetter et al. (2010). See the text for explanations.
Resp. C.W. Confidence C.L. Confidence C.L. Confidence C.W. Confidence
= of = of = of = of
B.W. agreement B.L. agreement B.W. disagreement B.L. disagreement
1 Yes 1.00 No 0.74 No 1.0 No 1.0
2 Yes 0.92 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
3 Yes 1.00 Yes 0.75 No 1.0 No 1.0
4 Yes 1.00 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
5 Yes 1.00 Yes 0.98 No 1.0 No 1.0
6 Yes 1.00 Yes 0.99 No 1.0 No 1.0
7 Yes 1.00 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
8 Yes 0.79 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
9 Yes 0.79 Yes 0.86 No 1.0 No 1.0
10 Yes 1.00 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
11 Yes 0.93 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
12 Yes 1.00 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
13 Yes 0.83 Yes 0.45 No 1.0 No 1.0
14 Yes 1.00 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
15 Yes 1.00 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
16 Yes 1.00 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
17 Yes 0.99 Yes 0.59 No 1.0 No 1.0
18 Yes 1.00 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
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Table 2.7: Bootstrap analysis of the agreement among Condorcet and Borda for ternary paired comparison data
from the Cash I condition of Regenwetter and Davis-Stober (2009). See the text for explanations.
Resp. C.W. Confidence C.L. Confidence C.L. Confidence C.W. Confidence
= of = of = of = of
B.W. agreement B.L. agreement B.W. disagreement B.L. disagreement
1 Yes 0.99 Yes 0.73 No 1.0 No 1.0
2 Yes 1.00 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
6 Yes 1.00 Yes 0.86 No 1.0 No 1.0
7 Yes 0.87 Yes 0.91 No 1.0 No 1.0
8 Yes 0.97 No 0.75 No 1.0 No 1.0
11 Yes 1.00 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
12 Yes 0.98 Yes 0.99 No 1.0 No 1.0
13 Yes 1.00 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
23 Yes 0.94 No 0.77 No 1.0 No 1.0
24 Yes 0.69 Yes 0.72 No 1.0 No 1.0
29 CC 0.70 CC 0.75 No 1.0 No 1.0
Table 2.8: Bootstrap analysis of the agreement among Condorcet and Borda for ternary paired comparison data
from the Cash II condition of Regenwetter and Davis-Stober (2009). See the text for explanations.
Resp. C.W. Confidence C.L. Confidence C.L. Confidence C.W. Confidence
= of = of = of = of
B.W. agreement B.L. agreement B.W. disagreement B.L. disagreement
1 Yes 0.83 Yes 0.95 No 1.0 No 1.0
2 Yes 1.00 Yes 0.71 No 1.0 No 1.0
3 Yes 1.00 Yes 0.79 No 1.0 No 1.0
6 Yes 1.00 Yes 0.79 No 1.0 No 1.0
7 Yes 0.91 No 0.76 No 1.0 No 1.0
8 Yes 0.56 No 0.78 No 1.0 No 1.0
10 Yes 0.99 Yes 0.99 No 1.0 No 1.0
13 Yes 1.00 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
17 Yes 0.99 No 0.72 No 1.0 No 1.0
19 Yes 0.81 CC 0.67 No 1.0 No 1.0
27 Yes 1.00 Yes 0.93 No 1.0 No 1.0
28 Yes 0.84 Yes 0.75 No 1.0 No 1.0
29 Yes 0.92 Yes 0.81 No 1.0 No 1.0
Table 2.9: Bootstrap analysis of the agreement among Condorcet and Borda for ternary paired comparison data
from the Noncash condition of Regenwetter and Davis-Stober (2009). See the text for explanations.
Resp. C.W. Confidence C.L. Confidence C.L. Confidence C.W. Confidence
= of = of = of = of
B.W. agreement B.L. agreement B.W. disagreement B.L. disagreement
2 Yes 0.86 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
6 Yes 0.69 Yes 1.00 No 1.0 No 1.0
8 Yes 0.94 Yes 0.70 No 1.0 No 1.0
29 Yes 0.95 Yes 0.99 No 1.0 No 1.0
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Chapter 3
A Behavioral Perspective on Social
Choice
Abstract
We discuss what behavioral social choice can contribute to computational social choice. An important trademark
of behavioral social choice is to switch perspective away from a traditional sampling approach in the social choice
literature and to ask inference questions: Based on limited, imperfect, and highly incomplete observed data, what
inference can we make about social choice outcomes at the level of a population that generated those observed data?
A second important consideration in theoretical and behavioral work on social choice is model dependence: How
do theoretical predictions and conclusions, as well as behavioral predictions and conclusions, depend on modeling
assumptions about the nature of human preferences and/or how these preferences are expressed in ratings, rankings,
and ballots of various kinds? Using a small subcollection from a Netflix Prize dataset, we illustrate these notions
with real movie ratings from real raters. We highlight the key roles that inference and behavioral modeling play in
the analysis of such data. The social and behavioral sciences can provide a supportive role in the effort to develop
behaviorally meaningful and robust studies in computational social choice.1
Key Words:Behavioral Social Choice, Consensus Methods, Inference, Model Dependence, Voting Para-
doxes.
3.1 Introduction
Voting rules and Social Choice methods have been used for centuries in order to reach collective decisions.
Increasingly, in computer science, data collection and reasoning systems are moving towards distributed and
multi-agent design paradigms (Shoham and Leyton-Brown, 2009). With this design shift comes the need to
aggregate the (possibly disjoint) observations and preferences of individual agents into an overall partial or
1This chapter is published as Popova, A., Regenwetter, M., and Mattei, N. (2012). A behavioral perspective on social choice.
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 68:5-30.
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complete ordering in order to synthesize knowledge and data.
One of the most common methods of preference aggregation and group decision making in human systems
is voting. Many societies, both throughout history and across the planet, use voting to arrive at collective
decisions on a range of topics from deciding what to have for dinner in a small group to declaring war as a
nation. Unfortunately, mathematical results in the field of Social Choice prove that there is no perfect voting
system and, in fact, voting systems can succumb to a host of problems. Arrow’s Theorem demonstrates that
any preference aggregation scheme for three or more alternatives will fail to meet a set of simple fairness
conditions (Arrow, 1963). Each voting method violates one or more properties that most would consider
important for a voting rule, such as non-dictatorship (see, e.g., Chamberlin et al., 1984, Felsenthal and Maoz,
1993, Tideman, 2006). Similarly, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem implies that every non-dictatorial
voting rule is manipulable (Gibbard, 1973, Satterthwaite, 1975). Moreover, one can easily create an example
illustrating how competing voting rules can disagree on winners, losers, and social orders. Questions about
voting and preference aggregation have circulated in the mathematics and Social Choice communities for
centuries (Arrow et al., 2002, Condorcet, 1785, Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1978, Nurmi, 1983, Saari, 1994).
Many scholars wish to study how often and under what conditions individual voting rules fall victim to
violations of various voting laws and axioms (Chamberlin et al., 1984, Felsenthal and Maoz, 1993). Due
to a lack of large, accurate datasets, many computer scientists, economists, and political scientists have
turned towards statistical distributions to generate election scenarios in order to benchmark and analyze
voting rules and other decision procedures (Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1976b, Riker, 1982, Rivest and Shen,
2010, Walsh, 2010). Commonly used theoretical assumptions about the distribution of preferences in the
electorate such as the Impartial Culture assumption, IC (Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1976b) and the Impartial
Anonymous Culture assumption, IAC, (Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1976a), are extreme symmetry assumptions
that represent maximum disagreement among voters. These knife edge distributions lead to pessimistic
(and arguably even nonsensical) predictions about voting rules (Gehrlein, 1983, Gehrlein and Lepelley,
2000, Riker, 1982) which, in turn, can lead to questionable policy recommendations. For instance, some
scholars have concluded one should minimize turnout and minimize the number of candidates running for
office, if decisions are to be reached by majority rule (Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997). By and large, these
approaches take a sampling, not an inference, perspective on Social Choice.
Another famous but problematic theoretical benchmark is the notion of Condorcet efficiency (the prob-
ability that a voting rule’s winner matches the “Condorcet” winner, given that one exists.) A candidate
who can beat all other candidates in pairwise elections (the Condorcet winner) remains a cornerstone in
the normative Social Choice literature. Low Condorcet efficiency under IC and IAC exacerbates the gloomy
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predictions from the axiomatic literature about the inability of an electorate to arrive at a group decision
(Gehrlein, 1985, 1992, Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1978, Gehrlein and Lepelley, 2000). These statistical models
may or may not be grounded in reality and it is an open problem in both the political science and Social
Choice fields as to how, exactly, election data may be modeled realistically (Regenwetter and Grofman,
1998a, Regenwetter et al., 2006b, 2007a, Tideman and Plassmann, 2012).
A fundamental problem in empirical and behavioral research into properties of voting rules is the lack of
large data sets to run empirical studies (Regenwetter et al., 2006b, Tideman and Plassmann, 2012). There
have been studies of several distinct datasets but these are limited in both number of elections analyzed
(Chamberlin et al., 1984, Regenwetter et al., 2002c) and size of individual elections within the datasets
analyzed (Felsenthal and Maoz, 1993, Niemi, 1970, Tideman and Plassmann, 2012). While it is too early
to judge the frequency with which different voting paradoxes occur in general, or to judge the consensus
between voting methods in general, the existing studies so far (Regenwetter, 2009, Regenwetter et al., 2006b,
2009b) have found little evidence of a cyclical majority ordering, Condorcet’s Voting Paradox, (Gehrlein,
2002, Mackie, 2003). At the same time, preference domain restrictions such as single peakedness (Black,
1948, Faliszewski et al., 2009a, Regenwetter et al., 2006b, 2009b), where one candidate out of a set of three is
never ranked last, which is a sufficient conditional to eliminate the Condorcet paradox, also did not account
well for real data. Additionally, most of the studies have found a strong consensus between most voting
rules except Plurality (Chamberlin et al., 1984, Felsenthal and Maoz, 1993, Regenwetter et al., 2006b).
3.2 What is Behavioral Social Choice?
The supreme goal of behavioral Social Choice is to investigate Social Choice procedures empirically while
avoiding unnecessary and/or unsubstantiated assumptions about human behavior. It is critical, in any
fully rigorous behavioral paradigm, that all assumptions about human behavior be stated as explicitly as
possible. Ideally, any such assumptions should be tested for their validity. Untested assumptions require
especially strong motivation and/or scrutiny. In this spirit, a first step in behavioral Social Choice is to
define individual voter preferences in a general and flexible fashion, and then define consensus methods at a
level that is applicable to such general definitions of preference. Our first definition introduces mathematical
concepts and terminology as given by Roberts (Roberts, 1979), and as commonly used by U.S. scholars (but
not as routinely used by European scholars, due to language differences).
Definition: Let C be a finite set of choice alternatives or candidates. A binary (preference) relation R
on C is a collection of ordered pairs of elements of C, i.e., R ⊆ C × C. We also write xRy for (x, y) ∈ R.
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If R and S are two (binary) relations on C, we write RS = {(z, y) ∈ C × C : ∃x ∈ C, zRx, xSy}. Let
R−1 = {(x, y) ∈ C × C : yRx}, R = (C × C) \R, and IdC = {(c, c) : c ∈ C}. A binary relation R on C is
complete if R ∪R−1 ∪ IdC = C × C,
asymmetric if R ∩R−1 = ∅,
negatively transitive if R R ⊆ R,
transitive if RR ⊆ R.
A strict partial order is an asymmetric and transitive binary relation. An interval order is a strict partial
order R with the property that RR−1R ⊆ R. A semiorder is an interval order R with the property that
RRR−1 ⊆ R. A strict weak order is an asymmetric and negatively transitive binary relation. A strict
linear order is a transitive, asymmetric, and complete binary relation. If we replace “strict preference” by
“preference or indifference” then a strict partial/weak/linear order becomes a “partial/weak/linear order.”
We will assume asymmetric (“strict”) preference without loss of generality.
Much of the Social Choice literature assumes that individual preferences are (strict) linear orders or
(strict) weak orders. Within the field of computational Social Choice there is some use of other information
models, specifically (strict) partial orders, where questions of winner determination (Xia and Conitzer, 2011)
and manipulation (Conitzer et al., 2011) have been addressed. There has also been some work on winner
determination and manipulation when voters express probabilities over their preferences (Erde´lyi et al., 2009,
Hazon et al., 2012). However, despite these forays into more complex information models, the bulk of the
work in computational Social Choice still assumes that strict linear orders are either available, or that they
are at least reasonable hypothetical constructs even if not directly observable. The goal of this paper to
highlight, by providing additional references and concrete examples, the pitfalls that may befall scholars,
e.g., in computational Social Choice, as they move from the theoretical to the empirical.
A “profile” in classical voting theory is typically a mapping from the set of individual preferences into the
natural numbers, i.e., a vector of voter frequencies or proportions indexed by the appropriate set of binary
preferences, such as strict linear orders. We will generalize that definition to include a range of behaviorally
important applications. First, it seems reasonable to assume asymmetry because it simply captures “strict”
preference (as opposed to “preference or indifference”). The two key generalizations are that preferences
can be any asymmetric binary relations of any kind, and that we move from frequencies (or proportions) of
binary relations to probabilities of binary relations.
Definition: Let C be a finite set of choice alternatives or candidates. Let R denote the collection of all
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asymmetric binary relations on C. A profile P is a probability distribution over R:
P : R → [0, 1]
R 7→ P (R).
The classical model where a profile is viewed as proportions of people who hold various strict weak orders is
a special case concentrating all probability mass on strict weak orders and where P is just interpreted as a
probability measure representing proportions.
In order to define a broad range of consensus methods, such as, e.g., “scoring rules,” for such general
representations of preferences, we need a mathematical concept of numerical ranks that applies to the
general representation. We define the “generalized rank” first axiomatized and discussed in Regenwetter
and Rykhlevskaia (2004).
Definition: Let C be a finite set of n many choice alternatives, i.e., |C| = n. The differential ∆R(c) of any
element c ∈ C with respect to a binary relation R ⊆ C × C is
∆R(c) = |{a ∈ C : (a, c) ∈ R}| − |{b ∈ C : (c, b) ∈ R}|.
The generalized rank RankR(c) of c with respect to R is given by
RankR(c) =
n+ 1 + ∆R(c)
2
.
Note that generalized ranks are multiples of 12 . For strict linear orders, they are the usual integer valued
ranks associated with complete rankings without ties. Also, note that, still with |C| = n,
RankR(c) = 1⇔ [(c, b) ∈ R,∀b ∈ C, b 6= c]
and
RankR(c) = n⇔ [(a, c) ∈ R,∀a ∈ C, a 6= c].
In other words, a candidate has generalized rank 1 if it is strictly preferred to all other candidates, and an
option has generalized rank n if all other options are strictly preferred to it. We will utilize the concept of
generalized rank both at the individual preference level and at the social welfare level.
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We are now ready to define the five Social Choice procedures we will consider here, Condorcet, Borda,
Plurality, Antiplurality, and Plurality Runoff, for general representations of preferences. The definitions
of Condorcet, Borda, Plurality, and Antiplurality are from Regenwetter et al. (2002c), Regenwetter and
Rykhlevskaia (2007), the definition of Plurality Runoff is new.
Definition: Let P be a profile on the collection R of binary relations on a finite set C of choice alternatives
with |C| = n. Let c, d ∈ C. Condorcet is a pairwise comparison procedure:
c is Condorcet preferred to d⇔
∑
R∈R
(c,d)∈R
P (R) >
∑
R′∈R
(d,c)∈R′
P (R′).
Borda, Plurality, and Antiplurality are scoring rules in that they assign scores to choice alternatives as
a decreasing function of their generalized ranks in an individual’s preference:
Borda(c) =
∑
R∈R
P (R) [n−RankR(c)],
P lurality(c) =
∑
R∈R
RankR(c)=1
P (R),
Antiplurality(c) =
∑
R∈R
RankR(c)=n
P (R).
To derive the pairwise preferences for Borda, Plurality, and Antiplurality, we only need to compare scores:
c is Borda preferred to d ⇔ Borda(c) > Borda(d),
c is Plurality preferred to d ⇔ Plurality(c) > Plurality(d),
c is Antiplurality preferred to d ⇔ Antiplurality(c) < Antiplurality(d).
A winner under Plurality Runoff first requires that there must be a unique set of two candidates, say
{x, y} ⊆ C, such that x and y are the two options with the highest plurality scores. If such a set exists, then
x is Plurality Runoff winner if
∑
R∈R
(x,y)∈R
P (R) >
∑
R′∈R
(y,x)∈R′
P (R′),
y is Plurality Runoff winner if
∑
R∈R
(x,y)∈R
P (R) <
∑
R′∈R
(y,x)∈R′
P (R′).
In all other cases, Plurality Runoff yields no winner.
Prior work on behavioral Social Choice has used such generalized definitions, as well as similarly general
definitions for various “utility” and “random utility” representations, to compute Social Choice outcomes
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from a variety of empirically generated inputs.
In earlier work, a number of papers (Chamberlin et al., 1984, Felsenthal and Maoz, 1993, Regenwetter
et al., 2002a, Regenwetter and Grofman, 1998a,b, Regenwetter et al., 2002b, 2006b, 2002c, 2003, Regenwetter
and Tsetlin, 2004, Tsetlin and Regenwetter, 2003, Tsetlin et al., 2003) considered general definitions of
Condorcet and investigated the empirical prevalence of Condorcet cycles, e.g., where A is Condorcet preferred
to B, B is Condorcet preferred to C and C is Condorcet preferred to A. They investigated approval voting
ballots from which they inferred probability distributions over strict linear orders (Chamberlin et al., 1984,
Felsenthal and Maoz, 1993, Regenwetter and Grofman, 1998a,b, Regenwetter et al., 2006b, Regenwetter and
Tsetlin, 2004). They also analyzed various national election survey data from France, Germany, and the
United States, where they interpreted numerical ratings of candidates as strict weak orders or as semiorders
(Regenwetter et al., 2002a,b, 2006b). This literature found virtually no evidence for Condorcet cycles in
empirical data. They also compared Condorcet and Borda outcomes for strict linear order preferences
inferred from approval voting ballots and concluded that Condorcet and Borda led to virtually identical
outcomes. More recently, behavioral Social Choice researchers have found different consensus methods,
such as Condorcet, Borda, and Plurality, to agree with each other extensively, especially on candidates
with generalized rank 1 or generalized rank n, out of n candidates, (Regenwetter, 2009, Regenwetter et al.,
2009b, 2007a,b). All of the empirical studies surveyed (Chamberlin et al., 1984, Felsenthal and Maoz,
1993, Niemi, 1970, Regenwetter et al., 2006b, 2007b, Tideman and Plassmann, 2012) came to a similar
conclusion: there is scant evidence for occurrences of Condorcet’s Paradox (Nurmi, 1983). Many of these
studies find no occurrence of majority cycles (and those that find cycles find them in fewer than 1% of
elections). Additionally, each of these (with the exception of Niemi and his study of university elections,
which he observes is a highly homogeneous population Niemi (1970)) find almost no occurrences of either
single-peaked preferences (Black, 1948) or the more general value-restricted preferences (Regenwetter et al.,
2006b, Sen, 1966).
Two important concepts have become prominent in prior behavioral Social Choice analyses:
1. Inference: When investigating Social Choice outcomes on empirical data, one should evaluate how
‘confident’ on can be about finding the ‘correct’ outcomes if one thinks of the data as imperfect and
incomplete reflections of the electorate’s preference profile. So far, the main tools for evaluating the sta-
tistical confidence or replicability of Social Choice outcomes have been a Bayesian inference framework
(Regenwetter et al., 2006b, Regenwetter and Rykhlevskaia, 2007) and a bootstrap approach (Regen-
wetter, 2009, Regenwetter et al., 2009b, 2007b). In the bootstrap, one samples N many observations
with replacement from an original data set of N many observations and records the outcomes of the
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Social Choice procedures of interest. In our analysis for the results section, we used a pseudo-random
sampling procedure in MATLAB to draw such bootstrap samples of size N each. We repeated this
process 10,000 times to check what proportion of 10,000 bootstrap samples replicated the social order
found in the original data set. The larger the number of bootstrap samples that match a result in the
original profile, the higher the confidence in and replicability of the finding in the original profile. The
idea behind the bootstrap is to quantify how resilient the Social Choice outcome is to perturbations
in the data. Prior analyses of empirical data with these inference tools have suggested that Condorcet
paradoxes can be ruled out with high replicability and that different Social Choice procedures agree
with each other on the winner and loser with high replicability.
2. Model Dependence: Theoretical and empirical analyses of Social Choice rules can depend to various
degrees on the modeling assumptions about individual preferences. In the behavioral analyses we
have cited Regenwetter (2009), Regenwetter et al. (2009b, 2007a,b), the common finding was that
the election winners and social orders often depended on modeling assumptions, but the absence of a
Condorcet paradox and the agreement among consensus methods did not hinge on a specific model
being used.
The rest of this paper offers an illustration of behavioral Social Choice on new data. We will see whether
the earlier inference and model dependence findings appear to extend readily to the much sparser data sets
of the Netflix Prize. We will see that the picture for the Netflix data will be more complicated.
3.3 Netflix Data
We have extracted consumer ratings from the Netflix Prize dataset (Bennett and Lanning, 2007). Netflix
is a company based in the USA where users pay a flat monthly fee and either receive DVD’s by mail or
have video content delivered over the web. A central component of the Netflix service is its recommendation
engine. Netflix encourages users to submit ratings (between 1 and 5 stars) of the movie they have just
watched or of any other movies, e.g., movies they may have seen on Netflix or elsewhere in the past. Based
on these ratings, users receive recommendations for other movies that they may enjoy based on what they
have viewed and/or rated thus far.
The Netflix dataset offers a vast amount of rating data; compiled and publicly released by Netflix for its
Netflix Prize (Bennett and Lanning, 2007). There are 100,480,507 distinct ratings in the database. These
ratings cover a total of 17,770 movies and 480,189 distinct users. Each user has provided ratings on a five-
point scale (the rating ? is the lowest, the rating ? ? ? ? ? is the highest) for any number of movies, with
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some raters having rated as many as thousands of movies, while others have rated just a handful. While
all movies have at least one score, every user has rated only a small fraction of all the movies. According
to Netflix, the dataset contains every movie rating received by Netflix, from its users, between early 2002,
when Netflix started tracking the data, and late 2007, when the competition for the Prize was announced.
These data have been anonymized to protect privacy and are conveniently coded for use by researchers.
The Netflix data are rare in preference studies: Since users of the Netflix service can expect to receive
presumably higher quality recommendations from Netflix if they respond truthfully to the rating prompt,
there is an incentive for each user to express sincere preference in their ratings. In the Netflix setup, the
user is receiving a tangible benefit (clearer and more accurate recommendations) for providing truthful data.
With Netflix’s catalog of over 17,000 movies, users need help sorting through all the data, especially if they
are interested in discovering great movies that they don’t already know. This is in contrast to many other
datasets which are compiled through surveys or other methods where the individuals questioned about their
preferences often have little or no stake in providing truthful responses. The Netflix rating system also
gives viewers a natural incentive to rate as many movies as possible, as long as they have clearly formed
preferences among them, since more information from the user will presumably lead to more accurate and
more relevant recommendations.
To illustrate the role of behavioral Social Choice in empirical studies, we selected three sets of five movies
from the dataset. The first two sets were more or less selected at random. These movies had a fairly high
number of joint ratings, that is, users who had rated multiple movies out of the set. The third was selected
so that all five movies in the set had received a similar and large number of ratings. For this last set, we
found five movies that had all received 10, 040± 10 user ratings. Brief summaries of the movies we selected
can be found in the top panels of Tables 3.2 - 3.5. All movie descriptions and genre information are taken
from the respective movie page at the Internet Movie Database (www.imbd.com).
Tables 3.2 - 3.5 provide various types of summary information about the three movie sets and their
ratings. For example, Table 3.2 shows, for Movie Set 1, that only 91 raters offered ratings for movie A,
“Bliss: Season 1,” and of these, 23 gave a ?-rating and 11 gave a ? ? ? ? ?-rating. In contrast, more than
150,000 viewers rated movie E, “Lost in Translation.” The table also provides the arithmetic average of the
star-ratings for each movie among the raters who rated that given movie. Among those who rated “Jaws,”
the average rating is 3.89 stars, whereas among those who rated “Bliss,” the average rating was 2.56 stars.
It is not clear whether it is meaningful to use an arithmetic average: we do not know whether these ?-ratings
form an interval scale, according to which the difference between a ?????-rating and a ???-rating expresses
the same “strength of preference” as the difference between a ? ? ?-rating and a ?-rating (Roberts, 1979).
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Table 3.1: Movie Set 1: Synopsis (top panel), summary of ratings (center panel), and full ratings of those 15 viewers
who rated the entire movie set. Part I.
Movie Set 1, Description:
Movie No. Title Year Genre Synopsis
3462 Bliss: Season 1 2002 Drama-
Romance
A Showtime Original Series
that explores the desires, pas-
sions and fantasies of women.
798 Jaws 1975 Thriller A giant great white shark
threatens a small fishing com-
munity and a group of men
set out to stop it.
758 Mean Girls 2004 Comedy-
Drama
A high school teen drama
centering on two girls fighting
over a boy.
1145 The Wedding Planner 2001 Comedy-
Romance
A wedding planners life is
turned upside down when she
falls head over heels for a
client.
12232 Lost in Translation 2003 Drama A movie star with a sense
of emptiness, and a neglected
newlywed meet in Tokyo and
form an unlikely bond.
Rating summary:
A B C D E
Rating Bliss: Jaws Mean The Wedding Lost in
Season 1 Girls Planner Translation
? 23 1,219 2,899 12,194 15,750
?? 23 4,527 9,773 23,238 23,578
? ? ? 27 20,240 38,016 49,351 36,605
? ? ?? 7 31,606 38,099 37,366 41,143
? ? ? ? ? 11 23,686 15,575 18,005 35,330
Number of Raters: 91 81,278 104,362 140,154 152,406
Mean Rating: 2.56 stars 3.89 stars 3.51 stars 3.18 stars 3.37 stars
Median Rating: ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ??
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Table 3.2: Movie Set 1: Synopsis (top panel), summary of ratings (center panel), and full ratings of those 15 viewers
who rated the entire movie set. Part II.
Ratings of those 15 viewers who rated all five movies:
Number of Movies Generalized rank
raters A B C D E 1 5
1 ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ?? C A
1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? E A
1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? C A
1 ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? ? B –
1 ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? – A
1 ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? – A
1 ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? C B
2 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? – E
1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? C E
1 ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? – D
1 ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? E –
1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? – A
1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? – A
1 ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? B –
In other words, arithmetic averages could be meaningless summary statistics (Roberts, 1985, Roberts and
Rosenbaum, 1986, Roberts, 1998). The median rating is perhaps the more appropriate summary statistic,
though much less refined. We report the medians for all movies in Tables 3.2 - 3.5. A major rationale behind
Social Choice aggregation methods is to use, as input into the consensus method, only ordinal information
from each judge.
In the usual incarnation, Social Choice theory uses ordinal, rather than quantitative, input about individ-
ual preferences as the theoretical primitive. However, much Social Choice theory is based on the assumption
that individual voters/judges have asymmetric, complete and transitive (strict linear order) preferences
among the candidates/options. There is very little reason to believe this assumption in the context of Net-
flix movie viewers, especially that individual preferences ought to be complete. It does not make sense to
assume that anyone even knows all of these 17,000+ movies. It also makes little sense to assume that viewers
have a strict preference among every two movies, and this is reflected by the fact that Netflix only uses a
simple five-point scale for rating the movies. It also may not be legitimate to assume complete preferences
over groups of movies, say, if one attempted to reduce the numbers by grouping movies into genres, release
dates, and/or other criteria in an effort to sort them into equivalence classes of sorts.
If we just consider the five movies in each of the three sets we have selected for analysis, it is striking
from Tables 3.2 - 3.4, that of those few people who rated all movies in a given set not a single one mapped
the movies one-to-one into ratings. There is no evidence in these data, not even from a single rater, that
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Table 3.3: Movie Set 1: Synopsis (top panel), summary of ratings (center panel), and full ratings of those 5 viewers
who rated the entire movie set.
Movie Set 2, Description:
Movie No. Title Year Genre Synopsis
15870 Anna Karenina 1967 Drama-
Romance
A young wife of an
older husband compli-
cates her life by having
an affair.
12458 Splendor 1999 Comedy-
Romance
A twenty-something
starts a romantic affair
with two men at the
same time.
2568 StarGate SG-1: Season 8 2004 Action-
SciFi
A secret military team
is formed to explore
the StarGate.
2651 Dragon Ball Z: Super Android 13 1992 Animation-
Action
A team of super-
humans fights an
interplanetary force of
androids.
197 Taking Lives 2004 Mystery-
Thriller
An FBI profiler is
called in to catch a se-
rial killer.
Rating summary:
A B C D E
Rating Anna Splendor StarGate SG-1: Dragon Ball Z: Taking
Karenina Season 8 Super Android 13 Lives
? 29 102 49 460 2,900
?? 25 188 32 187 9,017
? ? ? 61 406 129 422 27,651
? ? ?? 36 302 425 567 29,649
? ? ? ? ? 22 127 1,177 790 12,043
Number of Raters: 173 1,125 1,812 2,426 81,260
Mean Rating: 2.98 stars 3.15 stars 4.46 stars 3.43 stars 3.48 stars
Median Rating: ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ??
Ratings of those 5 viewers who rated all five movies:
Number of Movies Generalized rank
raters A B C D E 1 5
1 ? ? ? ? ? – –
1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? E –
1 ?? ?? ? ? ?? – –
1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? – A
1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? – A
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Table 3.4: Movie Set 3: Synopsis (top panel), summary of ratings (bottom panel).
Movie Set 3, Description:
Movie No. Title Year Genre Synopsis
14731 The Good Son 1993 Drama-
Thriller
A young boy moves in
with his relatives and be-
gins tormenting his young
cousins.
17491 Like Mike 2002 Comedy-
Family
A young orphan becomes
an NBA star after finding
a pair of Michael Jordan’s
shoes.
433 Untamed Heart 1993 Drama-
Romance
Girl meets boy, falls in
love and into tragedy.
5650 Buena Vista Social Club 1999 Document.-
Music
Documentary about the
life and times of aging
Cuban musicians.
13244 Striking Distance 1993 Action-
Crime
Police officer searches for
the true perpetrator of a
murder.
Rating summary:
A B C D E
Rating Striking Untamed Buena Vista Like The Good
Distance Heart Social Club Mike Son
? 418 290 340 621 205
?? 1,354 980 777 1,264 902
? ? ? 3,831 3,512 2,393 3,547 3,691
? ? ?? 3,278 3,384 3,938 3,126 3,808
? ? ? ? ? 1,153 1,1877 2,595 1,488 1,442
Number of Raters: 10,034 10,043 10,043 10,046 10,048
Mean Rating: 3.38 stars 3.55 stars 3.76 stars 3.36 stars 3.54 stars
Median Rating: ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ??
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Table 3.5: Movie Set 3: Full ratings of those 30 viewers who rated the entire movie set.
Ratings of those 30 viewers who rated all five movies in Movie Set 3:
Number of Movies Generalized rank
raters A B C D E 1 5
2 ? ? ? ? ? – –
1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? – –
1 ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? E –
1 ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? – –
1 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? – –
1 ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? – C
1 ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? – –
1 ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? – B
1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ?? – –
1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? – C
1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? E D
1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? – –
1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? – D
1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? – E
1 ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? B –
1 ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ?? ?? – –
1 ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? B D
1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? B D
1 ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? – –
1 ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? A B
1 ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? – C
1 ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? D C
1 ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? A –
1 ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? – D
1 ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? B –
1 ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? – A
1 ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? – B
1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? ? ? ?? – C
1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? – –
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Figure 3.1: Hasse diagram of the binary preference relation of a hypothetical viewer who rated all five movies.
Arrows indicate strict preference, with arrows implied by transitivity omitted.
A ? ? ? ? ?
RankR(A) = 1
B ? ? ??
RankR(B) = 2.5
C ? ? ??
RankR(C) = 2.5
D ??
RankR(D) = 4
E ?
RankR(E) = 5
would suggest that asymmetric, transitive, complete preferences are behaviorally valid. We should indeed
be wary of making such an assumption.
The insight that we have detailed information from very few users and the insight that we should not
assume preferences to be complete, have important implications that are hard to overstate. In fact, one
of the main take-home messages of this paper is that we face two monumental challenges in evaluating
consensus outcomes:
1. In any situation like the Netflix data sets, and even in most ballot profiles from real elections, we only
have very limited, incomplete, and possibly inaccurate information about each individual’s preferences.
This forces us to consider consensus as an inference problem.
2. When we attempt to interpret data as partial indicators of preferences, we must be highly attentive to
the modeling assumptions we make and how they may affect our substantive conclusion, such as, e.g.,
our inferences about the consensus outcomes. In other words, we face a problem of potential model
dependence of our analyses and conclusions.
We highlight these two problems, because such concerns are second-nature to quantitative or mathematical
behavioral scientists, but, not being questions of computational complexity per se, they may not be quite so
salient in the computational Social Choice community at large.
The goal of this paper is not to develop and find the most accurate and refined model of movie rating
behavior. That appears like a daunting task. Rather, we illustrate the role of any such model in the analysis
of Social Choice procedures. For purposes of illustration, in this paper, we will thus use three simple models
of how binary preferences may be expressed in Netflix movie ratings. More precisely, the three models
specify how preferences can be inferred from movies ratings. One model takes an “agnostic” view in that
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it specifically avoids assuming preferences that involve unrated choice options. This model is based on the
“strict partial order” or “Zwicker” model of prior analyses of partial ranking ballots (Regenwetter et al.,
2009b). The second model takes the “pessimistic” view, according to which each rater dislikes unrated
movies more than any movies s/he has rated so far. This model is motivated by the “strict weak order”
model used previously for the analysis of partial ranking ballots (Regenwetter et al., 2009b, 2007b) according
to which all candidates ranked on a partial ranking ballot are preferable to all unranked candidates, and
according to which the voter has no strict preference among any unranked candidates. The third model
takes a “anchor-and-adjust” point of view, according to which the ‘default’ rating of a movie is ? ? ?, unless
the viewer has given the movie an explicit rating himself. All three model assume that a rater prefers movie
x to movie y whenever she gives x a higher rating than y.
Figure 3.1 shows the Hasse diagram of an example where a hypothetical person gave ratings to all five
movies, say, A: ? ? ? ? ?, B: ? ? ? ?, C: ? ? ? ?, D: ? ?, and E: ?. Under all three models, this translates
into the binary relation
R = {(A,B), (A,C), (A,D), (A,E), (B,D), (B,E), (C,D), (C,E), (D,E)}
depicted by the Hasse diagram in Figure 3.1. The figure also shows the generalized rank of each option in
that preference relation: RankR(A) = 1 because A is strictly preferred to all other options. RankR(B) =
RankR(C) = 2.5, whereas D and E have generalized ranks 4 and 5, respectively.
The models differ in how they deal with the many missing ratings. Figure 3.2 illustrates how the three
models assign binary preference relations to viewers who did not rate all five movies in a set. Imagine that
a rater gives, say, A: ? ? ? ?, B: ? ? ?, C: ?, and does not rate D and E. According to the Agnostic
model, this person prefers movies they gave more stars to movies they gave fewer stars and has no other
strict preferences. This model yields a strict partial order, here, the binary relation
{(A,B), (B,C), (A,C)}.
From the Pessimistic model’s view point, while this person prefers movies with more stars to movies with
fewer stars, the key difference to first model is that unrated movies are treated as though they had zero
stars. This yields a strict weak order where the unrated movies are tied at the bottom of the strict weak
order, here
{(A,B), (A,C), (A,E), (A,F ), (B,C), (B,E), (B,F ), (C,E), (C,F )}.
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Figure 3.2: Hasse diagrams for three models of the binary preference relation of a hypothetical viewer who has
rated only some but not all movies in a set. The figure shows an arrow from a preferred movie to a less liked movie,
with arrows implied by transitivity omitted.
Agnostic Model
A ? ? ? ? ?
RankR(A) = 2
B ? ? ?
RankR(B) = 3
C ?
RankR(C) = 4
E
RankR(E) = 3
D
RankR(D) = 3
Pessimistic Model Anchor-and-Adjust Model
A ? ? ? ? ?
RankR(A) = 1
B ? ? ?
RankR(B) = 2
C ?
RankR(C) = 3
E
RankR(E) = 4.5
D
RankR(D) = 4.5
A ? ? ? ? ?
RankR(A) = 1
B ? ? ?
RankR(B) = 3
C ?
RankR(C) = 5
E
RankR(E) = 3
D
RankR(D) = 3
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The third model anchors all movies at a default ???-rating and then adjusts the ratings of those movies that
the viewer has indeed rated. Beyond that assumption, the Anchor-and-Adjust model then assumes that this
person prefers movies with more stars to movies with fewer stars and has no other strict preferences, here
{(A,B), (A,C), (A,D), (A,E), (B,C), (D,C), (E,C)}.
Note that the three models are mutually irreconcilable in their assumptions about unrated movies and the
strict preference relationships between rated and unrated movies.
3.4 Results
Table 3.6 summarizes our inferences made about the social orders under the five consensus methods, using
the three models, for the three Netflix movie sets. The top panel shows our results for Movie Set 1, the
center panel shows the results for Movie Set 2, and the bottom panel those for Movie Set 3. The Agnostic
model, Pessimistic model, and the Anchor-and-Adjust model are arranged from left to right in each panel.
For each social order, we also provide the replicability, by which we mean the proportion of bootstrap
samples (out of 10,000) that led to the same social order as did the original data. For example, under the
Pessimistic model, all bootstrap samples yielded the social order EDCBA (ranked from best to worst) by
Condorcet and Borda, in Movie Sets 1 and 2, as did Plurality in Movie Set 2. In contrast, only 27% of the
10,000 bootstrap samples replicated the social order marked [CEDBA] under Antiplurality in Movie Set 1.
All social orders that we replicated in fewer than 50% of bootstrapped samples are marked by square brackets
[. . . ]. Results with replicability above 95% are marked in bold. For instance, under the Anchor-and-Adjust
model interpretation of the data, we have high replicability for all rules in Movie Set 2. Under the Agnostic
model interpretation, we have low replicability in most cases. Plurality Runoff only yields a winner, not a
social order. Candidates listed in set brackets are tied. For example, under the Agnostic model in Movie Set
1, Plurality yields the unique winner C, followed by a tie between B and E, followed by a tie between A and
D. This social order is, however, poorly replicable, as it only occurred in 14% of our 10,000 bootstrapped
samples.
As we reviewed in Section 3.2, behavioral Social Choice analyses over the past decade share several
common features of their findings. As one shifts one’s gaze away from random sampling out of highly artificial
distributions like the Impartial Culture, towards considering inference about an underlying population from
real empirical data, one perceives a landscape that is very different from that painted on the basis of classical
analytical results. On the rare occasion where, in past behavioral Social Choice analyses, a Condorcet
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Table 3.6: Behavioral Social Choice inferences for Movie Sets 1, 2, and 3 under three interpretations of numerical
ratings. “Repl.” stands for bootstrapped replicability.
Movie Set 1
Agnostic Pessimistic Anchor-and-Adjust
Social Order Repl. Social Order Repl. Social Order Repl.
Condorcet BCEDA 0.99 EDCBA 1 BECDA 1
Borda BCAED 1 EDCBA 1 BCEDA 0.57
Plurality [C{B, E}{A, D}] 0.14 EDCBA 0.99 EDBCA 1
Antiplurality [C{B, D}EA] 0.11 [CEDBA] 0.27 ABCDE 1
Plur. Runoff C 0.61 E 1 E 1
Movie Set 2
Agnostic Pessimistic Anchor-and-Adjust
Social Order Repl. Social Order Repl. Social Order Repl.
Condorcet [C {cycle} A] 0.19 EDCBA 1 ECDBA 1
Borda [CDBAE] 0.26 EDCBA 1 ECDBA 1
Plurality E{A, B, C, D} 0.63 EDCBA 1 ECDBA 1
Antiplurality {B, C, D, E}A 0.86 [ECDBA] 0.03 ACBDE 0.99
Plur. Runoff E 0.63 E 1 E 1
Movie Set 3
Agnostic Pessimistic Anchor-and-Adjust
Social Order Repl. Social Order Repl. Social Order Repl.
Condorcet CBEAD 1 [CBEAD] 0.42 CEBDA 0.77
Borda BCEAD 1 [BCEAD] 0.2 CEBDA 0.78
Plurality [B{A, E}DC] 0.03 CDBAE 0.93 CBEDA 0.78
Antiplurality [{A,E}B{C,D}] 0.02 BAEDC 0.39 EBCAD 0.53
Plur. Runoff B 0.59 C 1 C 1
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paradox could not be ruled out, some pairwise margins were narrow enough that even slight deviations from
the observed ballot counts eliminated the paradox. In other words, the Concorcet paradox has been rare
and when it could not be ruled out, it had very poor replicability. Our findings here are compatible with
that pattern of findings. However, we have a bit of an exception in that this appears to be the first time
that we find somewhat (19%) replicable evidence for a Condorcet cycle. This cycle is located the middle of
the social order for Movie Set 2 under the Agnostic model analysis and does not affect the existence of a
Condorcet winner and of a Condorcet loser. In all other Movie Set 1 & 2 analyses, we have a strict linear
order by Condorcet with high or perfect replicability. In Movie Set 3, despite the large numbers of ratings,
we are confronted with low replicability for Condorcet under two models, i.e., there are narrow margins that
can be flipped fairly easily in the bootstrap.
Despite the centuries-old and ongoing debate about the relative merits of Condorcet and Borda, the
empirical evidence has suggested over and again that the two rules frequently led to the same social order.
Table 3.6 shows separately computed inferences for Condorcet and Borda, but we can already see that in
all cases where we find social orders with high or near perfect replicability, they are also identical. However,
there are many cases (many more than in the prior literature we have cited) in which Condorcet or Borda
or both are inferred with low or dismal replicability. In other words, we have many cases where we cannot
make solid inferences from the data. This is particularly true for Movie Set 3.
Table 3.6 highlights the two key messages we hope to convey:
1. Inference: The social orders we computed from these data vary dramatically in how confidently we
can make inferences about them from the same set of data if we treat these data as uncertain and
incomplete reflections of the population’s preferences. An individual preference enters the Plurality
tally only when one choice option is preferred to all other options and, hence, when one choice option
has generalized rank one. Preferences enter the Antiplurality tally only if they have a choice option
to which all other options are strictly preferred, hence if one option has generalized rank five. For
the Agnostic model, where we very rarely have a single best or single worst movie for a given rater,
Plurality, Antiplurality, and Plurality Runoff depend on the few raters in Table 3.2 who identify a
movie with generalized rank one or five. For Movie Set 1, this leads to low replicability of Plurality,
Antiplurality, and Plurality Runoff. Interestingly, in Movie Set 2, because only candidate E is ever at
generalized rank 1 (by one rater), and only candidate A is ever at generalized rank 5 (by two raters),
the replicability for Plurality and Antiplurality in Movie Set 2 is, in fact, not very low, because more
than half of bootstrapped samples include one or more such data points. However, Plurality fails
to yield more than a winner and Antiplurality fails to yield more than a loser because there is not
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enough information in the ratings of Table 3.3 to yield more consensus information. Hence, there is
also not enough information in the bootstrap samples to yield more consensus information. Plurality,
Antiplurality, and Plurality Runoff in Movie Set 2 hinge completely on including the two or three
informative raters of Table 3.3 in the tally. If we were to drop the three raters in Table 3.3, then those
three consensus methods would completely collapse. This highlights the importance of considering
an inference perspective that takes into account how much information is really contained in a given
set of human data and how sensitive our conclusions are to minor or major distortions in those data.
When using the Agnostic model, our ability to draw inferences for Plurality, Antiplurality and Plurality
Runoff is very limited.
2. Model Dependence: Now, one might think that the easy way out of this problem is to simply add
additional information to the data. This is where model dependence comes into play. We know from
the inference discussion above that we often have very little confidence that we are able to extract the
‘correct’ social order for some of the procedures. Hence, to the extent that we gain confidence through
imputation of additional information, this confidence may be gained at the cost of additional model
dependence, that is, conclusions could very much hinge on the methods by which we might impute
additional information. Imputing values for unrated movies can quickly ‘take over’ in that there can
be more imputed ratings than real ratings in the data being aggregated: The hypothetical data may
overwhelm the real data and create a false sense of confidence in what the social outcomes are.
Our approach here has been to illustrate the effects of three simple models in our analysis. The Agnostic
model did not impute any binary preference information. It captures the idea that viewers cannot possibly
view all movies, hence a lack of a rating may not tell us anything about the counterfactual whether they
‘would’ prefer a given unrated movie to one they have already rated. The model captures this intuition
formally with the explicit assumption that there is no strict preference involving unrated options. This
model led some voting rules to have almost no valid input because very few raters gave enough information
for the Agnostic model to yield rankings, or at least single most or single least preferred choice options,
from individual decision makers. The Pessimistic model can be thought of as imputing information where
none was given, because it assumes that the users are indifferent between all unrated movies and strictly
prefer all their rated movies to all their unrated movies. This would make sense if users did not rate a movie
because they did not deem it good enough to watch and rate. But clearly, there can be many other reasons
for not rating a movie. The Anchor-and-Adjust model captures the intuitive notion that the default rating
of a movie is ? ? ? and that actual ratings could be upwards adjustments for movies that the rater enjoyed
and downwards adjustments for movies that the rater did not enjoy. A similar, but more elaborate, model,
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Table 3.7: Movie Set 1, bootstrap replicability using 10,000 bootstrapped samples. Replicability of agreement
(off-diagonal) and replicability of existence (diagonal) of an unambiguous winner (generalized rank 1) in the upper
panel, and an unambiguous unique loser (generalized rank 5) in the bottom panel.
Row and Column: Same Unique Winner
Agnostic Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality Plur. Runoff
Condorcet 1
Borda 1 1
Plurality 0.11 0.11 0.82
Antiplurality 0 0 0.28 0.39
Plur. Runoff 0.11 0.11 0.82 0.28 0.82
Pessimistic Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality Plur. Runoff
Condorcet 1
Borda 1 1
Plurality 1 1 1
Antiplurality 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.83
Plur. Runoff 1 1 1 0.12 1
Anchor-and-Adjust Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality Plur. Runoff
Condorcet 1
Borda 1 1
Plurality 0 0 1
Antiplurality 0 0 0 1
Plur. Runoff 0 0 1 0 1
Row and Column: Same Unique Loser
Agnostic Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality
Condorcet 1
Borda 0.003 1
Plurality 0 0 0
Antiplurality 0.86 0.003 0 0.94
Pessimistic Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality
Condorcet 1
Borda 1 1
Plurality 1 1 1
Antiplurality 1 1 1 1
Anchor-and-Adjust Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality
Condorcet 1
Borda 1 1
Plurality 1 1 1
Antiplurality 0 0 0 1
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Table 3.8: Movie Set 1, bootstrap replicability using 10,000 bootstrapped samples. The Replicability of agreement
between a unique row winner and a unique column loser.
Unique Row Winner & Column Loser Exist and Match
Agnostic Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality
Condorcet 0 0 0.003
Borda 0 0 0.003
Plurality 0 0 0.003
Antiplurality 0 0 0
Plur. Runoff 0 0 0 0.003
Pessimistic Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality
Condorcet 0 0 0
Borda 0 0 0
Plurality 0 0 0
Antiplurality 0 0 0
Plur. Runoff 0 0 0 0
Anchor-and-Adjust Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality
Condorcet 0 0 0
Borda 0 0 0
Plurality 0 0 1
Antiplurality 1 1 1
Plur. Runoff 0 0 0 1
which we did not include here, would be to use, say, each rater’s median ratings as their individual default
rating.
Table 3.6 shows that the social orders differ substantially within a movie set, depending on the behavioral
modeling assumptions that entered the analysis. The three models are simple cases of a potentially large set
of conceivable descriptive models one may develop. We used these to illustrate how such models can impact
both the conclusions and the replicability of the conclusions one draws.
We now shift our attention from the social orders to just the winners and losers under the various
consensus methods.
Tables 3.7-3.11 show the existence of unique winners, unique losers, and the degree of agreement about
winners and losers among consensus methods under the two models for the three data sets. For example,
the top panel of Table 3.7 shows, on the diagonal, the existence of a unique winner (a movie with generalized
rank 1) in the social order, for each consensus method. Condorcet and Borda yielded a unique winner in
all 10,000 bootstrap samples under all three models for Movie Set 1. The Anchor-and-Adjust model yielded
unique winners with perfect replicability for every consensus method. In the other models, antiplurality
yielded such a unique winner only in some of the bootstrap samples.
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Table 3.9: Movie Set 2, bootstrap replicability using 10,000 bootstrapped samples. Replicability of agreement
(off-diagonal) and replicability of existence (diagonal) of an unambiguous winner (generalized rank 1) in the upper
panel, and an unambiguous unique loser (generalized rank 5) in the bottom panel.
Same Unique Winner
Agnostic Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality Plur. Runoff
Condorcet 0.66
Borda 0.66 1
Plurality 0 0 0.63
Antiplurality 0 0 0 0
Plur. Runoff 0 0 0.63 0 0.63
Pessimistic Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality Plur. Runoff
Condorcet 1
Borda 1 1
Plurality 1 1 1
Antiplurality 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
Plur. Runoff 1 1 1 0.51 1
Anchor-and-Adjust Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality Plur. Runoff
Condorcet 1
Borda 1 1
Plurality 1 1 1
Antiplurality 0 0 0 1
Plur. Runoff 1 1 1 0 1
Same Unique Loser
Agnostic Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality
Condorcet 0.51
Borda 0 1
Plurality 0 0 0
Antiplurality 0.46 0 0 0.86
Pessimistic Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality
Condorcet 1
Borda 1 1
Plurality 1 1 1
Antiplurality 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.80
Anchor-and-Adjust Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality
Condorcet 1
Borda 1 1
Plurality 1 1 1
Antiplurality 0 0 0 1
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Table 3.10: Movie Set 2, bootstrap replicability using 10,000 bootstrapped samples. Replicability of agreement
between a unique row winner and a unique column loser.
Unique Row Winner & Column Loser Exist and Match
Agnostic Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality
Condorcet 0 0 0
Borda 0 0 0
Plurality 0 0.63 0
Antiplurality 0 0 0
Plur. Runoff 0 0.63 0 0
Pessimistic Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality
Condorcet 0 0 0
Borda 0 0 0
Plurality 0 0 0
Antiplurality 0 0 0
Plur. Runoff 0 0 0 0
Anchor-and-Adjust Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality
Condorcet 0 0 1
Borda 0 0 1
Plurality 0 0 1
Antiplurality 1 1 1
Plur. Runoff 0 0 0 1
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Table 3.11: Movie Set 3, bootstrap replicability using 10,000 bootstrapped samples. Replicability of agreement
(off-diagonal) and replicability of existence (diagonal) of an unambiguous winner (generalized rank 1) in the upper
panel, and an unambiguous unique loser (generalized rank 5) in the bottom panel.
Same Unique Winner
Agnostic Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality Plur. Runoff
Condorcet 1
Borda 0 1
Plurality 0 0.59 0.82
Antiplurality 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.63
Plur. Runoff 0 0.59 0.82 0.09 0.82
Pessimistic Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality Plur. Runoff
Condorcet 0.71
Borda 0.44 1
Plurality 0.54 0.30 1
Antiplurality 0.10 0.41 0 0.92
Plur. Runoff 0.54 0.30 1 0 1
Anchor-and-Adjust Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality Plur. Runoff
Condorcet 1
Borda 1 1
Plurality 1 1 1
Antiplurality 0 0 0 1
Plur. Runoff 1 1 1 0 1
Same Unique Loser
Agnostic Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality
Condorcet 1
Borda 1 1
Plurality 0 0 0.46
Antiplurality 0.37 0.37 0.20 0.83
Pessimistic Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality
Condorcet 0.82
Borda 0.72 1
Plurality 0.01 0.03 1
Antiplurality 0.03 0.01 0 1
Anchor-and-Adjust Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality
Condorcet 1
Borda 0.98 1
Plurality 0.87 0.87 1
Antiplurality 0.13 0.13 0 1
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Table 3.12: Movie Set 3, bootstrap replicability using 10,000 bootstrapped samples. Replicability of agreement
between a unique row winner and a unique column loser.
Unique Row Winner & Column Loser Exist and Match
Agnostic Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality
Condorcet 0 0.02 0.54
Borda 0 0.10 0.30
Plurality 0.03 0.01 1
Antiplurality 0.01 0.03 0.07
Plur. Runoff 0.03 0.01 0 1
Pessimistic Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality
Condorcet 0 0.46 0.38
Borda 0 0 0.08
Plurality 0.02 0.02 0.03
Antiplurality 0 0 0
Plur. Runoff 0.02 0.02 0 0.03
Anchor-and-Adjust Model
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality
Condorcet 0 0 0
Borda 0 0 0
Plurality 0 0 0
Antiplurality 0 0 0
Plur. Runoff 0 0 0 0
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The off-diagonal in the top panel shows how often two rules yielded one and the same movie with
generalized rank 1, i.e., the same unique winner. The rates of agreement vary substantially across rules and
across models. The panel in the center shows the corresponding results for movies with generalized rank 5
in the social order, i.e., movies that are ranked strictly worse than any other movie, in a given social order.
Again the results are highly model dependent. Antiplurality, for which we have hardly any valid ballots,
yields essentially useless results. For the other rules, using the Pessimistic and Anchor-and-Adjust model,
we consistently have agreement in Movie Set 1 with perfect replicability. Note that this analysis does not
apply to Plurality Runoff, which only yields a winner. Table 3.8 shows how often we find the situation that
is so highly advertised in textbooks on Social Choice: We search for an option that is the unique best option
by one consensus method and yet the unique worst option by another consensus rule. The results are much
more model-dependent than they have been in earlier papers. For Movie Set 1 and the Pessimistic model,
not once in 10,000 bootstrap iterations did we see a movie have generalized rank one in one rule (row) and
generalized rank 5 in another rule (column). The same applies for the other models and voting rules, except
for Antiplurality, which completely hinges on whether a model generates many, some, or virtually no ballots
with individual preferences that rank some option as unique worst. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 highlight how little
we can infer when we do not impute assumptions about preferences where no information was given by the
movie rater, but also how artificially we might inflate our confidence in conclusions drawn from data that
have a high imputed component, like the Pessimistic model.
As we move to Movie Sets 2 and 3, reported in Tables 3.9–3.12, we find a similar picture: The winners,
losers, and the relationship between consensus methods are highly dependent on the modeling assump-
tions that entered the analysis. Likewise, the bootstrap-based replicability highly depends on the modeling
assumptions.
Like in previous empirical studies, we find that voting paradoxes do not appear to loom nearly as large as
they are made to appear in the axiomatic and sampling literature. We do not find strong evidence that the
best of one rule is the worst of another rule in any analysis that actually treats many raters as providing valid
ballots. To understand how large the potential disagreements among voting methods really loom requires
that we tackle inference and model dependence. Unfortunately, the behavioral analyses in Tables 3.6-3.12
produce much more dramatic and sobering findings than did previous empirical studies on political survey
and election ballot data. Because the Netflix data, while being extensive, are so extraordinarily sparse, the
challenges associated with inference and model dependence appear to be strongly amplified in these data.
We also amplify that contemporary research may need to shift focus away from classical problems of voting
paradoxes to more pressing challenges. Consistent with earlier behavioral Social Choice papers, the threat
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of no Condorcet winner and/or the threat of dramatic disagreements among competing consensus methods
continue to be dwarfed by the much more real treat of inaccurate inference about social preferences as well
as the threat of their strong dependence on modeling assumptions.
3.5 Conclusions and Future Directions
How can behavioral Social Choice interface with computational Social Choice? Imagine a sensitive computer
system protected by elaborate cryptography. The security of this system might be called into question
if an adversary learned that a high-level user exclusively employed family birthdays and pet names as
passwords, unless the cryptographic protection somehow specifically planned for such structured behavior.
Similarly, behavioral insights could have extensive implications to computational Social Choice, because the
computational properties of consensus methods could be affected profoundly by behavioral regularities in
voter behavior.
Specifically, we hope that scholars in the computational Social Choice community will continue to inves-
tigate how computational considerations in Social Choice are affected by the two main points we highlight
in this paper:
1. Behaviorally accurate evaluation of Social Choice outcomes depends on effective inference from in-
complete and possibly noisy or biased data.
2. Some Social Choice considerations can be profoundly dependent on modeling assumptions about
the nature of individual preferences and how they are expressed in the ballots, ratings, or rankings
that are being aggregated.
We believe that those concerns are almost self-evident, especially in the analyses we have reported.
With data as incomplete and sparse as the Netflix data, accurate modeling and reliable inference pose both
undeniable and formidable challenges. Yet, the classical Social Choice literature has paid almost no attention
to these concerns. Our analysis has shown that treating preferences as strict linear orders or strict weak
orders may require researchers to impute vast amounts of information not provided by the voters or raters.
The resulting conclusions about the consensus processes then often rest on computations that used more
hypothetical than real data. As Social Choice scholars, we do not wish to emulate the drunkard who lost
his keys in a dark parking lot and proceeded to search for them under a street light because it was brighter
there. Experts in recommender systems have recently started to tackle similar challenges (Marlin and Zemel,
2009). On the other hand, when making as few assumptions about individual preferences as possible, as
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we attempted in the Agnostic model, we may not even be able to draw inferences at all for some consensus
methods because of data sparsity.
Behavioral Social Choice has put inference and model dependence at the forefront of its research paradigm,
and hence, may provide some helpful guidance to scholars interested in behaviorally adequate computational
Social Choice. Future developments in computational Social Choice may take into account that strategic
interaction, manipulability, and computational complexity may be intertwined in complicated ways with
inference and model dependence at various levels. Realistically, both individuals and collectivities who want
to compute strategic choices and/or manipulate a consensus process need to account for inference and model
dependence issues in their respective computations.
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Chapter 4
Consensus in Organizations: Hunting
for the Social Choice Conundrum in
APA Elections
Abstract
According to the axiomatic literature on consensus methods, the best collective choice by one method of prefer-
ence aggregation can easily be the worst by another. Are award committees, electorates, managers, online retailers,
and web-based recommender systems stuck with an impossibility of rational preference aggregation? We investigate
this social choice conundrum for seven social choice methods: Condorcet, Borda, Plurality, Antiplurality, the Single
Transferable Vote, Coombs, and Plurality Runoff. We rely on Monte Carlo simulations for theoretical results and
on twelve ballot datasets from American Psychological Association (APA) presidential elections for empirical results.
Each of these elections provides partial rankings of five candidates from about 13,000 to about 20,000 voters. APA
preferences are neither domain-restricted nor generated by an Impartial Culture. We find virtually no trace of a
Condorcet paradox. In direct contrast with the classical social choice conundrum, competing consensus methods
agree remarkably well, especially on the overall best and worst options. The agreement is also robust under pertur-
bations of the preference profile via resampling, even in relatively small pseudo samples. We also explore prescriptive
implications of our findings.1
Key Words:Alternative Vote, behavioral social choice, consensus methods, collective decision making,
Instant Runoff.
Dedicated to Prof. Patrick R. Laughlin (1934–2012).
Pat was a remarkebly kind person who enjoyed a great fascination
with collaborative problem solving and consensus in groups.
1This chapter is in press as Popov, S., Popova, A., and Regenwetter, M. (2014). “Consensus in organizations: Hunting for
the social choice conundrum in APA elections.” Decision.
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4.1 Introduction
Selecting award winners, recommending “best-in-class” services or products; electing a president of a country
or of a professional society; selecting a CEO of an organization; determining a good time for a group lunch;
selecting the most pertinent document, webpage, or database entry; or ranking job applicants are just a few
of the multitude of collective decisions that groups, businesses, organizations, and society face daily. Alas,
according to rational Social Choice theory, those who seek a consensus face a conundrum instead! Different
mathematical formulae for Social Choice can disagree with each other, undermining any hope for consensus
about a unique best choice. In 2000, when Bush ran against Gore in the US presidential bid, Bush secured
the 25 electoral college votes for the state of Florida with a 0.009% margin to win the presidency. Many
Florida voters chose Ralph Nader, who collected 1.6% of the popular vote, over Al Gore. Maybe, if the
voting had not been based on plurality rule, but instead had elicited and used partial or complete rankings
from voters, those who voted for Nader might have contributed more towards Al Gore’s counts. Maybe this
change in procedure would have changed the election outcome itself. Another example is a 2009 election
in Burlington, VM, where the election outcome, according to some sources 2, appears to have depended
fundamentally on the voting method used to gather and tally votes. This raises a difficult and important
question: How much do consensus processes hinge on the vote casting and aggregation methods used? We
will consider seven aggregation methods and focus on one vote casting method that provides particularly
rich data.
In this paper, we first expand the theoretical predictions of the existing literature. Then, we proceed to
an extensive case study of real-world consensus formation in a very large organization that is the umbrella
organization and publisher of this journal: We analyze ballots from 12 presidential elections of the American
Psychological Association (APA) for the years from 1998 to 2009. These elections provide a rich source
of full and partial ranking ballots. Each year features five candidates (anonymized here). The number of
ballots in the APA elections typically exceeds 15,000. This is two to three orders of magnitude more than the
sample size of most laboratory studies on consensus methods in social psychology (see Hastie and Kameda,
2005). Another major advantage of these data sets over laboratory data is that, as Chamberlin et al. (1984)
explain, the APA elections can legitimately be thought of as high-stakes consensus processes of a highly
diverse organization. The APA represents the interests of several very distinct constituencies and engages in
high-level lobbying and extensive public education campaigns on behalf of its membership: APA presidential
elections were not—and are not—a mere formality.
We show that, consistent with earlier empirical work (Brams and Fishburn, 2001, Chamberlin et al.,
2http://rangevoting.org/Burlington.html.
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Table 4.1: Hypothetical preference profile of 13 voters for three choice options, B,P, and S.
Individual preference ranking Number of voters
(from best to worst) who have that preference
B  S  P 3
P  B  S 5
P  S  B 1
S  B  P 3
S  P  B 1
1984, Chamberlin and Featherston, 1986, Dobra, 1983, Dobra and Tullock, 1981, Feld and Grofman, 1992,
Felsenthal and Machover, 1995, Felsenthal et al., 1993, Laslier, 2003, Leining, 1993, Mackie, 2003, Niemi,
1970, Niemi and Wright, 1987, Radcliff, 1997, Rapoport et al., 1988, Regenwetter and Grofman, 1998a,b,
Regenwetter et al., 2006a, 2007b, Saari, 2001c, Tideman and Plassmann, 2012, Van Deemen and Vergunst,
1998), there is hardly a trace of a Condorcet paradox. Building on that prior work, we furthermore find that
Condorcet yields outcomes consistent with all six competing Social Choice rules we consider: Antiplurality
(Negative Plurality); Borda; Coombs; Plurality; Plurality Runoff and the Single Transferable Vote. While
prior work has paid attention primarily to the Condorcet paradox and either the match and mismatch
of winners or social orders generated under competing voting methods, we shift perspective to the core
conundrum entrenched in the theoretical literature: Extreme disagreement among competing consensus
criteria. More precisely, our analysis will place a premium on comparing the consensus winners with the
consensus losers of different aggregation methods. To provide some background, we now give a ‘worst-
case-scenario’ example of utter disagreement among four rules over three candidates. Then we review the
literature and reinforce the grim predictions under common theoretical assumptions. Finally, we turn to the
data, dispelling those grim predictions, and we finish with the discussion of our results and their prescriptive
implications for consensus formation in organizations.
Social Choice Disagreement. Consider a hypothetical example when a group of 13 voters needs to
collectively rank three choice options, B, P , and S. Writing X  Y when a voter strictly prefers an option
X to an option Y , consider the individual preference rankings of these 13 voters in Table 4.1. A frequency
distribution over preference states is called a profile.
According to the Borda procedure3, the first ranked option of each voter scores two points, and the
second ranked scores one point. The group consensus is therefore the social order B  P  S, with a
14 : 13 : 12 point tally, asserting that the collective choice, the Borda winner, is B.
3Detailed and formally precise algorithms for the seven consensus methods, that accommodate a variety of input formats,
can be found in the Online Supplement. Here we only briefly sketch intuitively how they work.
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But will everyone accept that B represents a consensus candidate? Application of the most commonly
used contemporary voting method, the Plurality rule, provides the aggregate order P  S  B, with a
6 : 4 : 3 tally. Here, each voter gives one vote to one option, namely the option he or she ranks first. From
this perspective, the consensus choice, the Plurality winner, ought to be option P .
Next, consider the most heavily promoted, but also strongly contested, procedure for electoral reform
across all types and levels of government in the United States, the STV Rule.4 If seeking a single consensus
option, STV chooses the Plurality winner when that option was ranked first by more than half of the voters.
Otherwise, an iterative elimination and retallying process starts. The option with the smallest number of
Plurality votes is eliminated, the remaining options are re-ranked, and a new Plurality score is computed
among the remaining options. In our example, using the preference profile in Table 4.1, B is eliminated,
and STV selects consensus option S, hence disagreeing with both the Borda and Plurality procedures. The
two-seat version of STV selects S and P , hence suggesting that the consensus ordering from best to worst
is that S is the overall best, and that B is the overall worst option for the collectivity.
So, which choice alternative is the consensus option? We have come full circle: each of the three
alternatives B, P , and S has, in turn, been identified as the consensus option using a major consensus
procedure. In fact, the situation is even more dire!
The Marquis de Condorcet (1785) proposed a Social Choice rule that yields an option as the winner if
that option beats all competitors in pairwise competition (Ben-Ashar and Paroush, 2000, Berg, 1993, 1996,
Estlund, 1994, Ladha, 1992, 1995, List and Goodin, 2001, Miller, 1996, Owen et al., 1989, Young, 1988).
The critical problem with this rule is known as the Condorcet paradox of majority cycles (Arrow, 1951, 1963,
Gehrlein, 1981, 1983, Kuga and Nagatani, 1974, Lepelley, 1993). The rule can completely fail to generate
a consensus choice due to intransitive social preferences. The possibility of majority cycles threatens that
organizations could become paralyzed when facing collective decisions. Organizations could also expose
themselves to outcome manipulation through agenda setting.
Returning to our hypothetical group of 13 voters, we find a Condorcet paradox, indeed: option P is
preferred to option B by a majority (7 voters prefer P to B whereas only 6 voters prefer B to P ), B is
majority preferred to S, and S is majority preferred to P , hence yielding an intransitive cycle. No matter
what decision the organization adopts, a majority of voters objects to the decision!
Table 4.2 summarizes the Social Choice conundrum we have just reviewed. Examples like this abound
4In cases where an organization seeks to find a single consensus option, this is the popular multistage procedure labeled
Instant Runoff in the media (see, e.g., http://www.instantrunoff.com/). In academic circles, this consensus method is known
as the Hare system (Hare, 1857) or the Alternative vote. This procedure is called the Single Transferable vote (STV) among
election scholars in the more general case, where an organization or society seeks to find a prespecified number of consensus
choices, such as a committee or a national parliament.
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Table 4.2: Social Choice outcomes for the preference profile in Table 4.1.
Consensus method Borda Plurality STV Condorcet
Winner B P S None
Loser S B B None
Social Order B  P  S P  S  B S  P  B Cycle
in the theoretical Social Choice literature (cf. Saari, 2000a). These examples illustrate how easily one can
imagine a situation in which competing aggregation rules disagree massively on the legitimate winners and
losers of a consensus procedure. Hence, four consensus rules can provide four completely different conclusions
about just three choice options.
In the Social Choice literature, as well as in the public debate on the internet, it is standard to use
thought experiments like this to discredit any given consensus method. Opponents of Borda will, e.g.,
provide hypothetical examples where introduction of a ‘decoy’ candidate can reverse the outcome between
the two front runners. Opponents of Plurality will, e.g., provide hypothetical examples where a plurality
winner has support of extremely few voters. Opponents of STV will, e.g., provide hypothetical examples
where a candidate can improve his chance of winning by strategically asking some of his supporters either
not to vote or to rank an opponent as preferable. Opponents of Condorcet will provide examples like ours
where a majority of voters will oppose the winner, no matter who is elected.
Extensive and sophisticated mathematical work, such as Arrow’s “impossibility theorem” (Arrow, 1951)
explain why there is a large potential for disagreement: different procedures satisfy and violate different
rationality principles and are therefore mutually irreconcilable. After intense study in the second part of the
20th century, Social Choice theory has fallen out of fashion in the socio-economic sciences, with many scholars
fully disillusioned about finding one perfect Social Choice rule. However, thanks to the ubiquitous need for
information aggregation, including preference aggregation, in online retailing and data base search, as well
as the push towards electronic voting, consensus methods are experiencing a new boom in computer science,
engineering, operations research, and related disciplines (see, e.g., Bartholdi and Orlin, 1991, Conitzer et al.,
2006, 2007, Faliszewski et al., 2009c, Goldsmith and Rothe, 2013, Ilyas et al., 2008, Kalech and Goldman,
2011, Lu and Boutilier, 2011a,b, Zhou et al., 2009, for examples and additional references). Much of that
work focuses on algorithms and complexity issues related to consensus methods.
Are award committees, electorates, managers, online retailers, and web-based recommender systems
stuck with an impossibility of rational preference aggregation? Are groups, large and small, including the
American Psychological Association, doomed to make arbitrary consensus decisions that are bound to violate
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systematically at least some principles of rational choice, no matter what consensus method they employ?
4.2 Literature Review
The theoretical literature has relied on two major tool sets to compare consensus methods. A large branch
of the literature relies on algebraic and geometric methods, oftentimes through axiomatic characterization of
mathematical possibilities and impossibilities. A second, smaller branch has taken a statistical perspective,
almost exclusively through sampling-based characterizations of consensus outcomes. Both of these branches
of the literature are routinely interpreted as showing that competing Social Choice rules fundamentally
contradict each other. We first briefly summarize landmark results of the axiomatic approach to show why
they may suggest that uniquely rational Social Choice is unachievable. Then we summarize and extend the
sampling-based approach with a number of new analyses. We provide a new simulation study that uses two
standard theoretical assumptions and that dampens some of the pessimism inherent in most discussions that
use thought-experiments.
4.2.1 Axiomatic, Algebraic and/or Geometric Foundations
Impossibility Results. The normative literature on Social Choice has highlighted in systematic ways how
profoundly various Social Choice procedures differ from each other in their mathematical properties (see the
summaries in Chamberlin and Cohen, 1978, Tideman, 2006). The most prominent examples are impossibility
theorems such as Arrow’s paradox (see Arrow, 1951) and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (see Gibbard,
1973, Satterthwaite, 1975). Scholars frequently interpret these to state that every consensus method is
flawed, because every conceivable aggregation rule must violate at least one axiom of rational collective
choice. For example, since the Condorcet rule can produce majority cycles, it violates the properties of
“transitivity” and “unrestricted domain.” In particular, the Condorcet rule does not necessarily provide a
unique winner. The Condorcet paradox of cyclical majorities has been explored extensively in the Social
Choice literature (see among others Gehrlein, 1983, Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1976b, Saari, 1994). More
recent work along similar lines, by Saari (1994, 1999, 2000a), has provided algebraic and geometric tools to
characterize and even systematically construct many if not all conceivable (and mathematically possible)
disagreements among consensus methods. A common interpretation of the algebraic and geometric work is
that drastic disagreements among rules, such as those illustrated in the introduction, where the best choice
by one method was the worst by another, are to be expected by default.
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Domain Restrictions and Possibility Results. Another branch of the Social Choice literature inves-
tigated domain restrictions that help avoid the Condorcet paradox. One of the most prominent is Black’s
single-peakedness theorem and Sen’s more general possibility theory based on value restriction (Black, 1948,
Sen, 1969, 1970, 1999). These results state that a Condorcet paradox will be impossible whenever, among
any triple of choice options, there is at least one option that none of the voters rank as best, or none of the
voters rank as middle, or no voters rank worst. It appears not only that those results are hard to generalize
to a multidimensional space, but also in spite of all the virtues of single peaked preferences and their impor-
tance in political science, real electorates generally do not appear to satisfy those restrictions (Faliszewski
et al., 2009b, Regenwetter et al., 2003). Again, the sheer restrictiveness of ruling out some preference states
entirely, according to domain restriction conditions, seems to suggest that unequivocal consensus might exist
only in highly contrived situations, hence unequivocal rational Social Choice in real(istic) organizations may
be unobtainable.
So far, we have reviewed why both impossibility and possibility results suggest the intuition that selecting
a consensus option almost always requires violating some rationality principle. We now proceed to a second
strand of the literature that has strongly reinforced this general expectation. This literature has attempted
to quantify the threat of the Social Choice disagreement more specifically. Scholars in this domain have
put numbers on the degree to which we should expect Condorcet paradoxes to happen and the degree to
which we should expect competing consensus methods to clash with each other. We provide additional new
predictions based on two standard theoretical assumptions in this domain.
4.2.2 Statistical Sampling from Theoretical Cultures
A number of scholars have considered Social Choice from a statistical point of view: If we create a profile
by sampling from some theoretical distribution over individual voters or over entire profiles, how likely is it
to run afoul of a voting paradox or other problem? Research in this area has relied on both analytical and
simulation methods with two main goals: To evaluate the likelihood of Condorcet paradoxes and to find the
conditional probability of various methods electing a Condorcet winner when it exists (or, likewise, in some
papers, a Borda winner).
Most work in this area has considered one of two assumptions on how a profile, i.e., a frequency distribu-
tion over preference rankings, comes about. According to the Impartial Culture (IC) assumption, a profile
of N voters comes about by sampling N many individual voter preferences from a uniform distribution over
rankings or other preference relations. According to the Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) assumption,
84
a profile of N voters comes about by sampling one single profile from a uniform distribution over profiles.5
The permissible profiles are usually frequency distributions over linear orders or weak orders. The literature
based on the IC, IAC, and related cultures has predicted that the Condorcet paradox must be ubiquitous
on unrestricted domains (Berg, 1985, Berg and Bjurulf, 1983, DeMeyer and Plott, 1970, Gehrlein, 1981,
1997, Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1976a,b, 1980a,b, Gehrlein and Lepelley, 1997, Jones et al., 1995, Riker, 1982,
Timpone and Taber, 1998, Van Deemen, 1999), whereas a different theoretical assumption based on cardinal
utilities led to the prediction that the Condorcet paradox is rare (Tangian, 2000). The literature on Con-
dorcet efficiency has discussed the conditional probability that a voting method agrees with the Condorcet
rule, as a benchmark of rational Social Choice, given that a Condorcet winner exists, (see Adams, 1997,
Gehrlein, 1985, 1992, 1999a,b, Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1976b, Merrill, 1984, 1985). The general tone of that
literature is similar to the axiomatic literature, namely that agreement among consensus methods is not to
be expected. In contrast, Hastie and Kameda (2005) found high agreement among methods in a simulated
hunter-gatherer society.
Table 4.3: Theoretical Condorcet efficiency of five major consensus methods.
Source Our Simulation Nurmi (1992)
Consensus Unconditional Unique Winner Conditional Conditional
Method Condorcet Proportion Condorcet Condorcet
Efficiency Efficiency Efficiency
Condorcet 0.748
Borda 0.634 0.989 0.854 0.86
Plurality 0.428 0.962 0.593 0.58
Antiplurality 0.399 0.959 0.557 -
Single Transferable 0.601 0.887 0.903 0.89
Coombs 0.611 0.899 0.905 0.90
Plurality Runoff 0.428 0.962 0.593 -
Note: We report the unconditional and conditional Condorcet efficiencies, as well as the proportion of times
a unique winner existed, in 10,000 simulated profiles, for 5 candidates and 999 voters, under the Impartial
Culture assumption.
Instead of going over the grim predictions of the IC and IAC assumptions from miscellaneous authors,
we replicate and extend them in simulations. Table 4.3 shows simulated Condorcet efficiency rates under
the Impartial Culture assumption, for five candidates and 999 voters. We also provide the unconditional
Condorcet efficiency, by which we mean the total rate of agreement between each voting rule shown in the
first column, and the Condorcet rule. The unconditional rates are relatively low, as shown in column two of
Table 4.3. The third column shows, for each rule, the probability that a unique winner exists. Riker (1982,
p. 122) reported that 25.1% of profiles have no Condorcet winner, for five candidate and infinite electorates,
5While conceptually similar, these are not equivalent. While in the IC every ballot is equally likely, in the IAC every profile
is equally likely. There is a ‘different’ IAC for every value of N .
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hence the prediction for 999 voters essentially matches the infinite electorate case. The Conditional Condorcet
efficiency refers to the rate of agreement between a voting rule and the Condorcet rule conditional on both
rules having a unique and well defined winner, as is the standard in the literature on Condorcet efficiency.
The predicted prevalence of Condorcet paradoxes leads to a sizeable difference between conditional and
unconditional Condorcet efficiency values. Comparing columns 4 and 5 indicates that our results closely
match those reported by Nurmi (1992).
For the rest of this section, we move beyond Condorcet efficiency and provide a number of new simulation
results, some of which temper the pessimistic tone of the prior theoretical literature. We later use these
results to provide further evidence that our empirical results are very different from the predictions under
the IC and IAC assumptions, effectively rejecting both cultures.
Table 4.4: Beyond Condorcet efficiency: agreement between winners.
Impartial Culture Assumption
Condorcet Borda Plurality Anti- Single Coombs Plurality
Plurality Transferable Runoff
Condorcet 0.748
Borda 0.634 0.989
Plurality 0.428 0.540 0.962
Antiplurality 0.399 0.515 0.281 0.959
Single Transferable 0.601 0.619 0.489 0.361 0.887
Coombs 0.611 0.626 0.391 0.470 0.538 0.899
Plurality Runoff 0.428 0.540 0.962 0.281 0.489 0.391 0.962
Impartial Anonymous Culture Assumption
Condorcet Borda Plurality Anti- Single Coombs Plurality
Plurality Transferable Runoff
Condorcet 0.748
Borda 0.636 0.996
Plurality 0.459 0.558 0.987
Antiplurality 0.378 0.503 0.278 0.986
Single Transferable 0.648 0.667 0.576 0.379 0.962
Coombs 0.657 0.691 0.469 0.476 0.628 0.969
Plurality Runoff 0.459 0.558 0.987 0.278 0.576 0.469 0.987
Note: We report the unconditional rates with which two rules yielded unique and identical winners, in
10,000 simulated profiles, for 5 candidates and 999 voters, under the IC assumption (top panel) and the IAC
assumption (bottom panel). The diagonal entries (given in italics) show how often a unique winner existed.
Table 4.4 shows the proportion of simulated samples in which a pair of voting rules yields identical
and unique winners under the IC and IAC assumptions, respectively. The rows and columns in the tables
represent Social Choice rules. Each cell represents the proportion of the simulated profiles for which the
two rules in the corresponding row and column generate identical and unique winners. The cells on the
diagonal indicate how often each rule actually yields a unique winner. In Table 4.5 we move even further
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beyond Condorcet efficiency, to another important question that has not received much attention before. We
consider the likelihood that two rules agree on what is the worst choice option from a collective viewpoint.
We identify how often each rule yields a unique worst choice (diagonal entries) i.e., an option to which
each other option is strictly preferred, and how often two rules identify unique and identical worst collective
choices (off-diagonal).
Table 4.5: Beyond Condorcet efficiency: agreement between losers.
Impartial Culture Assumption
Condorcet Borda Plurality Anti- Single Coombs
Plurality Transferable
Condorcet 0.741
Borda 0.629 0.988
Plurality 0.398 0.515 0.956
Antiplurality 0.409 0.520 0.273 0.961
Single Transferable 0.368 0.477 0.887 0.255 0.887
Coombs 0.387 0.491 0.265 0.885 0.247 0.899
Impartial Anonymous Culture Assumption
Condorcet Borda Plurality Anti- Single Coombs
Plurality Transferable
Condorcet 0.756
Borda 0.649 0.996
Plurality 0.386 0.509 0.985
Antiplurality 0.470 0.570 0.297 0.990
Single Transferable 0.376 0.496 0.962 0.290 0.962
Coombs 0.463 0.562 0.301 0.957 0.293 0.969
Note: We report the unconditional rates with which two rules yielded unique and identical worst choices, in
10,000 simulated profiles, for 5 candidates and 999 voters, under the IC assumption (top panel) and the IAC
assumption (bottom panel). The diagonal entries (given in italics) show how often a unique worst choice
existed. For the Single Transferable Vote this is the candidate who fails to get elected in every committee
of size four or smaller.
Finally, we move to disagreements between rules. In Tables 4.1 and 4.2, the Borda winner was the worst
choice according to the Plurality rule. The possibility that the winner according to one rule can be the
loser according to another rule is an important theme in axiomatic discussions and Social Choice text books.
Table 4.6 reports how often we find that there is a choice alternative which is the unique winner for the row
rule and the unique worst choice according to the column rule, under IC and IAC, respectively.
It is important to notice that these simple simulations, by shifting the attention from Condorcet efficiency
to a much broader set of questions, already casts the ubiquitous pessimism of the axiomatic literature in a
new light: Even the highly artificial assumptions of IC or IAC do not at all reflect the pessimistic tone in
the axiomatic literature. Even under these assumptions, we have very little reason to expect that one of
the choice options could be the single best by one criterion and the single worst by another criterion. It is
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also noteworthy that the worst predicted disagreement rates involve the rules that use the least information
from each voter, namely Plurality, Antiplurality, and Plurality Runoff.
This insight alone may have important implications for electoral design in that organizations should
avoid consensus methods that ignore or discard valuable information about the members’ preferences. This
completes our theoretical discussion, we now proceed to behavioral and empirical work.
Table 4.6: Beyond Condorcet efficiency: match between winners and losers.
Impartial Culture Assumption
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality Single Transferable Coombs
Condorcet - 0 118 139 112 126
Borda 0 - 210 223 195 203
Plurality 129 217 - 1,165 0 1,047
Antiplurality 119 199 1,099 - 1,012 3
Single Transferable 0 41 0 443 - 408
Coombs 0 25 429 0 402 -
Plurality Runoff 129 217 0 1,165 0 1,047
Impartial Anonymous Culture Assumption
Condorcet Borda Plurality Antiplurality Single Transferable Coombs
Condorcet - 0 130 140 130 140
Borda 0 - 250 140 250 210
Plurality 120 190 - 1,050 0 980
Antiplurality 140 250 1,250 - 1,230 0
Single Transferable 0 40 0 480 - 470
Coombs 0 30 430 0 430 -
Plurality Runoff 120 190 0 1,050 0 980
Note: We report the number of times that we find an option that is the unique best choice under the row rule
and the unique worst choice according to the column rule, in 10,000 simulated profiles, for 5 candidates and
999 voters, under IC (top panel) and IAC (bottom panel). We provide frequencies because most proportions
are very small.
4.3 Data and Methodology
If we want to apply and compare a variety of consensus rules on empirical data from collective decision set-
tings in real-world organizations, we face an immediate challenge: Most rules considered in the theoretical
literature are traditionally defined only for preferences represented by complete linear or weak orders. In
contrast, most data sets, say, from real elections, provide only very limited information about individual
preferences of the voters. Plurality ballots only designate a single choice option in each ballot, other ballot
formats include limited additional information about some but usually not all candidates. We need suffi-
ciently rich data and we need to carefully monitor the role of any modeling assumptions we make regarding
‘missing’ data.
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4.3.1 APA Presidential Election Ballots
We analyze ballots from 12 presidential elections of the American Psychological Association (APA). There
is slight overlap with three earlier papers in Psychology and Biology that set the stage for the present paper.
In all, of the 16,380 behavioral statistics underlying this paper, 48 were previously published and 12 were
strongly suggested.6
In other words, we provide a large-scale and full-fledged analysis that shows the viability of the research
program put forth by the three predecessor papers. APA elections present unique data sets in that they
provide a detailed picture of the distribution of preferences in a very large scientific and professional organi-
zation in the United States. They occur annually and always feature five candidates. The median turnout
in our 12 sets of ballots is 17,503 voters. In contrast, most national or local surveys and open source election
ballots include a much smaller number of candidates (typically three) or a much smaller voter pool (typically
fewer than 2,000 observations). The particular advantage of the APA data set for behavioral Social Choice
is not only the large number of candidates and ballots, but also the format of the ballots, which we label
as partial ranking ballots. Each voter provides either a full ranking (all candidates are ranked) or a partial
ranking (some candidates are ranked) of the candidates.
Truthful Reporting. As with any voting data, it is necessary to question whether the data reveal the
true preferences of the voters. We treat these particular data sets as sincere ballots for three reasons. First,
the vast number of voters (about 20 thousand per year) makes small-scale manipulation inefficient, unless
the contest is extremely tight. Second, unlike political elections, the APA elections do not entail much
campaigning or public announcements that can serve as coordination devices for manipulation. Third, the
APA uses the STV aggregation method, in which effective strategic manipulation, even by a sophisticated
electorate, is known to be extremely computationally expensive (cf. Tideman, 2006, pp. 194–195).
Before we proceed to discuss methodology, we consider some basic empirical properties of these data
sets and how they relate to three central primitives of the theoretical literature that played an important
role in the first half of the paper: Linear order preferences, the Impartial Culture, and domain restriction
conditions.
The Theoretical Primitive of Linear Order Preferences. Much of the Social Choice literature
assumes that individual preferences are linear orders, i.e., complete rankings of the choice alternatives.
6Regenwetter et al. (2007b) introduced the bootstrap methods and two of the models, but did not compute rates of agreement.
They considered 4 of our 12 elections. A position paper by Regenwetter et al. (2009b) considered two of the three models for
three of the seven consensus methods on eight of the twelve APA data sets. They introduced the bootstrap analysis of pairwise
agreements among winners. Another position paper (Regenwetter, 2009) used one model, five of the seven consensus methods,
and one data set in an illustration. All three papers bootstrapped pseudo-profiles exclusively of the same size as the original
empirical profile.
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Empirically, the picture may be more complicated. While many voters fully rank all five candidates, Table 4.7
shows that partial rankings always represent a non-negligible portion of the data since they make up from
38% to 79% of all ballots. It also shows that partial rankings of all lengths are very common in all 12 data
sets. In every data set, between 37% and 44% of voters only rank three or fewer candidates. This calls into
question the common assumption in the literature that every voter has a complete linear order preference
among the choice options. We later discuss what methodology we use to tackle this discovery in a way that
protects us from making arbitrary assumptions about the nature of individual preferences. It is tempting to
treat incomplete rankings as rankings with missing data and to draw inferences about these missing data.
When considering this possibility, we want to avoid extracting or constructing artifacts.
Table 4.7: Full and partial rankings in the data.
Election Number of Candidates Ranked Number of
Year 5 4 3 2 1 Voters
1998 0.57 0.01 0.08 0.14 0.20 18,723
1999 0.56 0.01 0.09 0.15 0.18 18,398
2000 0.56 0.01 0.10 0.15 0.19 20,239
2001 0.57 0.02 0.08 0.13 0.20 17,911
2002 0.60 0.02 0.11 0.11 0.16 17,094
2003 0.21 0.36 0.08 0.14 0.21 17,956
2004 0.58 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.19 16,245
2005 0.58 0.01 0.08 0.17 0.16 14,506
2006 0.59 0.02 0.10 0.14 0.16 16,836
2007 0.62 0.02 0.09 0.12 0.16 13,318
2008 0.54 0.05 0.07 0.13 0.21 18,286
2009 0.58 0.01 0.08 0.12 0.21 15,313
Culture Assumptions and Restricted Domain Restrictions. As we have seen earlier, a very com-
mon assumption in the theoretical Social Choice literature is the Impartial Culture assumption according to
which each electorate is a random sample from a uniform distribution over linear orders. So, did the APA
partial ranking data originate from an Impartial Culture?
For 5 candidates we obtain 5! = 120 possible linear orders and 5! + 5! + (5× 4× 3) + (5× 4) + 5 = 325
possible partial rankings. To test whether a given set of APA ballots originate from an Impartial Culture,
we consider two approaches: 1) We concentrate on the full rankings only, discard the other ballots, and test
whether the observed full rankings from a given year are a random sample from a uniform distribution over
the 120 possible linear orders. 2) We consider the full data from a given year and test whether they form
a random sample from a uniform distribution over all 325 possible partial rankings. A regular Chi-square
test rejects the Impartial Culture hypothesis at the 0.001 significance level for each of the 12 data sets, both
on linear orders and partial rankings. For illustrative purposes we graph the number of ballots containing
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each of the 120 linear orders for the year 1998 in Figure 4.1, using a dashed curve. The solid lines show the
expected frequencies according to the Impartial Culture and the dotted lines delineate a reasonable range
within which we expect to see about 95% of the frequency distribution if we allow for variability due to finite
sampling. The other 11 empirical profiles give similar results and are omitted for brevity.
Figure 4.1: Frequencies of linear orders in the 1998 APA data.
Testing whether the APA data are consistent with an Impartial Anonymous Culture—the assumption
of a uniform distribution over profiles—would require a large number of empirical profiles. Hence, with
just 12 elections, we cannot test the IAC assumption. However, we later see that its predictions about the
disagreement among voting methods are not descriptive of our data.
As we have seen earlier, possibility theorems in Social Choice typically leverage domain restriction con-
ditions to derive the possibility of rational Social Choice. Are the APA ballots domain-restricted? In each
data set we observe large numbers of all possible linear orders. The smallest frequency of any linear order
in the 1998 election in Figure 4.1 was 18 voters. Value restriction, including single-peakedness, is clearly
rejected in each election and does not require a formal statistical test.
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4.3.2 Methodology
Drawing conclusions about an organization from limited data requires making inferences. The replicability of
these inferences should be quantified (Regenwetter et al., 2006a). To measure the robustness of our inferences
about population consensus from our empirical data, we employ bootstrap techniques. In our nonparametric
bootstrap analyses, we create ten thousand pseudo-profiles by sampling ballots with replacement from each
empirical profile. In our parametric bootstrap analyses, we first generate a best fitting population profile
based on the observed empirical profile, subject to certain modeling constraints, and we then generate ten
thousand pseudo-profiles by sampling ballots with replacement from the best-fitting population profile. We
apply each voting rule to each of the 10,000 bootstrapped pseudo-profiles and can thereby evaluate how
sensitive the consensus outcomes are to effects of random sampling, and as a proxy, to small variations in
the empirical distribution.
Modeling Assumptions. Besides statistical replicability, a second major hurdle makes behavioral Social
Choice challenging: As we saw in Table 4.7, oftentimes fewer than 60% of APA voters provide the complete
ranking (linear order) of choice alternatives that forms the theoretical primitive of standard Social Choice
theory. When individual responses do not provide a complete ranking of all choice alternatives, we must
make a difficult decision about whether or not to treat this as a missing data problem, and how to even
compute consensus outcomes for such data. Whatever assumptions we make in this step could profoundly
influence our substantive conclusions. Regenwetter et al. (2006a) and Regenwetter and Rykhlevskaia (2007)
developed a general modeling environment that allows us to work with a wide class of voting rules and make
them applicable to a variety of preference representations, not just complete rankings.
We consider three different models of partial rankings, building on Regenwetter et al. (2009b, 2007b) and
Regenwetter (2009). Figure 4.2 illustrates the basic ideas. Imagine a respondent who partially ranked five
choice alternatives A, B, C, D, E from best to worst as A  B  C. The three models make fundamentally
different assumptions about how such a partial ranking comes about. According to all three models this
person prefers A to B, A to C and B to C, as indicated by the corresponding arrows in the three directed
graphs of Figure 4.2. But the models differ in what they assume about preference involving choice alternatives
D and E. The latter are marked in dashed circles on grey background in Figure 4.2.
The weak order model assumes that all unranked candidates are tied at the bottom. Voters only express
their preferences for their most preferred candidates and do not rank any other candidates. This model
assumes that the voter prefers all ranked candidates to all unranked candidates, and has no preference
between any two unranked candidates. This is illustrated by the directed graph on the left of Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Three models of partial ranking responses for the example of partial ranking A  B  C.
We employ a nonparametric bootstrap when using the weak order model.
The (size-independent) linear order model assumes that each respondent has a complete ranking (linear
order) of the choice alternatives, but that many people only reveal the beginning of that ranking. The rest
of the ranking is treated as missing data and inferred statistically from the distribution of responses as a
population probability distribution over linear orders. The inference process assumes that the number of
objects partially ranked is independent of the underlying full ranking. The partial ranking A  B  C is the
beginning of two linear orders, A  B  C  D  E and A  B  C  E  D, shown as directed graphs
in the center panel of Figure 4.2. Denote the population probabilities of orderings A  B  C  D  E
and A  B  C  E  D as pABCDE and pABCED, respectively. Let the probability of reporting just 3
alternatives be s3. Then, the probability pABC , of observing partial ranking A  B  C, is modeled as
pABC = s3 × (pABCDE + pABCED) . We use a parametric bootstrap with the linear order model.
The partial order model only assumes binary preferences among options that were included in the partial
ranking.7 In A  B  C, A is preferred to B and C, but, as the lack of arrows in the right hand side
graph in Figure 4.2 indicates, there is no preference involving either D or E. We employ a nonparametric
bootstrap when using the partial order model.
Model-Dependence. In their critiques of the theoretical literature, List and Goodin (2001) and Regen-
wetter et al. (2006a, 2009b) showed that the likelihood of a Condorcet paradox and the Condorcet efficiency
change dramatically under even minute deviations from the Impartial Culture assumption. Whether a Con-
7Elsewhere, this was named the Zwicker model, after W. Zwicker, who proposed it to one of the authors at a meeting.
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dorcet paradox occurs in a random sample from a hypothetical culture hinges entirely on the theoretical
assumptions about that culture. “Cultures of indifference,” such as the uniform distribution over linear
orders, are cultures in which all candidates are tied by a given consensus method at the level of the theo-
retical distribution. These cultures are misleading. In the case of Condorcet, as we draw samples or profiles
from these, the majority outcome in samples of odd size cannot be a tie. Therefore the sample Condorcet
outcome converges to the majority tie of the underlying distribution with probability zero for odd samples
as the sample size increases. Instead, that majority tie is replaced by sample majority cycles. In theoretical
cultures with unique and matching Condorcet, Borda, Plurality and Antiplurality winners, e.g., probability
distributions on linear orders that have matching and unique winners under these rules, the conditional and
unconditional Condorcet efficiencies of Borda, Plurality and Antiplurality for large electorates converge to
100%. This is because samples of increasing size will converge to the consensus outcome in the culture from
which they are drawn when that culture is not a culture of indifference.
How does behavioral Social Choice tackle and control for problems of pivotal modeling assumptions?
The three models underlying our behavioral analysis offer radically different and mutually incompatible
interpretations of partial rankings. They also have profoundly different effects on consensus calculations.
For example, to contribute to the Plurality score, a ballot must have an option that is preferred to all other
options. For the partial ranking A  B  C this is the case for option A under both the weak order model
and the linear order model. But the partial order model considers all partial rankings as invalid ballots
for Plurality, because they do not contain a choice option that is strictly preferred to all other options.
Similarly, to contribute to the Antiplurality score, a ballot must have an option to which all other options
are strictly preferred. When a ballot partially ranks only three or fewer out of five options, then only
the linear order model uses this ballot in Antiplurality. This will turn out to be very important. Given
the myriad of possible ways that partial rankings can reflect underlying preferences, we should be strongly
concerned about the ways in which our substantive conclusions regarding the Social Choice conundrum vary
with modeling assumptions. Many prior papers have not considered the model-dependence of their findings
(see Regenwetter et al., 2006, 2007, 2009, and Regenwetter, 2009, for more thorough discussions).
4.4 Results
We considered 12 different APA elections, using the three different models for interpreting partial rankings.
After computing the outcomes according to seven consensus methods, we used bootstrap methods to evaluate
how confident we can be that pairs of rules yield identical winners, identical losers, or that the winner
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of one rule is the loser by another. In the bootstrap analyses, we generated 10,000 parametrically or
nonparametrically bootstrapped pseudo-profiles per election and model. Hence, across 12 elections and 3
models, we generated a total of 360,000 pseudo-profiles. Each such pseudo-profile contained on the order of
20,000 voters—in these analyses we always drew as many voters for the pseudo-profiles as there were in each
original data set. Using each set of 10,000 bootstrapped pseudo-profiles, we obtained rates of agreement
between all pairs of rules for 36 sets of data, where a “set of data” is an election paired with a model. The
Online Supplement fully tabulates 36 separate analyses for the agreement on winners and losers, respectively.
Here, we focus on key summary results.
We start with the Condorcet efficiency. Table 4.8 shows the empirical counterpart to Table 4.3 regarding
Condorcet efficiency rates. We report the empirical rate of agreement between Condorcet and each of the
other rules, averaged over all 360,000 pseudo-profiles. The table provides both conditional and unconditional
empirical Condorcet efficiencies, as well as the proportion of times that each rule yielded a unique winner.
Table 4.8: Empirical Condorcet efficiency
Consensus Unconditional Rate Conditional
Method Condorcet method yields Condorcet
Efficiency unique winner Efficiency
Condorcet 0.983
Borda 0.929 1.000 0.945
Plurality 0.863 1.000 0.878
Antiplurality 0.717 1.000 0.729
Single Transferable 0.981 1.000 0.997
Coombs 0.923 1.000 0.938
Plurality Runoff 0.871 1.000 0.881
Note: empirical rate of conditional and unconditional agreement between Condorcet and other rules, and
rate at which each rule yielded a unique winner, averaged over all 360,000 pseudo-profiles generated from
the 12 APA elections and three models.
The first notable difference between the data and the theoretical predictions is the virtual absence of the
Condorcet paradox. In Table 4.4, the IC and IAC assumptions yield a Condorcet winner 75% of the time.
We find no Condorcet paradox in any of the original 12 elections under any of the three models, nor in any
of the 240,000 pseudo-profiles generated from the 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2006–2009 elections under any of
the three models. Only in the partial order analysis of the 1998 election do we observe a substantial number
of Condorcet paradoxes in our sampled pseudo-profiles (6.7%). In all other analyses the rate is below three
per mille. Because of the rarity of the Condorcet paradox, the conditional and unconditional Condorcet
efficiency rates are almost identical in the data. This result contrasts the theoretical predictions under the
Impartial Culture assumption. Most importantly, the empirical Condorcet efficiency is far higher than the
theory predicts.
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Figure 4.3: Agreement on unique winners and on unique losers.
Condorcet rule, Winners Borda rule, Winners
Condorcet rule, Losers Borda rule, Losers
Note: Seven consensus rules, 12 APA elections, using 3 models for partial rankings. Rates of agreement
increase with distance from the center. The size of each circle indicates the number of data sets, out of 36,
whose rate of agreement falls in that range. The theoretical rates of agreement according to IC/IAC are
marked with squares/Xs.
We now proceed beyond Condorcet efficiency and consider the agreement among different consensus
methods regarding best and worst consensus options. To summarize our results, we present most of them
graphically. First we discretize the rates of agreement by dividing the unit interval into five ranges of equal
size, so that we can categorize the rates as falling into the intervals [0,0.2], (0.2,0.4], (0.4,0.6], (0.6,0.8], or
(0.8,1]. For each pair of rules, we computed the number of sets of data out of 36, for which the rate of
agreement falls into each of these five ranges. Figure 4.3 presents the rates of agreement on unique winners
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and unique losers, among the seven different voting rules across twelve years and three partial ranking
models. The upper left diagram of Figure 4.3 compares the rates of agreement between the Condorcet
winner and the winners according to the other six voting rules. The voting rule in the center represents the
reference rule (here it is Condorcet). Each leg represents a unit interval with 0 at the reference rule and 1
at the end of the leg. Each leg can have up to five circles, represent the five ranges mentioned before. The
diameter of each circle visualizes the number of data sets for which the rates of agreement between the two
rules fall within the corresponding range. The number of data sets is also written inside each circle when
there is enough space. The largest possible number is 36, namely when all 12 elections give that rate of
agreement across all 3 models. When the largest circle is at the end of a leg, the corresponding rule agrees
almost perfectly with the reference rule. Similarly, when the largest circle is at the start of the leg, near the
center of the display, then the two rules agree in almost none of the pseudo-profiles.
The upper right diagram in Figure 4.3 presents the rates of agreement on unique winners between the
Borda rule and the other six rules. The two lower diagrams show the rates of agreement on unique losers
between the Condorcet rule (on the left), respectively the Borda rule (on the right), and the other rules.
Plurality Runoff only selects a winner. Therefore, when computing the rate of agreement regarding losers
with Plurality Runoff, we assume, in this figure, that there is an agreement if the loser of a rule is not selected
as the Plurality Runoff winner. We also show the two theoretical benchmarks that we have discussed in
the theoretical part of the paper, namely the expected rates of pairwise agreement among rules under the
Impartial Culture and Impartial Anonymous Culture assumptions. The rates of agreement under IC are
indicated by squares, and those under IAC are shown as Xs. We obtained these theoretical rates via Monte-
Carlo simulation.
Consider, for example, the rate of agreement between Antiplurality and Condorcet on a unique winner.
In the upper left panel of Figure 4.3, the square and X indicate that we would expect the rate of agreement
to be quite low based on the IC and IAC assumptions. The empirical picture is more complicated: There
are four circles on the leg connecting Condorcet and Antiplurality. The largest circle, located at the end of
the leg, shows that in 23 of 36 analyses, the two rules yield the same unique winner in more than 80% of
bootstrapped pseudo-profiles generated from the data. The second largest circle is located in the [0, 20%]
range. Here, the two rules agree in fewer than 20% of bootstrapped pseudo-profiles. This happens in 8 of
the 36 analyses.
The two upper panels of Figure 4.3 show unconditional theoretical and empirical Condorcet/Borda
efficiencies. If the position of a circle on a leg is far from (close to) the center, then the unconditional
empirical Condorcet/Borda efficiency of the corresponding rule is high (low). The upper left diagram of
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Figure 4.3 suggests that the empirical Condorcet efficiency of all the rules, except Antiplurality, is very
high. Similarly, the upper right diagram indicates that the Borda efficiency of all rules is high. In all cases,
the Impartial Culture and the Impartial Anonymous Cultures appear to be overly pessimistic assessments
compared to the empirical results. Yet, at the same time a few analyses yield worse performance than the
theoretical expectation, as indicated by the smaller circles that are closer to the center than the squares and
Xs.
Notice that, when applied to the APA data sets, the complex multistage rules (Single Transferable Vote,
Coombs, Plurality Runoff) provide results very similar to the simple rules (Plurality, Antiplurality). The
agreement among Borda, Plurality, Condorcet, the Single Transferable Vote, and Plurality Runoff rule on
winners is virtually perfect. Agreement among the same rules on losers is also relatively high. This is
consistent with a theoretical result of Saari (1999), that, in the absence of Condorcet cycles, Borda and
Condorcet stand a good chance of yielding identical social orders. Surprisingly, the Plurality rule agrees
with many other rules almost perfectly on winners, even though it disregards much preference information
and only includes ballots that rank a candidate strictly best.
Two Key Findings. Table 4.9 is the empirical counterpart to Table 4.6 and it highlights two particularly
important findings. The middle panel shows the total number of pseudo-profiles, out of 10,000 nonparametric
weak order bootstrap samples drawn from the 2009 data, in which the best choice by each row rule matches
the worst choice by each column rule. The bottom panel shows the corresponding numbers for the partial
order model nonparametric bootstrap. The top panel gathers the corresponding total numbers of pseudo-
profiles out of all remaining 340,000 bootstrap samples combined, in which the best choice by the row rule
matched the worst choice by the column rule. The top panel shows the first important finding, namely
the complete absence of the prototypical Social Choice conundrum across all three models in 11 of the
12 elections. With the exception of the 2009 APA election, none of the analyses ever revealed a choice
alternative that was the unique winner for the row rule and the unique worst choice according to the column
rule either in the original elections under any of the three models, or in any of the 340,000 pseudo-profiles
we just mentioned. By Table 4.6 we would expect most counts in the top of Table 4.9 to be in the thousands
or tens of thousands. To our knowledge, we are the first to ever carry out this type of analysis.
The analyses, especially of the 2009 election, document another major finding: Social Choice analyses,
whether theoretical or behavioral, can be model dependent. If we are to believe the linear order model,
according to which all voters have complete linear order preferences as commonly assumed in the Social
Choice literature, and according to which partial rankings are linear orders with missing data, then there is
no trace of the “best versus worst” disagreement in 2009 either. However, the weak order and the partial
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Table 4.9: Beyond Condorcet efficiency: empirical match between winners and losers.
All data sets, except data sets from year 2009 under partial and weak order models
(Out of 340,000 bootstrapped pseudo-profiles)
Condorcet Borda Plurality Anti- Single Coombs
Plurality Transferable
Condorcet - 0 0 0 0 0
Borda 0 - 0 0 0 0
Plurality 0 0 - 0 0 0
Antiplurality 0 0 0 - 0 0
Single Transferable 0 0 0 0 - 0
Coombs 0 0 0 0 0 -
Plurality Runoff 0 0 0 0 0 0
Data set from year 2009, partial order model
(Out of 10,000 bootstrapped pseudo-profiles)
Condorcet Borda Plurality Anti- Single Coombs
Plurality Transferable
Condorcet - 0 0 0 0 0
Borda 0 - 0 0 0 0
Plurality 0 0 - 941 0 939
Antiplurality 0 0 0 - 0 0
Single Transferable 0 0 0 0 - 0
Coombs 0 0 0 0 0 -
Plurality Runoff 0 0 0 941 0 939
Data set from year 2009, weak order model
(Out of 10,000 bootstrapped pseudo-profiles)
Condorcet Borda Plurality Anti- Single Coombs
Plurality Transferable
Condorcet - 0 0 9,905 0 9,905
Borda 0 - 0 857 0 857
Plurality 0 0 - 10,000 0 10,000
Antiplurality 0 0 0 - 0 0
Single Transferable 0 0 0 9,905 - 9,905
Coombs 0 0 0 0 0 -
Plurality Runoff 0 0 0 10,000 0 10,000
Note: We report the number of times, in all 360,000 pseudo-profiles generated from the data, that we find
maximum disagreement between two Social Choice rules, namely that an option is the unique best choice
under the row rule and the unique worst choice according to the column rule.
order model put a question mark on that assumption. In these models, partial rankings are not valid for
Antiplurality computations or, potentially, for the elimination procedure in Coombs. Only the observed
complete rankings enter the Antiplurality tally. At any stage in Coombs, only complete rankings of the
remaining options enter the elimination procedure because only they list a single worst option. And in these
models, Antiplurality and Coombs clash with several of the other rules in that they often declare as worst
choice an option the other rules would declare a clear winner. To be the worst choice in Antiplurality, one
must have been ranked last place among 5 choices on the largest number of ballots. To be the worst choice
in Coombs, one must be eliminated from every committee, regardless of the number of seats that the quota
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Figure 4.4: Agreement on winners for different sample sizes.
Sample size 5 Sample size 10
Sample size 500 Sample size 1,000
Note: We consider samples of 5, 10, 500, and 1,000 voters.
is set for. We have a case of maximal model dependence: Short of knowing how the preferences of those 42%
of voters with incomplete rankings in 2009 relate exactly to the preferences of the other 58% who provided
complete rankings, we cannot tell whether or not there was a clash among voting procedures.
Dependence on the Number of Voters. So far, we analyzed the original data sets and pseudo-profiles
of the same size drawn from them, i.e., around 15,000–20,000 voters per pseudo-profile. We now consider
much smaller pseudo-profiles: if each individual vote mattered more, would that change the relationship
between consensus outcomes? Figure 4.4 presents the rates of agreement on winners between Condorcet and
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the other six rules (akin to the upper left of Figure 4.3) for pseudo-profiles with 5, 10, 500 or 1,000 voters.
The comparison of rates of agreement in Figures 4.4 and 4.3 demonstrates the high level of robustness of our
results across different sample sizes. A bootstrap sample of 1,000 voters from each APA data set is sufficient
to obtain nearly the same pattern of results we found when each pseudo-profile was as large as the original
empirical profile. The agreement rates converge very quickly with the subsample size: an increase from
sample size 5 to sample size 500 already demonstrates substantial improvements in the rates of agreement
on the winner.8 To our knowledge, this is, again, the first analysis of this question in the literature. There
are, however, related recent efforts in computational Social Choice and algorithmic decision theory, to tackle
computational aspects of how much information one needs to collect, how, and at what computational cost,
in order to assess and aggregate the preferences of some target population (see, e.g., Lu and Boutilier,
2011a,b, for examples and further references).
4.5 Practical Implications & Prescriptive Recommendations
Our analyses provide a foundation for various prescriptive recommendations, especially in cooperative envi-
ronments and in environments where strategic behavior is difficult, e.g., because of computational complexity
or lack of actionable information.
Consensus formation in organizations need not be arbitrary. While many situations, such
as elections, require that the consensus method be specified before data or ballots are gathered, this does
not mean that organizations cannot investigate how strongly their consensus outcomes are contingent on
the aggregation formula in use. In particular, in organizations whose members cooperatively wish to find a
consensus, it makes great sense that they should compute a variety of Social Choice rules to get a better
sense of the issues, if any, that need to be fundamentally resolved before the consensus can be robust across
multiple criteria for ‘rational’ aggregation. In the case of APA presidential elections, our findings suggest
that the consensus found through the single transferable vote procedure enjoys strong support also by a
variety of other aggregation methods. Because the single transferable vote is broadly viewed as resilient to
strategic manipulation, particularly in an election with very limited communication between voting members,
we believe that the APA is served well by its voting system. There is much reason to infer that the APA
probably need not worry about arbitrary consensus outcomes in its presidential elections.
8We also checked the reliability of our results with respect to the bootstrap size itself, i.e., the number of pseudo-profiles we
generate from each empirical profile. Our results were based on 10,000 pseudo-profiles per data set. We find that a bootstrap
size of 100 pseudo-profiles already yields essentially the same results.
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Evaluating disagreement and learning from it. While committee decision making oftentimes
involves strategic behavior by its members, there is a straightforward recommendation for cooperative com-
mittees that genuinely seek sincere consensus. Such committees should consider a variety of ways of express-
ing their preferences (such as subsets, partial rankings, full rankings of the choice options) and they should
employ a variety of aggregation rules in order to detect whether there is a component of arbitrariness in the
aggregation process. Seeing where consensus procedures misalign may help the committee better understand
the tradeoffs involved in the consensus process at hand.
Warning signs of questionable consensus outcomes. Any organization that is interested in
genuine collaborative consensus formation should be highly wary of any consensus outcome that is supported
on the basis of small margins: Whenever margins are small, then even slight perturbations to the data
(e.g. ballots) may change the consensus outcome. We interpret this to mean that the organization does not
really have much confidence in knowing what the consensus is in such a case. We conjecture that narrow
margins can also serve as a warning sign for a situation where different aggregation methods, because they are
not stable themselves, can disagree with each other on the consensus outcome. This seems to be particularly
dangerous when there are multiple small margins that create multiple combined uncertainties (and the
possibility of a Condorcet cycle, in particular). Moreover, whenever a consensus outcome is supported with
small margins, then it is crucial that the organization do what it can to maximize sample size (or election
turnout) and to aid the individuals in expressing the preferences as completely as possible (e.g., by moving
from plurality ballots to approval subsets or partial rankings that provide more information from each voter,
or by moving from partial rankings to complete rankings if it seems reasonable to expect voters to provide
that much information). This will help determine whether the small margins are due to massive disagreement
among members or to lack of information about member preferences. There is, however, the danger that
requiring members to provide more information will lead them to provide arbitrary information, say, by
selecting some arbitrary ranking of options that they do not know much about. Hence, organizations that
face narrow margins in a consensus process may also take this as a sign that members have different, hence
possibly incomplete perceptions and knowledge about the alternatives, thus need to be more fully informed
about the choice options.
Ground truth or no ground truth. The basis of the famous Condorcet theorem (Austen-Smith
and Banks, 1996, Ben-Ashar and Paroush, 2000, Berg, 1993, 1996, Estlund, 1994, Grofman et al., 1983,
Ladha, 1992, 1995, List and Goodin, 2001, Miller, 1996, Owen et al., 1989) is the assumption that there is
a ‘ground truth,’ an objectively correct ranking of choice alternatives from best to worst. In a situation like
this, individual’s views of the choice options are often referred to as “judgments,” rather than “preferences”
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and “voters” become “judges.” According to Condorcet’s view, individual judges vary in their judgments
because they are not perfectly able to detect the objective ground truth. We conjecture that in such cases,
there is very little danger of the Social Choice conundrum unless the margins are small (i.e., the judges have
very low validity) and, hence, the confidence in correct outcomes is low as well. In contrast, when there is
no ground truth, it appears to be much more plausible that the distribution of preferences can be highly
multimodal due to a high diversity of opinions, and that there is more opportunity for different consensus
methods to pick up genuinely different properties of that distribution.
Social Choice theory of the future. In our opinion, future theoretical developments should move
beyond the somewhat philosophical question of collective rationality and, instead, place practical goals and
empirical considerations front and center. Instead of axiomatizing rationality principles, future work could
axiomatize properties that enhance the practicality of a consensus method. Much work in computational
Social Choice is aimed at this goal, e.g., by determining the computational hurdles to strategic behavior and,
hence the resilience of consensus methods to manipulation, for example. Likewise, much work in computer
science is aimed at handling situations involving extremely large numbers of choice alternatives. This issue
has not played a focal role in classical axiomatic Social Choice theory because that theory was developed
before the advent of cyberspace and before the availability of massive databases. From a behavioral point of
view, it is critical to take into account that we do not have a solid understanding of individual preferences,
especially preferences over very large collections of choice alternatives, such as movies or online video content.
This means that theoretical work must take great care to evaluate model dependence of results. Axiomatic
work usually makes overly strong assumptions, such as completeness of individual preferences over all choice
options. Likewise, future axiomatic and other theoretical developments should consider in more depth the
dependency of consensus methods on the numbers of voters. In particular, theorists should aim to design
methods that preform well even with a small number of voters who, furthermore, may provide inaccurate or
incomplete information. This goal is closely intertwined with replacing universal domain, restricted domain,
and IC/IAC assumptions by descriptively accurate or behaviorally reasonable assumptions about the types
of profiles that need to be aggregated. The role of statistics in Social Choice theory has primarily been in the
study of hypothetical sampling distributions, whereas the Social Choice theory of the future should consider
inferential statistics more systematically and hand in hand with empirical evaluations of real profiles. Our
vision is that the Social Choice theory of the future should develop a synergy of axiomatic, computational,
and behavioral points of view.
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4.6 Conclusions and Discussion
We have provided an extensive case study of seven well-known voting rules using twelve exceptionally
large scale data sets from high-stakes elections of an important and diverse organization, the American
Psychological Association. We have evaluated the empirical evidence for the well-known fact that the
collective best choice by one consensus method can easily be the collective worst choice according to another
consensus criterion.
First, there was no Condorcet paradox in any of the 12 elections with any of the three models. To
control for the influence of small random factors, we generated 10,000 pseudo-profiles via a parametric
or nonparametric bootstrap and recomputed the consensus outcomes. In virtually all of these pseudo-
profiles, the Condorcet rule yielded complete linear orders. These findings contrast the dominant view in
the theoretical literature that Condorcet cycles pose an imminent threat to consensus formation, especially
in large electorates. They are consistent with and replicate previous empirical findings in approval voting
and survey data that the Condorcet rule performed well on real data We also ruled out domain restriction
conditions, such as single peaked preferences, the most common explanation for the absence of cycles, again,
replicating earlier findings from survey data. In our data, the lowest frequency of any complete linear order
ranged from two voters (in 2003) to 24 voters (in 2001). We believe that we have provided the most extensive
analysis of domain restriction conditions to date.
Second, we found strong agreement of all rules with respect to the identity of a unique best collective
choice and/or a unique worst collective choice. This high level of agreement was obtained for rules of different
complexity. For example, the one-stage Plurality rule agreed well on winners with the multistage Single
Transferable Vote, where we only reported a unique winner when each smaller committee was included in
each larger committee. This property is call monotonicity in the literature.9 Critics have challenged STV on
the grounds that it can violate monotonicity in thought experiments. However, Figure 4.3, which shows that
36 analyses yield high confidence of agreement on unique winners between STV and Condorcet, documents
that we have high confidence in all 36 analyses that monotonicity was satisfied. The three scoring rules
(Plurality, Borda, Antiplurality) agreed well with the more mathematically complex Condorcet rule, whose
tally requires computing pairwise comparisons. We are the first to have provided an analysis of this kind
and scope.
Third, with the important exception of the 2009 comparison of winners and losers, we demonstrated the
robustness of our results to different modeling assumptions. We did not discard any partial ranking data since
incomplete rankings often represent 40% or more of the ballots. To make all voting rules applicable to partial
9The earlier papers only considered the AV winner, i.e., the single seat STV winner, without checking monotonicity.
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ranking data, we had to consider modeling assumptions about how hypothetical underlying preferences gave
rise to observed partial rankings. Our analysis demonstrated that, despite major differences in the modeling
assumptions, the empirical agreement among voting rules is consistently high. We believe that our attention
to model-dependence far exceeds that of the theoretical literature.
Fourth, we investigated how many voters are needed for our findings. Not only were the agreement
rates high in pseudo-profiles of size 15,000–20,000 (like the data), they also remained high for bootstrapped
pseudo-profiles with just 500–1,000 voters. This implies that surveying 500 or so randomly selected people
could reflect a population profile like the APA electorate and could yield an accurate and consistent consensus
option across multiple consensus methods. We know of no prior paper that has investigated this question.
Empirical analyses of consensus methods are extremely rare in the literature, maybe because the theo-
retical literature has made it so abundantly clear that there is no hope for a universally acceptable rational
aggregation procedures and maybe because it is not clear how results from a few examples in the real world
will generalize to other electorates and other consensus processes. However, empirical research in any dis-
cipline is always bound to considering a small snapshot of the real world, and yet most sciences feature
burgeoning empirical research. Why should Social Choice be any different?
Even though it is obvious that one can only draw limited inferences from a small empirical study, it
should be clear that the current theoretical literature suffers from even stronger limitations. The theoretical
literature abounds with knife-edge assumptions, such as the Impartial Culture or the Impartial Anonymous
Culture assumptions. Many theoretical results hinge on such assumptions because the slightest deviation
from a culture of indifference can profoundly change the predictions, say, of the likelihood of a voting paradox.
Therefore, standard and broadly accepted theoretical assumptions like the Impartial Culture, could very well
lead the literature astray in the same way that a small scale empirical analysis has the potential to mislead.
It has been very clear from our analyses that cultures of indifference and domain restriction conditions are
strong distortions of the empirical reality. So, not only can we question the generalizability of the theoretical
predictions based on these assumptions, even these limited empirical data suffice to refute the standard
assumptions themselves. Likewise, the common assumption that every voter has a complete linear ranking
of the choice options does not appear to be descriptive of our data. The theoretical literature has made many
unchecked assumptions in an attempt to draw very broad policy implications. Some of these assumptions
clearly do not hold up to empirical scrutiny. Empirical work suffers from similar limitations. Clearly, much
more research is needed before we can draw broad generalizations and conclusions about other real world
electorates and other real world consensus situations. That future work should aim to further reconcile and
combine theoretical and empirical considerations. In particular, because our findings contrast theoretical
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predictions, it is of great importance that future work include replication studies that evaluate whether our
findings can be corroborated in other contexts and with other organizations.
While our empirical analyses are tied to the American Psychological Association, the particular years,
candidates, and voters of those 12 elections, we believe, nonetheless, that we can extrapolate important
lessons from these data. The APA elections are representative of many other consensus scenarios. There are
many consensus situations that, like the APA elections, involve organizations with very large memberships
that feature highly diverse goals and priorities, and where the stakes are substantial. Because of the sheer
number of voters, the lack of a large scale election campaign or other communication channels, and the use
of voting procedure that places high computational hurdles in the path of sophisticated voters, we believe it
is plausible that these data provide a rare glimpse at sincere preferences in a diverse and large electorate.
We have placed a high emphasis on evaluating the model-dependence of our findings, and we have
documented that profoundly different models of ballot casting did not affect the substantive conclusions in
most cases. Like our three models of latent preferences, the assumption of sincere ballots is a modeling
assumption that could be relaxed in future extensions. The challenge is to spell out parsimonious and
testable descriptive models of the strategic behaviors of interest. For an example of such an analysis using
Approval Voting data, see Regenwetter et al. (2007a).
Whether a group of people from an organization will reflect the consensus of the organization depends on
whether the group is a representative sample, how many people are in the group, and how narrow the margins
are for each of the consensus methods under consideration. When there is a clear best collective choice
according to a given consensus method in the organization, then a small representative group may already
reflect that overall consensus. This is not the case when margins are narrow. The theoretical literature
based on the Impartial Culture usually recommends small electorates and small numbers of candidates in
order to reduce the risk of a Condorcet paradox. Hence, behaviorally adequate analyses have the potential
to reverse policy recommendations that have originated from the theoretical literature.
In our view, the Social Choice conundrum is consistently overstated in the theoretical literature, in text
books and on the internet. It is standard to highlight that the winner by one rule can easily be the worst
choice according to a different consensus criterion. To our knowledge, we are the first to report a systematic
behavioral analysis of this question on multiple data sets, for multiple rules, and across different electorate
sizes. Although the theoretical literature predicts dismal agreement between voting rules, we find that even
the IC and IAC assumptions actually do not support the idea that the best choice under one rule can easily
be the worst choice under another rule. Furthermore, we find an even much more remarkable overlap among
the seven voting rules when applied to real election data, effectively rejecting the plausibility of both IC
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and IAC assumptions as a proxy for real-life data. But what are good distributional assumptions? Little is
known about the consensus-related distributional properties of real world voters and their preferences. In
our view, the field is wide open for a more integrated synergy of theoretical and empirical work on consensus
methods in the future.
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Chapter 5
Understanding Election Data through
the Saari Decomposition
5.1 Introduction
The classical literature on theoretical Social Choice asserts that certain obstacles and complexities haunt
every aggregation method. Nevertheless, empirical Social Choice rarely finds empirical evidence for the
declared caveats and paradoxes (i.e., counter-intuitive outcomes of aggregations) in real-world data sets. It
is important to note that most conclusions in the theoretical literature heavily rely on abstract impractical
models, while most findings in the empirical literature are obtained from descriptive analysis of ballots. Due
to this distinction, it is difficult to bridge the gap between the drastically different results from these two
branches of literature. Because aggregation methods are particularly pertinent to everyday life, for each
individual and for society as a whole, it is imperative that a better notion of decision theory is available to
a broader audience.
Thus, the area of Social Choice urgently needs practical tools that can facilitate a better understanding
of societal preferences. These tools should be simple enough to be practical for a general audience. These
tools should also be applicable to a wide variety of formats of preference data. One of the goals of this
paper is to provide a novel way of thinking about applying theoretical concepts to the analysis of societal
preferences in real-world electorates. As a first step toward this ambitious goal, I propose a statistic based
on the decomposition method introduced by Donald Saari in 2000.
Saari moved away from the traditional combinatoric approach prevalent in the theoretical Social Choice
literature of the time to a geometrical representation of preferences (Saari, 2000a). He proposed to decompose
the space of all electoral preferences into subspaces, such that changes within each subspace are responsible
for affecting a specific class, while having no impact on other classes of aggregation methods. Saari studied
the properties of these subspaces and proved that, for any electoral profile (a profile lists the preferences of
each voter), there always exists a unique decomposition into two subspaces.
The first subspace consists of profiles that avoid all possible disagreements among the outcomes of
different voting rules and thus achieve consistency of societal preferences across these aggregation methods.
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Saari called these profiles Basic profiles, and the projection of a preference profile on the subspace of Basic
profiles, its Transitive component.
The second subspace, orthogonal to the first one, is responsible for all deviations from the desired
consistency among aggregation methods. Saari called the projection of a preference profile on the second
subspace its Condorcet component. He also proved that the Condorcet component is responsible for the
occurrence of the Condorcet cycle.
Therefore, this decomposition allows me to analyze the structure of an electoral profile and to provide
an explanation for all paradoxes, cycles, and differences in outcomes for a large class of voting rules. Even
though Saari illustrates his decomposition for linear orders, I demonstrate that it can be also applied to
profiles where voters report indifference among candidates. Thus, using this theoretical framework, I can
analyze a wide variety of real-world data sets. I illustrate the way in which the Saari decomposition can
serve as a reliable predictor of rates of agreement between different rules.
In this paper, I expand upon the theoretical predictions found in the existing literature and then proceed
to real-world data analysis. I begin with computing and comparing the social orders of three classic voting
rules: Condorcet, Borda, and Plurality. To illustrate the theoretical predictions, I use three popular envi-
ronments: the Impartial Culture, the Impartial Anonymous Culture, and Single-Peakedness. Then I explore
a broad class of electoral distributions that includes these three standard scenarios as special cases, in order
to draw statistical inferences from survey data about real-world electorates.
Next, I move to the analysis of real-world data sets. In this section, I analyze 77 real-world data sets under
two modeling assumptions that I make regarding ‘missing’ data. I demonstrate, using both real data and
Monte Carlo simulations, the way in which the disagreement between two outcomes for each pair of voting
rules depends on the relative size of the Transitive and Condorcet components of an electoral profile. In
addition, I examine the effect of social homogeneity on the size of the Transitive and Condorcet components
using a Po´lya-Eggenberger urn model.
My results indicate that, when the Condorcet component is non-negligible, a ratio of the absolute val-
ues of the Transitive and Condorcet components translates into rates of disagreement among the outcomes
of the Condorcet, Borda, and Plurality voting rules. I show that this result is robust to the level of so-
cial homogeneity and modeling assumptions regarding missing data. Furthermore, I provide estimates of
the Condorcet Efficiency of the Borda and Plurality rules for various combinations of the Transitive and
Condorcet components. I also provide estimates of the levels of social homogeneity in real-world electorates.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 describes the data and the data formats. Section 5.3 outlines
the theoretical framework. Section 5.4 describes the methodology I use to analyze the data. Section 5.5
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explains my simulation strategy. Section 5.6 discusses the results and major findings. Section 5.7 draws
the conclusion. A detailed data description and the correspondence between my notation and that of Saari
(2000) is in Section 5.2.3.
5.2 Data Description
In this section, I provide information about data characteristics and a description of the data formats.
I have analyzed 9 sets of election ballots from American Psychological Association presidential elections
and 77 National Survey data sets from eight countries: Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Israel,
Japan, Mexico, and Russia, collected between 1961 and 2006. Except for the American Psychological
Association ballots, all data sets were obtained from the web-site of the Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research (ICPSR). The corresponding ICPSR study numbers are provided in Tables 5.3-
5.4.
There are three types of options regarding the preferences reported by the respondents: Political parties,
political leaders, and political values/important issues. Out of the total 77 data sets, 40 data sets contain
data regarding parties; 32 contain data regarding leaders; and 5 contain preferences regarding values and
important issues.
There are two main formats of the data that I use: the Feeling Thermometer format and the Ranked
Data format. Out of the total 77 data sets, 63 are in the former format and 14 are in the latter.
5.2.1 The Feeling Thermometer Data
The Feeling Thermometer data appear in five types of scales. In the first four types, a respondent could
report her preferences on a scale of 0 to 100, 0 to 11, 0 to 10, or 0 to 5. To obtain the preferences, a
questionnaire asked: How much do you like the leader, Mr. XXX/ the political party XXX? Where would
you place him/it on the thermometer? In these types of scales, a larger thermometer value (numerical
rating) represents a more positive attitude toward the particular candidate or political party. For example,
if a respondent prefers candidate A to candidate B, she might assign candidate A numerical rating of 87 and
assign candidate B numerical rating of 34, on a scale of 0 to 100. In the fifth type, a respondent reported
preferences on a scale of 1 to 5, with the condition that a smaller value represents a better opinion of a
particular option, a candidate or a political party. The number of options varied from 3 to 7. I report a
summary overview of these data sets in Table 5.3 in Section 5.2.3.
Table 5.1 provides an example of the Feeling Thermometer data format. In this example, there are 70
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voters and 5 candidates: A, B, C, D, and E. Columns 2-6 represent the candidates; column 7 represents
the number of voters who provided numerical ratings listed in each row. In this particular example, a voter
assigns a higher numerical rating to a more preferable candidate. For example, the first row of Table 5.1
reports that there are 15 voters who assigned a score of 10 to candidate A, a score of 3 to candidate B, a
score of 25 to candidate C, and a score of 60 each to candidates D and E.
Table 5.1: Example of a voting profile: Feeling Thermometer data.
Type A B C D E # of voters
Type-one voter 10 3 25 60 60 15
Type-two voter 80 12 20 50 1 25
Type-three voter 50 50 10 25 6 30
5.2.2 The Ranked Data
The Ranked (ordinal) data appear in two ranges, from 1 to 4 and from 1 to 5. In the first range, a respondent
ranks 4 options, in the second, 5. In order to obtain ranked data, each respondent was presented with a
questionnaire. The questionnaire instructed the interviewer to ask the respondent to report the preference
rank he/she gives to XXX. A smaller value in this data type is always assigned to a more preferable candidate.
I report a summary overview of these data sets in Table 5.4 in Section 5.2.3.
I provide an example of the Ranked Data format in Table 5.2. There are 40 voters and 3 candidates:
F , G, and H. The first row reports that there are 10 voters who ranked candidate F first, candidate G
second, and candidate H third. The second row of Table 5.2 reports that 5 voters ranked candidate H first,
candidate F second, and did not provide any ranking for candidate G.
When completing a questionnaire, the respondents could report full or partial information regarding
their preferences. They could also assign the same numerical rating or rank to more than one candidate.
Unfortunately, survey descriptions and codebooks do not provide information on why some of the data are
missing. Generally, surveys take the form of a questionnaire with a fixed structure; therefore the respondents
have no space to provide reasons why they do not answer some of the questions. There can be multiple
Table 5.2: Example of a voting profile: Ranked Data.
Type F G H # of voters
Type-one voter 1 2 3 10
Type-two voter 2 . 1 5
Type-three voter 1 3 2 25
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reasons for this type of omission: the respondents may have simply not liked some of the candidates; or, they
may have not possessed sufficient knowledge/information about some of the candidates; or, they may have
simply overlooked that particular question in the questionnaire. To accommodate the missing data in my
analysis, I use two models of partial ratings. I provide a detailed description of these models in Section 5.4.1.
It is important to note that national surveys provide a vast source of information. On the one hand,
the surveys usually ask respondents about their preferences in the time frame of a future or a past election.
Respondents are aware that this information is used to obtain the overall picture of the preferences of the
population, though the information that they provide does not directly affect the outcome of the particular
election. Therefore, the respondents have little incentive to report distorted preferences. Thus, I will treat
the data from national surveys as sincere voting data.
The aggregation of survey data mirrors not only a sincere election procedure, but also the very challenges
that large professional organizations and business units face on an everyday basis while making vital decisions
on resource allocation, strategies, and investment policies. Keeping in mind the variety of real-life decision-
making scenarios and the fact that the aggregation of preferences goes well beyond electoral processes, for
brevity I call a respondent a “voter,” and an option a “candidate.”
5.2.3 Real-World Data
This section provides a descriptive summary of 77 survey data sets. All data sets were obtained from the
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) website (http://www.icpsr.umich.edu).
Table 5.3 presents a descriptive summary of the Numerical Rating data sets. Table 5.4 presents the summary
description of the Ranked data sets.
ICPSR. The ICPSR is a unique identification number that corresponds to each survey study.
Type of Options. There are three types of options that were rated by the respondents: parties, candidates,
and values. The option parties means that the respondent provided a numerical rating for a political party.
The option candidates means that the respondent provided a numerical rating for a candidate running for
presidency in the pre/post election surveys or for a political leader in the panel studies. The option values
corresponds to important political issues or national values that the respondent had to rate or to rank.
Number of Options. The number of options in one set varies from 3 to 7. Respondents could report their
preferences about every option or about some of the options in the set. In the analysis I only used data from
the respondents who provided information about at least one option in the set.
Scale. The scale provides the maximum and minimum values that could be assigned to each option. The
respondents could assign each option any integer number between the maximum and the minimum values.
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Criterion. The criterion defines whether a better attitude of a respondent toward the option corresponds
to a smaller value (smaller better) or to a larger value (larger better).
Number of Respondents. The number of respondents column shows the number of respondents in each
data set who reported their preferences about at least one option.
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5.3 Theoretical Framework
In this section, I provide the notation and the main theoretical results that I use later in the paper. For
the sake of brevity and clarity, my notation is modified from the original notation in Saari (2000). The
correspondence between my notation and that of Saari (2000) is provided in Section 5.4.5.
5.3.1 Preferences
Let N be a set of N voters, N = |N|, and K = {A,B,C, ...,W} be a set containing K candidates, K = |K|.
I denote a candidate from the set K by k ∈ K.
For simplicity, let me start with the assumption that each voter reports a full complete asymmetric
transitive preference ranking (a linear order); later in this section, I will demonstrate that this result can be
generalized to a wider class of preferences. For K candidates there are K! possible linear orders. I denote
the set of linear orders by L and a linear order from this set by l ∈ L.
Let me provide an example for a case with K = 3 candidates: A, B, and C. For 3 candidates, there are
3! = 6 possible preference patterns. I list them in Table 5.5. I denote “candidate A preferred to candidate
B” as A  B. For example, the first two columns in the first row of Table 5.5 mean that in the linear
order l1, A  B  C, that is, candidate A is the most preferable candidate, candidate B is the second best
candidate, and C, at the bottom of the ranking, is the least preferable candidate.
Table 5.5: All possible linear orders for 3 candidates: A, B, and C.
l Ranking l Ranking
l1 A  B  C l4 B  C  A
l2 A  C  B l5 C  A  B
l3 B  A  C l6 C  B  A
Profiles. A profile specifies the number of voters for each preference pattern regarding the set of candidates.
I denote a profile by #»p and always refer to the number of candidates in the profile as K. For instance, a
profile with K candidates can be presented as a vector in the K!-dimensional space of natural numbers, NK!0 .
I call this space the profile space. Then, according to the sequence of linear orders presented in Table 5.5, a
vector (4, 0, 0, 5, 0, 1) is a profile with four l1, five l4, and one l6 ranking.
Normalized profiles. A normalized profile specifies the fraction of all voters that provide each ranking,
for each of these rankings. So, in the example from Table 3, (4, 0, 0, 5, 0, 1), with a total of ten voters,
normalizes to
(
4
10 , 0, 0,
5
10 , 0,
1
10
)
. I denote the fraction of all voters with the ranking l as λl. Then the space
of normalized profiles is identified with the (K!− 1) dimensional simplex:
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Si(K!) =
{
λ ∈ RK!
∣∣∣∣∣∑
l∈L
λl = 1, λl ≥ 0
}
.
Unanimity profiles. A unanimity profile is a profiles where all voters in the electorate unanimously agree
on their preferences. In other words, in a unanimity profile all voters report the same ranking. I denote a
normalized unanimity profile for a ranking l by
# »
El, where
# »
El is a unit vector with its l
th element equal to
one, and all other elements equal to zero.
5.3.2 The Saari Space
A standard challenge in theoretical Social Choice is providing representations of a profile in order to facilitate
the analysis. For K candidates, there are
(
K
2
)
= K(K−1)2 possible pairwise comparisons. For each of the
2
(
K
2
)
unordered pairs (X,Y )|X,Y ∈ K, I fix the order, either (X,Y ) or (Y,X). I call them ordered pairs and
denote them by o. Saari’s approach uses a representation of an electoral profile in the space of all ordered
pairs of K candidates. For the example of 3 candidates,
(
3
2
)
= 3 ordered pairs are (A,B), (A,C), and (B,C).
Here, and later, I list the ordered pairs in lexicographic order.
Let me define the space of ordered pairs R(
K
2 ). I call it the Saari space and denote it by S. In this space,
each axis represents an ordered pair of candidates. I use the same index o to denote these axes.
Each normalized unanimity profile
# »
El defines the preferences for each pair of candidates. To construct a
vector
#»
Vl in the Saari space (which corresponds to a profile
# »
El in the profile space), one can use the following
algorithm:
For each ordered pair o = (i, j) comparing candidates i, j ∈ K, the profile # »El ranks candidate i either
above or below j. In the first case, when candidate i is preferred to candidate j, (i  j), I postulate that the
oth element of the vector
#»
Vl is +1. In the second case, when candidate j is preferred to candidate i, (i ≺ j),
I postulate that the oth element of the vector
#»
Vl is −1.
Figure 5.1: The construction of a vector ~Vl in the Saari space.
# »
El → #»Vl
∀o = (i, j)
i  j
#»
Vl = [..., (+1)o, ...]
i ≺ j
#»
Vl = [..., (−1)o, ...]
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Thus, I can define a vector
#»
Vl in the Saari space, which corresponds to each normalized unanimity profile
# »
El, in the profile space. I illustrate this algorithm in the flowchart in Figure 5.1. Table 5.6 lists vectors
#  »
Vl1 , ...,
#  »
Vl6 for 6 normalized unanimity profiles
#   »
El1 , ...,
#   »
El6 respectively.
Table 5.6: The correspondence of the normalized unanimity profiles ~El in the profile space and ~Vl in the Saari
space, for 3 candidates: A, B, C.
Profile space Corresponding ranking Saari space (A,B) (A,C) (B,C)
#   »
El1 = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0] l1: A  B  C
#  »
Vl1 = [+1 +1 +1]
#   »
El2 = [0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0] l2: A  C  B
#  »
Vl2 = [+1 +1 −1]
#   »
El3 = [0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0] l3: B  A  C
#  »
Vl3 = [−1 +1 +1]
#   »
El4 = [0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0] l4: B  C  A
#  »
Vl4 = [−1 −1 +1]
#   »
El5 = [0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0] l5: C  A  B
#  »
Vl5 = [+1 −1 −1]
#   »
El6 = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1] l6: C  B  A
#  »
Vl6 = [−1 −1 −1]
The representation cube. Because, in the Saari space, each normalized unanimity profile
#»
Vl is a vector
of +1 and −1, the profile represents a vertex of a unit hypercube. The convex hull of these vertices is the
representation cube RC(K). I denote the profile in the Saari space by #»q . It corresponds to the profile #»p in
the profile space:
RC(K) =
{
#»q =
∑
l∈L
λl
#»
Vl
∣∣∣∣∣∑
l∈L
λl = 1, λl ≥ 0
}
.
A normalized profile is the convex sum #»p =
∑
l∈L λl
# »
El, so the corresponding RC(K) profile is
#»q =∑
l∈L λl
#»
Vl.
The transitivity plane and the basic profiles. To perform the analysis of electoral profiles, Saari
decomposed his space into subspaces and analyzed the properties of the profiles in different subspaces. He
discovered that the seemingly utopian idea of an electoral profile in which all positional voting rules1 agree
with each other is not at all unrealistic.
Furthermore, Saari specified the subspace that is composed of such desired profiles. He called this
subspace the Transitivity plane and the profiles that span this subspace, the Basic profiles. The Basic
profiles are the ones where the outcomes of aggregation procedures over all subsets of candidates are in
1In positional voting rules points are assigned to alternatives according to the position at which each voter ranks them on
his ballot. Then the candidates are ranked at the aggregate level according to the election tallies - the sums of assigned points
(Saari, 2000a).
119
agreement. I denote the Transitivity plane by T , and the Basic profiles by
{
#»
b k
}
k∈K
. In the Basic profile
#»
b k, candidate k defeats all other candidates by the unanimous vote, while all other candidates are tied
at the bottom of the ranking. I illustrate the algorithm of the construction of the Basic profile
#»
b k in the
flowchart in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: The construction of a Basic profile ~bk.
#»
b k
∀o = (i, j)
i = k
#»
b k = [..., (+1)o, ...]
i 6= k, j 6= k
#»
b k = [..., (0)o, ...]
j = k
#»
b k = [..., (−1)o, ...]
Table 5.7: Basic profiles of the Transitivity subspace for 3 candidates.
Basic profiles (A,B) (A,C) (B,C)
#»
b A = [+1 +1 0 ]
#»
b B = [−1 0 +1]
#»
b C = [ 0 −1 −1]
I list all basic profiles for the 3-candidate example in Table 5.7. These vectors are linearly dependent
(Theorem 4, Saari, 2000a, p. 11). Thus, they span aK−1-dimensional subspace of S, which is a 2-dimensional
space for the 3-candidate example:
∑
k∈K
#»
b k = 0.
Studying the properties of the Transitivity plane and the subspace that is responsible for all disagreements
that might arise in an electoral profile, Saari proved that these two subspaces are orthogonal to each other,
and that together they span the whole representation cube RC(K) (Theorems 8–9, Saari, 2000a, pp. 19–
22). Thus, the beauty of the Saari decomposition is that, by selecting the Transitivity plane in which all
aggregating procedures are in agreement, it automatically finds the orthogonal subspace. Saari called profiles
from this subspace the profile deviations.
The Saari components. Any profile #»p in the space of preference profiles has a corresponding profile
#»q ∈ RC(K) in the Saari space. Saari called the projection of a profile #»q on the Transitivity plane the
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Transitive component and denoted it by #»q T . He also called the projection of #»q on the profile deviations
subspace the Condorcet component and denoted it by #»q C . According to Theorems 9–10 in Saari 2000, any
electoral profile has a unique representation:
#»q = #»q T + #»q C .
Another benefit of the Saari space is that it defines properties for any point in this space. Because any
weak order has a corresponding point in the Saari space, I do not need to limit the preference profiles to
linear orders. The only difference will be that the point will have some zero coordinates. Even though Saari
illustrates his decomposition for linear orders, I show a way in which this decomposition can also be applied
to any weak order profile in Section 5.4.2. Therefore I can analyze a wide variety of real-world data sets.
In the next section, I propose an algorithm with which to calculate the Transitive and Condorcet com-
ponents. I illustrate this algorithm by using a numerical example.
5.4 Methodology
In this section, I describe the way in which I extract the preferences of a given voter from the data. I provide
an algorithm of representation of preferences in the Saari space, as well as the method of combining these
preferences into a profile. Then I propose the decomposition of the profile into a Transitive component and
a Condorcet component.
5.4.1 Data Representation
A challenge in the analysis of real-world data sets is the data format. While most of the theoretical concepts
are defined for linear orders only, this format of data is extremely seldom found in real-life situations. Instead,
most real-world data feature a wide variety of formats, structures, and scales. Furthermore, data sets only
provide partial preferences — specifically, when voters omit information. Therefore, these data formats need
additional assumptions and modeling in order to be able to interpret and analyze data according to the
theoretical paradigm.
As described in Section 5.2, there are three main data formats: Pairwise Comparisons, Feeling Ther-
mometers, and Ranked Data. To define preferences of each voter regarding each pair of candidates, I propose
a simple algorithm that can work equally well with both formats.
Suppose an election has K candidates and N voters. Each voter reports her preferences regarding the
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candidates. As before, I denote that a voter prefers candidate A to candidate B as A  B, a voter prefers B
to A as A ≺ B, and a voter is indifferent between candidates A and B as A ∼ B. For Pairwise Comparisons
format we obtain preferences of a voter directly. In this format each voter reports whether she prefers
candidate A to candidate B, candidate B to A, or she is indifferent between these two candidates. For the
remaining two cases I derive preferences of each voter from the data according to the following algorithm:
1. If two candidates A and B are assigned the same numerical value, then A ∼ B.
2. If two candidates A and B are assigned different numerical values, and candidate A has a higher
numerical value than candidate B, then
(a) Introduce a threshold value T
(b) If the difference between the two numerical values does not exceed the threshold T , then A ∼ B
(c) If the difference between the two numerical values exceeds the threshold T , then
• on the scale which assigns a higher numerical value to a more preferable candidate, the
candidate with a higher value (candidate A) is preferred to the candidate with a lower value
(candidate B), A  B.
• on the scale which assigns a lower numerical value to a more preferable candidate, the can-
didate with the lower value (candidate B) is preferred to the candidate with a higher value
(candidate A), A ≺ B.
3. If one or both candidates are not assigned numerical values, then one of the following two models of
partial ratings can be used:
• The modified Weak Order model (Regenwetter et al., 2009b).
(a) If both candidates are not assigned numerical values, then A ∼ B.
(b) If one of the candidates, say candidate A, is assigned a numerical value and another, say
candidate B, is not, then the rated candidate, A, is preferred to the unrated, B. Thus,
A  B.
• The modified Zwicker model (Regenwetter et al., 2009b).
(a) If a candidate, A, is not assigned a numerical value, then for any other candidate B ∈ K it is
assumed that A ∼ B.
My algorithm works for any format of numerical rating data and ranked data. As a result, I obtain
preferences of each voter regarding each respective pair of candidates. For K candidates, there are K(K−1)2
possible pairs. I use a zero threshold value, T = 0.
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Next, I describe how I map of these preferences onto the Saari space.
5.4.2 Preference Representation in the Saari Space
I map electoral preferences onto the Saari space in two steps. First, I map the preferences of each individual
onto the Saari space. As a second step, I aggregate individual preferences into a profile in the Saari space.
Firstly, in order to construct the representation of preferences of each individual in the Saari space, I
denote the set of preferences that exist in the electoral profile by <. I denote a particular type of preferences
in this set by r ∈ <, and the number of voters with this type of preferences by nr. If the set of preferences
consists of all possible linear orders, then < = L. For illustration purposes, consider a hypothetical profile
that includes 5 candidates and 20 voters. The profile consists of 15 voters with one type of preferences, r1,
and 5 voters with another, r2. I show this profile in Table 5.8. For illustration purposes, assume that a voter
assigns a smaller numerical value to a preferred candidate.
Table 5.8: Hypothetical electorate profile with 5 candidates and 20 voters.
Candidates A B C D E # of voters
r1 1 3 2 6 6 15
r2 7 3 3 2 1 5
On its axis, the Saari space S has all ordered pairs of candidates. In general, the size of this space is(
K
2
)
= K(K−1)2 . In my hypothetical electorate, in Table 5.8, there are 5 candidates; therefore, there are(
5
2
)
= 10 possible ordered pairs with fixed orders: (A,B), (A,C), (A,D), (A,E), (B,C), (B,D), (B,E),
(C,D), (C,E), (D,E).
The preference of each voter can be viewed as a degenerate electoral profile that consists of one voter.
Saari restricted the preference of a voter to be a strict linear order. Therefore, only two situations for a
pair of candidates A and B were possible: A  B and A ≺ B. In contrast to Saari (2000), I allow voters
to express indifference between any two candidates. Therefore, for each ordered pair, three situations are
possible, which in the Saari space are represented by +1, −1, and 0 coordinates on the corresponding axis.
For example, for the pair of candidates A and B, +1 means that A  B; −1 means that A ≺ B; 0
means that A ∼ B. These comparisons reside in a representation cube RC(5). The representation cube is a
5(5−1)
2 = 10-dimensional polytope, where each dimension is in the interval [−1, 1] I denote it by S.
The preferences of each voter have a corresponding vector in the Saari space. I denote the voter’s
preferences r by
#»
V r. There can be more than one voter with preferences of type r in the electorate. The
individual preferences r1 and r2 from Table 5.8 would then be represented by two vectors, Vr1 and Vr2 , as
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shown in Table 5.9.
Table 5.9: Saari vectors for the hypothetical electorate.
.
# »
Vr (A,B) (A,C) (A,D) (A,E) (B,C) (B,D) (B,E) (C,D) (C,E) (D,E) nr
#»
V r1 = [+1 +1 +1 +1 −1 +1 +1 +1 +1 0 ] 15
#»
V r2 = [−1 −1 −1 −1 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1] 5
#»q = [ 12
1
2
1
2
1
2 − 34 12 12 12 12 − 14 ]
The second step is to aggregate individual preferences of the voters in the electoral profile. It is important
to note that the electoral profile is a linear combination of preferences of individuals. Therefore, the profile
resides in the same space S. The profile, #»q , is constructed by summing the vectors, weighted by their counts
as shown in (1):
#»q =
∑
r∈<
nr∑
r∈< nr
# »
Vr. (5.1)
Now that I have obtained the representation of an electoral profile in the Saari space, I can construct
the vectors of the Transitivity plane T ∈ S.
5.4.3 The Transitivity Subspace
Saari proved that the Transitivity subspace is spanned by the Basic profiles
{
#»
b k
}
k∈K
described in Section 5.3
(Theorem 4, Saari, 2000a, p. 11). In my 5-candidate case, K = 5, these vectors are listed in Table 5.10.
Table 5.10: Basic profiles of the Transitivity subspace for 5 candidates.
(A,B) (A,C) (A,D) (A,E) (B,C) (B,D) (B,E) (C,D) (C,E) (D,E)
#»
b A = [+1 +1 +1 +1 0 0 0 0 0 0 ]
#»
b B = [−1 0 0 0 +1 +1 +1 0 0 0 ]
#»
b C = [ 0 −1 0 0 −1 0 0 +1 +1 0 ]
#»
b D = [ 0 0 −1 0 0 −1 0 −1 0 +1]
#»
b E = [ 0 0 0 −1 0 0 −1 0 −1 −1]
These vectors are linearly dependent (Theorem 4, Saari, 2000a, p. 11). Thus, they span a (K − 1)-
dimensional subspace of S, which, in the case of 5 candidates, is a 4-dimensional Transitivity plane.2 There-
fore, I can use the vectors from Table 5.10 to construct the projection of any profile #»q onto the Transitivity
plane.
2For the sake of consistency with terminology of (Saari, 2000a), I use the term “Transitivity plane” even when the dimen-
sionality of this plane is larger than 2.
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5.4.4 The Saari Decomposition of a Profile
Saari proved that there exists a unique decomposition of a profile #»q into a Transitive component #»q T ∈ T
and a Condorcet component #»q C ⊥ #»q T such that (Theorem 9, Saari, 2000a, p. 22):
#»q = #»q T + #»q C . (5.2)
The Transitive component #»q T corresponds to the Transitivity plane. In this subspace, the outcomes of
the Condorcet and the Borda rules always match. The Condorcet component #»q C is responsible for all the
cyclical patterns in the aggregate preferences, and for all the disagreements between the Borda rule social
order and the Condorcet social order, if they exist (Theorem 10, Saari, 2000a, p. 24).
I propose a three-step algorithm of decomposing an empirical profile #»q into the Saari components, as
shown in (2). First, I orthogonalize and normalize the Basic vectors
{
#»
b A,
#»
b B , ...
}
by projecting them onto
each other (Gram-Schmidt method):
b˜A =
#»
b A∣∣∣ #»b A∣∣∣ , b˜B =
#»
b B −
(
b˜A
#»
b B
)
b˜A∣∣∣ #»b B − (b˜A #»b B) b˜A∣∣∣ , b˜C =
#»
b C −
(
b˜A
#»
b C
)
b˜A −
(
b˜B
#»
b C
)
b˜B∣∣∣ #»b C − (b˜A #»b C) b˜A − (b˜B #»b C) b˜B∣∣∣ , ...
Second, I project the profile vector #»q onto the new orthogonal basis
{
b˜A, b˜B , ...
}
:
#»q T =
∑
k∈K
(
b˜k
#»q
)
b˜k.
Third, I calculate the Condorcet component as the residual:
#»q C = #»q −
∑
k∈K
(
b˜k
#»q
)
b˜k.
For my hypothetical profile in Table 5.8, I report the orthonormal basis
{
b˜A, b˜B , ...
}
and the Saari
components, #»q T and #»q C , in Table 5.11.
The main advantage of the Saari decomposition is that it allows me to characterize any empirical profile
in terms of its Transitive and Condorcet components. The relative sizes of these two components can then
be translated into a probability of disagreement between outcomes produced by different voting rules. In
other words, this translation allows for a simple yet meaningful statistical comparison between a particular
model of preferences of voters and the data.
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Table 5.11: The orthonormal basis of the Transitivity subspace for 5 candidates and the Saari components of the
hypothetical electorate of Table 5.8.
(A,B) (A,C) (A,D) (A,E) (B,C) (B,D) (B,E) (C,D) (C,E) (D,E)
b˜A = [0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00]
b˜B = [−0.39 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.00]
b˜C = [0.00 −0.37 0.18 0.18 −0.37 0.18 0.18 0.55 0.55 0.00]
b˜D = [0.00 0.00 −0.32 0.32 0.00 −0.32 0.32 −0.32 0.32 0.63]
#»q T = [0.45 0.15 0.75 0.65 −0.30 0.30 0.20 0.60 0.50 −0.10]
#»q C = [0.05 0.35 −0.25 −0.15 −0.45 0.20 0.30 −0.10 0.00 −0.15]
Let me provide an intuitive explanation of this model using two hypothetical examples. The first example
involves a world where all voters agree on the relative merits of different candidates and rank them purely
according to these characteristics. In contrast to this world, the second example involves a world where
all possible points of view on the merits of the candidates are equally present. My model allows for a
simple yet meaningful comparison between those two worlds: In the first world, the Transitive component
of the aggregate profile will be large. It will dominate the Condorcet component and lead to high rates
of agreement between different voting rules. In the second world, the Transitive component of a typical
aggregate profile will be small. Therefore, it becomes easier for the Condorcet component to dominate the
Transitive component, and the rates of disagreement among voting rules will increase dramatically.
5.4.5 The Correspondence of Notation
This section provides the correspondence of notation for this paper and Saari (2000). Simplex. The (n!−1)
dimensional simplex (Equation (3.2), Saari, 2000a, p. 6):
Si(n!) = {x = (x1, ..., xn!) ∈ Rn!|
n!∑
j=1
xj = 1, xi ≤ 0}.
I denote the fractions x by λ, index j by l, and the number of candidates n by K.
Representation cube. The convex hull of the unanimity vertices is the representation cube RC(n) (Equa-
tion (5.11), Saari, 2000a, p. 15):
RC(n) = {qn =
n!∑
i=1
λiVi|λi ≥ 0,
n!∑
i=1
λi = 1}.
Ei is a unanimity profile for the ith ranking, then Vi is the pairwise tally. A normalized profile is the
convex sum pn =
∑n!
i=1 λiEi, so the corresponding RC(n) point is pn =
∑n!
i=1 λiVi.
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I denote the number of candidates n by K, the profile in the Saari space qn by
#»q , the profile in the
profile space pn by
#»p , and index i by l.
Transitivity plane. The transitivity plane of RC(n) is the (n − 1) dimensional plane passing through
the origin of RC(n) spanned by Tnci
n
i=1
where vector Tnci has xi,j = 1 for all j (so ci unanimously beats each
of the other candidates), while xk,j = 0 when j, k 6= i (representing a tie vote for each remaining pair of
candidates) (Definition 6, Saari, 2000a, p. 16).
I denote the number of candidates n by K, the transitivity plane by T , and the Basic profiles {Tnci}ni=1
by
{
#»
b k
}
k∈K
.
5.5 Po´lya-Eggenberger Urn Model Simulations
The theoretical literature on Social Choice features a vast number of papers that concentrate on the analysis
of hypothetical electorates. Using both analytical and simulation methods, the literature provides estimates
for the occurrence of the Condorcet paradox, as well as for the rates of agreements on winners for different
voting rules. In the present paper, I will focus on the agreements of a unique best option of the Borda and
Plurality rules with a unique best option of the Condorcet rule, while also taking into account whether these
options exist. Consistent with the Social Choice literature, I label them “The Condorcet Efficiency of the
Borda rule” and “The Condorcet Efficiency of the Plurality rule.”
Most work in the theoretical literature focuses on two main classes of distributions of electoral preferences:
cultures of indifference (e.g., the Impartial Culture, IC; and Impartial Anonymous Culture, IAC), and the
opposite extreme distribution, which satisfies value restriction conditions (e.g., Single-Peakedness, SP). While
cultures of indifference assume that all possible preferences occur in a particular balanced way, the value-
restricted domains completely eliminate some permissible preferences in the electorate. Both classes are
too restrictive to represent real electorates. Nevertheless, an exploration of the electorates that fall in
between these two knife-edge distributions can provide an insight into the structure and properties of real-
world electorates. To explore the properties of the occurrence of the Condorcet cycle and the levels of the
Condorcet Efficiency in a wider range of distributions, I use the Po´lya-Eggenberger urn model.
The Po´lya-Eggenberger urn enables one to conceptualize discrete probability principles (Kotz and John-
son, 1977, Mahmoud, 2008). I use this model to create a class of discrete probability distributions, with
different levels of social homogeneity. These distributions lie in between the Impartial Culture and Single-
Peakedness.
Social homogeneity has been discussed in multiple models of hypothetical electorates (see, among others,
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Berg, 1985, Fishburn, 1973, Kuga and Nagatani, 1974, Lepelley et al., 2000, Niemi, 1969). This concept
was created to model similarity or dissimilarity of opinions among voters in an electorate. In an attempt
to formally measure the intensity of the similarity of preferences, Sven Berg used a “contagion” parameter,
α, in the Po´lya-Eggenberger urn model. He interpreted this parameter as “voters’ mutual influence on one
another,” or as the “presence of social homogeneity within the group of voters” (Berg, 1985, p. 379).
To demonstrate the way in which the preferences are generated under the IC, IAC, and SP assumptions,
and to illustrate the effect of social homogeneity on the structure of preferences, let me provide an example
for the case of three candidates and N voters. Imagine an urn with six balls of different colors. Each color
corresponds to one of the six possible linear orders. As earlier, I denote L as the set of all possible linear
orders, and use l ∈ L to denote a linear order from this set. The first voter draws a ball, returns it to the urn
and adds to the urn α extra balls of the same color. Then the second voter draws a ball from the updated
urn and returns it to the urn with α extra balls of the same color. This process continues until all N voters
each have drawn a ball from this urn. After N successive draws, the probability of drawing nl balls of each
color is (Kotz and Johnson, 1977):
Prob(n1, ..., n6) =
N !
6(N,α)
∏
l∈L
1(nl,α)
nl!
,
where x(y,α) = x(x+ α)(x+ 2α)...(x+ (y − 1)α), for y = 0, 1, ..., N and x(0,α) = x(1,α) = x.
By varying the parameter α in the Po´lya-Eggenberger model I can vary the homogeneity of the population
preferences and thus move from a very heterogenous electorate (IC) to a very homogenous electorate (SP)
(Berg, 1985, Gehrlein, 1995, Lepelley et al., 2000). By increasing α, I increase the probability that the
second ball drawn from the urn will have the same color as the first. Hence, I incline the voters toward
expressing similar preferences, which in turn increases the social homogeneity of the electorate. To generate
three popular theoretical distributions (the IC, IAC, and SP), let me consider three special cases of the α
level: α = 0, α = 1, and α = 60.
First, when α = 0, the previous draw has no impact on the next draw. In this case, the model is reduced
to a distribution in which each linear order is independent and equally likely at each draw:
Prob(n1, ..., n6) =
N !
6(N,0)
6∏
l=1
1(nl,0)
nl!
=
N !
6(N,0)
∗
∏6
l=1 1
(nl,0)
n1!...n6!
,
which through further transformation simplifies to
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N !
6(6 + 0 ∗ 1)(6 + 0 ∗ 2)...(6 + 0 ∗ (N − 1)) ∗
∏6
l=1 1 ∗ (1 + 0 ∗ 1)(1 + 0 ∗ 2)...(1 + 0 ∗ (nl − 1))
n1!...n6!
,
here simplifies to
Prob(n1, ..., n6) =
N !
n1!...n6!
(
1
6
)N
.
This is a multinomial model with each preference linear order equally likely to be drawn at each stage,
i.e. this is IC.
Second, when α = 1, the earlier draw has a slight influence on the next one. In this case, the model is
reduced to a distribution in which each combination of nl’s is equally likely — or, in other words, where
each possible profile for a fixed number of candidates and voters is equally likely:
Prob(n1, ..., n6) =
N !
6(N,1)
∏
l∈L
1(nl,1)
nl!
,
where 1(nl,1) = 1 ∗ (1 + 1 ∗ 1)(1 + 2 ∗ 1)...(1 + (nl − 1) ∗ 1) = nl!, therefore,
Prob(n1, ..., n6) =
N !
6(N,1)
∗
∏
l∈L
nl!
nl!
=
N !
6(N,1)
.
Then the Prob(n1, ..., n6) depends only on the total number of voters N in the electorate and does not
depend on the particular values of (n1, ..., n6). Therefore, all profiles are equally likely, i.e. this is IAC.
Third, when α is ‘large’, the electorate can be viewed as one that possesses the property of single-
peakedness, even though all possible preferences can be observed simultaneously in this body of voters
(Lepelley et al., 2000, p. 186). I propose to use α = 10K! as a ‘large’ α value, in order for the extra α balls
to account for the majority of balls in the urn after the first draw.
The number of balls before the first draw is equal to the number of all possible linear orders, K!.
Therefore, α > K! guarantees that the type of the ball that is drawn first, dominates in the following draws.
Then, for a 3-candidate case, a ‘large’ α is 60.
I simulate hypothetical electorates for each number of candidates, K, from 3 to 7. To guarantee that
the number of voters is much greater than the number of linear orders for each K, i.e. to get a number
of voters that are likely to report each linear order at least once, I fix the number of voters to be equal to
(20K! − 1). I construct a grid of 100 values of parameter α by combining 98 log equispaced values in the
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interval [1/2(K)!, 2(K)!] with two special values, 0 and 10K!. I further refer to this grid as α ∈ [0, 10K!].
Using the Po´lya-Eggenberger model, I generate 20,000 profiles for each value of α on the grid for each number
of candidates. Therefore, I simulate a total of two million profiles for each number of candidates for all α
levels combined.
First, for each of the generated profiles I aggregate preferences of the voters using three rules: Condorcet,
Borda, and Plurality. I check for the presence of a Condorcet cycle, compute the unique best options of these
rules, the winners, and then check if the winners match among the three different rules. Second, I construct
the Saari decomposition and calculate the Transitive and the Condorcet components for each generated
profile. I explore the dependence of the properties of the Condorcet Efficiency of Borda and Plurality on the
absolute sizes of the components of the Saari decomposition. I describe my findings in the next section.
5.6 Results
5.6.1 Simulation Results
The theoretical Social Choice literature often focuses on the performance of various voting rules in hypo-
thetical electorates. By varying the parameter of social homogeneity, α, in the Po´lya-Eggenberger model, I
explore a whole class of hypothetical electorates that includes the IC and SP as limiting cases, and the IAC
as a special case.
In Figures 5.3–5.5, I illustrate the relationship between the Condorcet Efficiency and the length of the
Condorcet and Transitive components in three different environments (IC, IAC, and SP) for 3 candidates
and 999 voters. Figure 5.3 illustrates the Condorcet Efficiencies of the Borda rule under the IC assumption
(α = 0, extremely low level of social homogeneity). The x-axis displays the values of the length of the
Transitive component, | #»q T |, that I found for each of 20,000 electorates generated under the IC assumption.
From the y-axis I read off the length of the Condorcet component, | #»q C |, for the same electorates.
The top panel of Figure 5.3 shows the unconditional Condorcet Efficiency: The percentage of simulated
profiles, with the corresponding combination of the Condorcet and Transitive components, out of the total
number of electorates with this particular combination of the Saari components, in which the Condorcet
and the Borda rules agreed on winners. The bottom panel of Figure 5.3 shows the conditional Condorcet
Efficiency: The percentage of the simulated profiles in which the Condorcet winner coincides with the Borda
winner, out of the total number of profiles where the Condorcet winner exists. I calculate this percentage
for each combination of the Saari components. The color depicts the level of the Condorcet Efficiency: dark
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blue regions represent electorates with a low level of agreement on winners between the Condorcet and the
Borda rules, and dark red regions represent electorates with a high level of this agreement.
Figure 5.3: The distribution of the Condorcet Efficiency of the Borda rule under the Impartial Culture assumption.
Figure 5.3 shows that in the electorates generated under the IC assumption, each Saari component is
small. Therefore, the actual area of possible combinations of the two Saari components is relatively small
compared with the area that can be obtained under the IAC assumption (α = 1, low level of social homogene-
ity), as illustrated in Figure 5.4. In contrast to the IC electorates, the electorates that are approximations of
the SP distribution (α = 60, extremely high level of social homogeneity) have large values of both the | #»q T |
and | #»q C |. Moreover, while under the IC and IAC assumptions, all possible levels of the Condorcet efficiency
are obtainable — that is, with the assumption of a high level of social homogeneity, both conditional and
unconditional Condorcet Efficiencies are extremely high: The dark red color dominates in Figure 5.5. This
result is consistent with the general intuition that outcomes of voting rules tend to agree more often in more
homogeneous electorates (Lepelley et al., 2000).
Since the literature never reported estimates of the α parameter in real electorates, it is instructive to
calculate the levels of the Condorcet Efficiency for all combinations of lengths of the Transitive and Condorcet
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Figure 5.4: The distribution of the Condorcet Efficiency of the Borda rule under the Impartial Anonymous Culture
assumption.
Figure 5.5: The distribution of the Condorcet Efficiency of the Borda rule under the assumption of Single-
Peakedness.
components, averaged across all 100 values of α that we consider. This result is shown in Figure 5.6. As
predicted by Saari’s Theorem 10 (2000), all of the differences between the Condorcet and the Borda winners
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Figure 5.6: The distribution of the Condorcet Efficiency of the Borda rule.
Note: α ∈ [0, 10K!] indicates that results are averaged on a grid of 100 values of α in the interval.
are due to the Condorcet component of the profile. Nevertheless, I find that the level of agreement of the
Borda and the Condorcet rules regarding the winners depends on the relative size of the Condorcet and
the Transitive components. I conjecture that the ratio of the two components, |
#»q T |
| #»q C | , can be an informative
statistic that aids in predicting the rates of agreement.
I provide a similar illustration for the conditional and unconditional Condorcet Efficiencies of the Plurality
rule in Figure 5.7. Similarly to the unconditional Condorcet Efficiency of the Borda rule in Figure 5.6, the
top panel of Figure 5.7 illustrates the same ‘ratio’ effect for the Plurality rule. Nevertheless, in contrast
to the unconditional Condorcet Efficiency, the conditional Condorcet Efficiency of the Plurality rule does
not provide strong evidence in favor of the ratio of the two Saari components being a good predictor of
agreement between the Condorcet and Plurality winners.
Figures 5.8–5.10 show what happens when I increase the number of candidates from 4 to 6. The main
tendency remains the same: When the length of the | #»q C | component is non-negligible, the ratio of the norms
of the two components, | #»q T | and | #»q C |, can be used as a predictor of the level of unconditional Condorcet
Efficiencies of the Borda and Plurality rules. Therefore, it is informative to explore the dependency of the
Condorcet Efficiency on the ratio |
#»q T |
| #»q C | . I call this ratio, the Saari ratio.
Figures 5.11–5.15 report the behavior of the conditional and unconditional Condorcet Efficiencies of
the Borda and Plurality rules as a function of the Saari ratio. Additionally, I explore the sensitivity of
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Figure 5.7: The distribution of the Condorcet Efficiency of the Plurality rule.
Note: α ∈ [0, 10K!] indicates that results are averaged on a grid of 100 values of α in the interval.
Figure 5.8: The unconditional Condorcet Efficiencies of the Borda and Plurality rules for 4 candidates.
Note: α ∈ [0, 10K!] indicates that results are averaged on a grid of 100 values of α in the interval.
the Condorcet Efficiency to changes in the social homogeneity parameter, α. As before, I start with the
electorates with 3 candidates and 999 voters. Figure 5.11 compares the conditional and unconditional
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Figure 5.9: The unconditional Condorcet Efficiencies of the Borda and Plurality rules for 5 candidates.
Note: α ∈ [0, 10K!] indicates that results are averaged on a grid of 100 values of α in the interval.
Figure 5.10: The unconditional Condorcet Efficiencies of the Borda and Plurality rules for 6 candidates.
Note: α ∈ [0, 10K!] indicates that results are averaged on a grid of 100 values of α in the interval.
Condorcet Efficiencies of the Borda and Plurality rules for different levels of α. As evident in Figure 5.11,
the conditional and unconditional Condorcet Efficiencies of both rules increase sharply with the ratio of the
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Saari components |
#»q T |
| #»q C | , when the ratio falls into the interval [0.75, 2] (on the horizontal axis). It is important
to note that this phenomenon remains the same for all three α-levels.
Figure 5.11: The Condorcet Efficiency as a function of |~q
T |
|~qC | and three levels of social homogeneity.
Figure 5.12: The Condorcet Efficiency as a function of |~q
T |
|~qC | .
Note: α ∈ [0, 10K!] indicates that results are averaged on a grid of 100 values of α in the interval.
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Figure 5.12 shows the aggregate relationship between the ratio of components of the Saari decomposition,
| #»q T |
| #»q C | , and both conditional and unconditional Condorcet Efficiencies of the Borda and Plurality rules when
the rates of agreement are averaged across all levels of social homogeneity, α ∈ [0, 60]. The unconditional
Condorcet Efficiencies of both rules increase with the increase in the Saari ratio for values of the ratio below
2, and remain consistently above 90 percent for values of the Saari ratio above 2. The conditional Condorcet
Efficiencies of both rules remain high (above 70 percent) as long as a Condorcet winner exists. Given the
fast transition in the rates of agreement from low to high as the Saari ratio increases, the Saari ratio emerges
as a convenient statistic, with high predictive power for the agreement among rules. My findings suggest
that, if I observe an electorate with a Saari ratio below 0.75, I should expect to observe a Condorcet paradox
with a relatively high probability. On the other hand, if I find that an electorate has a Saari ratio above 2,
I should expect to see agreement between the Condorcet, Borda, and the Plurality winners.
The same general conclusion holds as I increase the number of candidates. Figures 5.13–5.15 show similar
aggregated patterns as the number of candidates increases from 4 to 6. While the asymptotic levels of the
Condorcet Efficiency of the Borda remain high, the levels of the Condorcet Efficiency of Plurality gradually
fall with the increase in the number of candidates.
Thus, in this section, I can draw two preliminary inferences. First, I found that Condorcet cycles are
very unlikely when the Saari ratio is above 0.75, while the voting rules are very likely to agree when the
Saari ratio is above 2. I want to emphasize that the ”rule of thumb” values of the Saari ratio (0.75 and 2) are
highly robust to the change in the number of candidates, number of voters, and levels of social homogeneity.
Second, I observed that, as the Saari ratio increases in the interval [0.75,2], fast transition in the rates of
agreement of the voting rules from low to high makes the Saari ratio a convenient statistic with a high
predictive power for the agreement among rules.
5.6.2 Empirical Results
The Condorcet Efficiency and the Saari Decomposition
I consider 77 real-world data sets, using two different models of partial rankings. I ruled out the IC and SP
conditions as description of these populations. A regular Chi-square test rejects the IC hypothesis at the
0.01 significance level for each of the 77 data sets, both on linear orders and partial ratings. Additionally,
in each of 77 data sets, for each candidate there exists at least one voter who ranked this candidate last.
Therefore, I ruled out the SP condition as well, because, according to SP, there exists at least one candidate
that is never ranked last in the electorate.
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Figure 5.13: The Condorcet Efficiency as a function of |~q
T |
|~qC | for 4 candidates.
Note: α ∈ [0, 10K!] indicates that results are averaged on a grid of 100 values of α in the interval.
Figure 5.14: The Condorcet Efficiency as a function of |~q
T |
|~qC | for 5 candidates.
Note: α ∈ [0, 10K!] indicates that results are averaged on a grid of 100 values of α in the interval.
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Figure 5.15: The Condorcet Efficiency as a function of |~q
T |
|~qC | for 6 candidates.
Note: α ∈ [0, 10K!] indicates that results are averaged on a grid of 100 values of α in the interval.
First, when using either of the two models of partial ratings, I observe no Condorcet cycle in any of the
77 elections. This is consistent with previous findings, which report that the Condorcet cycle is extremely
seldom found in real-world electorates (Regenwetter and Grofman, 1998a, Regenwetter et al., 2006a, 2002d).
Second, I find a high rate of agreement of all three rules with respect to a best choice option — namely, the
winner. This result holds for both models of partial ratings.
Thus, the dramatically different assumptions about missing data in the two models lead to the same
levels of agreement in the electorates. This finding implies that the results are robust and suggests that
the choice of the model of missing data may not be crucial for the analysis of the levels of the agreement
among voting rules in real-world electorates. In addition, all principal results on agreement among voting
rules remain the same for both types of data (the Feeling Thermometer and the Ranked Data formats), and
for all three types of options: Parties, leaders, and values. I report mean rates of agreement averaged across
all data sets with the same number of candidates in Table 5.12.
Next, I calculate the Condorcet and Transitive components and their ratio for each data set under two
models of partial ratings. Figures 5.16–5.18 show the distribution of 77 real-world data sets with respect to
their Condorcet and Transitive components. In Figure 5.16, I represent the data sets that provide agreement
on winners for the Condorcet and Borda rules as “x”s; I represent the data sets where the Borda winner
does not match the Condorcet winner as “o”s. Figures 5.17–5.18 report the same information regarding the
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Table 5.12: Agreement between winners.
Number of The percentage of data sets in which two voting rules agree on winners.
candidates Condorcet vs Borda Condorcet vs Plurality Borda vs Plurality
K=3 100% 100% 100%
K=4 81% 97% 78%
K=5 85% 96% 80%
K=6 100% 86% 86%
K=7 94% 88% 94%
Note: I report the percentage of data sets in which two rules yielded a unique and identical best choice, the winner, out of the total
number of data sets for each number of candidates. For each data set that contains partial preferences I calculate the outcomes of the
voting rules under two models of partial ratings.
agreement between the Condorcet and Plurality winners and the Borda and Plurality winners, respectively.
The color represents the number of candidates in the data set. The general observation is that for any
number of candidates (any color), “o”s tend to have larger Condorcet components then “x”s.
To summarize the results in Figures 5.16–5.18, I report mean values of the Saari components, averaged
across all data sets with the same number of candidates, in Table 5.13. In addition, I report the mean of
the ratio of the two components.
There are two observations to make from Table 5.13 and Figures 5.16–5.18. First, in the analyzed
data sets the variance of both the Condorcet and Transitive components increases along with the increase
in the number of candidates. Therefore, it is difficult to compare these components across data sets for
different numbers of candidates. Nevertheless, the Saari ratio remains at the same level when the number
of candidates is larger than 3. As shown in Table 5.12, the rates of agreement are extremely high for all
numbers of candidates, and a high Saari ratio generally captures this effect. The highest mean ratio, 21.02,
occurs in electorates with 3 candidates. In every single one of these data sets we find perfect agreement on
the winners for all three rules.
Second, the Transitive component dominates the Condorcet component in all data sets, regardless of the
number of candidates. Even though the Condorcet component has a non-zero value, and though according
to Saari’s theoretical result there is a potential for the disagreement between the outcomes of the Condorcet
and Borda rules, we do not in fact observe this disagreement in the data sets. I interpret this result as
follows: the relative size of the Condorcet component is not large enough to generate disagreement among
voting rules with a large probability.
Tables 5.12–5.13 provide a descriptive analysis of real-world electorates. To gain an insight into how
likely the Condorcet, Borda, and Plurality rules are to agree on winners in these electoral profiles, I plot
my estimates of the Saari components for real-world electorates on top of my simulated heat maps of the
Condorcet Efficiency, computed in Section 5.6.1. For the purpose of illustration, I focus on the unconditional
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Figure 5.16: Agreement of the Condorcet and Borda rules on winners.
Note: I represent the data sets in which the Condorcet and Borda rules yielded a unique and identical best choice, the winner, by “x”s.
The data sets in which the Condorcet and Borda rules yielded different winners are coded by “o”s. For each data set that contains
partial preferences I calculate the outcomes of the voting rules under two models of partial ratings.
Figure 5.17: Agreement of the Condorcet and Plurality rules on winners.
Note: I represent the data sets in which the Condorcet and Plurality rules yielded a unique and identical best choice, the winner, by
“x”s. The data sets in which the Condorcet and Plurality rules yielded different winners are coded by “o”s. For each data set that
contains partial preferences I calculate the outcomes of the voting rules under two models of partial ratings
Figure 5.18: Agreement of the Borda and Plurality rules on winners.
Note: I represent the data sets in which the Borda and Plurality rules yielded a unique and identical best choice, winner, by “x”s. The
data sets in which the Borda and Plurality rules yielded different winners are coded by “o”s. For each data set that contains partial
preferences I calculate the outcomes of the voting rules under two models of partial ratings
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Table 5.13: The Condorcet and Transitive components in real-world data.
Number of
Mean | #»q C | Mean | #»q T | Mean | #»q T || #»q C |candidates
K=3 0.03 0.48 21.02
K=4 0.21 0.78 6.75
K=5 0.17 0.98 8.12
K=6 0.22 1.47 6.73
K=7 0.27 1.75 6.84
Note: I report the mean length of the Condorcet and the Transitive components averaged across all data sets with the same number
of candidates. For each data set that contains partial preferences I calculate the Condorcet and the Transitive components under two
models of partial ratings.
Condorcet Efficiency of the Borda rule. The Condorcet Efficiency of the Plurality rule demonstrates similar
results and is omitted for brevity. Figures 5.19–5.22 illustrate the mapping of real-world data sets onto the
simulated unconditional Condorcet Efficiency graph of the Borda rule. As before, I code data sets in which
the Condorcet and the Borda winners coincide as “x”s, and data sets in which the two winners mismatch as
“o”s.
There are three observations to make from Figures 5.19–5.22. First, none of the real-world electorates fall
into or close to the blue area where the Condorcet cycles are probable. This agrees with consistent reports
from the empirical Social Choice literature — namely, that the Condorcet rule performs very well in real
electorates.
Second, most of the data sets fall into the dark red area — the high Condorcet Efficiency. Therefore, most
of the analyzed electorates demonstrate a high Condorcet Efficiency regardless of the number of candidates.
This counters the gloomy prediction of the theoretical Social Choice literature — that the occurrence of the
Condorcet paradox and the disagreement among voting rules increase with the increase in the number of
candidates. Additionally, the data sets in which the winners of the Condorcet and Borda rules mismatch
tend to fall into or close to areas with lower Condorcet Efficiency (orange and yellow sectors). I observe
mismatches in those areas where I would expect a mismatch to be observed.
Third, the large value of the Condorcet component by itself is not informative enough, because this value
may still correspond to an area of high Condorcet Efficiency. For example, in Figure 5.21, for 5 candidates,
there are two crosses in the upper right corner of the heat map. Even though their Condorcet components
are large, these electoral profiles fall into the area of high Condorcet Efficiency. They have large Transitive
components and high Saari ratios; therefore, I do not expect the Condorcet and the Borda winners to
mismatch in these electorates.
I want to emphasize that nearly all analyzed real-world data sets have high Saari ratios and are likely to
provide a match between the Condorcet and Borda winners. I illustrate this finding in Figure 5.23.
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Figure 5.19: Saari decomposition for data sets with 3 candidates.
Note: α ∈ [0, 10K!] indicates that results are averaged on a grid of 100 values of α in the interval.
Figure 5.20: Saari decomposition for data sets with 4 candidates.
Note: α ∈ [0, 10K!] indicates that results are averaged on a grid of 100 values of α in the interval.
Figure 5.21: Saari decomposition for data sets with 5 candidates.
Note: α ∈ [0, 10K!] indicates that results are averaged on a grid of 100 values of α in the interval.
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Figure 5.22: Saari decomposition for data sets with 6 candidates.
Note: α ∈ [0, 10K!] indicates that results are averaged on a grid of 100 values of α in the interval.
The top panel of Figure 5.23 summarizes information from Figures 5.12–5.15. The graph shows the
simulated unconditional Condorcet Efficiencies of the Borda rule for 3, 4, 5, and 6 candidates as a function
of the ratio of the Condorcet and the Transitive components. The bottom panel of Figure 5.23 presents the
histogram that shows the distribution of real-world data sets. The x-axis displays the values of the Saari
ratio, |
#»q T |
| #»q C | . I split the histogram into 80 log equispaced intervals. The blue bars reflect the total number
of data sets that have a Saari ratio in the corresponding interval. The red bars represent the number of
data sets in which the Condorcet and the Borda rules disagree on winners. It is interesting to note that
95 percent of the data sets have a Saari ratio larger than 2 and a Condorcet Efficiency larger than 0.75.
Moreover, all data sets with a Saari ratio lower than 2 disagree on the Condorcet and Borda winners. This
agrees with my intuition (provided in Section 5.6.1) that electorates with the Saari ratio lower than 2 have
a low chance of providing an agreement between the Condorcet and the Borda winners.
Social Homogeneity
Another informative description of a real-world electorate is the level of its social homogeneity. To estimate an
α level for a particular real-world electorate with K candidates, I count the number of simulated electorates
that have values of the Saari components that are similar to this data set for each of 100 levels of α on
the grid, α ∈ [0, 10K!]. Then the α level that produces the largest number of simulated electorates in the
neighborhood of the data is my estimate of α for the data set.
The range of estimates of α increases with the number of candidates. Therefore, in order to compare the
levels of social homogeneity across data sets with different numbers of candidates, standardization is required.
I standardize by dividing the estimates of α by K!. Recall that the parameter α represents the number of
extra balls added to the Po´lya-Eggenberger urn after each draw. Thus, the parameter α is normalized by
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Figure 5.23: Unconditional Condorcet Efficiency as a function of the Saari ratio, |~q
T |
|~qC | , and the distribution of
real-world data.
the number of balls originally present in the urn, equal to K!. In Table 5.14, I report estimated values of
parameter α for individual data sets, averaged across all data sets with the same number of candidates.
Table 5.14: The estimates of α levels in real-world electorates.
Number of
Mean αˆ Range of αˆ Mean αˆ/K! Range of αˆ/K!
candidates
K=3 0.38 [0.01,0.70] 0.06 [0.002,0.117]
K=4 3.30 [0.14,12.5] 0.14 [0.006,0.521]
K=5 17.71 [0.80,172] 0.15 [0.007,1.4]
K=6 80.75 [35,155] 0.11 [0.05,0.22]
Note: I report the mean estimates of αˆ levels averaged across all data sets with the same number of candidates. For each data set that
contains partial preferences I estimate the level of α under two models of partial ratings. ”Range” denotes minimum and maximum
values.
I find that as the number of candidates increases, so does the level of social homogeneity, “voters’ mutual
influence on one another.” Nevertheless, the standardized values of social homogeneity are close to 0.1 for
all numbers of candidates. Figure 5.24 shows the distributions of standardized αˆ/K! levels for real-world
electorates for different numbers of candidates. The behavior of the density function remains the same
regardless of the number of candidates. The density functions reach their maximum around 0.1 and slowly
decrease with the increase in αˆ/K! for any number of candidates, K.
I conclude that the standardized level of social homogeneity in real-world electorates remains the same
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regardless of the number of candidates, although the level of α in the Po´lya-Eggenberger urn model should
still be adjusted to generate electorates with the same level of social homogeneity for different numbers of
candidates.
Figure 5.24: The density of standardized social homogeneity in real electorates for 3, 4, 5, and 6 candidates.
To summarize: In this section, I have studied 77 real-world data sets from 8 countries. All analyzed data
sets have a Saari ratio larger than 0.75. I did not find evidence for a single Condorcet cycle in any of the
77 data sets. This agrees with the prediction of my intuition — that a Condorcet cycle is highly unlikely
to occur when the Transitive component dominates the Condorcet component. Additionally, I found strong
agreement among all rules with respect to a unique best option. This high level of agreement is robust
to different modeling assumptions: two models of partial ratings with a completely different intuition and
interpretation provided me with similar levels of agreement and comparable Saari ratios. Moreover, I report
a high level of agreement among voting rules for a large number of candidates (7), as well as for a small
number of candidates (3). This finding counters the gloomy predictions of the theoretical literature, which
state that aggregation paradoxes are more likely to occur when the number of candidates increases. Instead,
and consistent with previous findings of the empirical Social Choice literature, I conclude that aggregation
paradoxes are highly unlikely in real electorates, regardless of the number and type of options or data
formats.
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5.7 Conclusion
The extreme relevance of aggregation methods in everyday life dictates that the area of Social Choice needs
a set of easy-to-use tools that are available to a broader audience. In this paper I propose a novel statistic,
the Saari ratio, that translates into the rates of occurrence of Social Choice paradoxes. My findings can be
summarized as follows.
My algorithm of computing the Saari ratio is applicable to a wide variety of data formats and easy to
use for anyone in Social Sciences who is interested in the occurrence of paradoxes of aggregation methods in
real-world data sets.
First, using Monte Carlo simulations, I demonstrate that the Saari ratio translates into the frequency
of disagreement between the Condorcet and Borda rules. Whenever the Saari ratio is high (above 2), the
frequency of Social Choice paradoxes is low. Whenever the Saari ratio is low (below 0.75), disagreement and
cycles are frequent. Using Monte Carlo simulations, I show that this relationship is highly robust to changes
in the number of candidates, voters, and levels of social homogeneity in electorates. These findings suggest
that there is a general monotonic relationship between the Saari ratio and the frequency of Social Choice
paradoxes. Although I do use the Po´lya-Eggenberger model in the simulations, this result is unlikely to be
a consequence of using this particular model, because the result holds for electorates which are uniformly
drawn from the set of all possible electorates.
Second, I calculated the Saari ratio for 77 real-world data sets from National Surveys and APA election
ballots. I find that all analyzed electorates have high Saari ratios and, as predicted, show high rates of
agreement among different voting rules. I demonstrate that this result is robust to different models of
‘missing’ data and to variation in the number of candidates.
Finally, I found that the estimated levels of social homogeneity in real-world electorates are relatively
high. I discovered that the value of the standardized estimates of social homogeneity, α = 0.1, fits the data
much better than any of the three main theoretical distributions (the IC, IAC, and SP). Nevertheless, the
Saari ratios of the majority of real-world electorates that I have analyzed are higher than those predicted by
95 percent of electorates produced by the Po´lya-Eggenberger model for any value of α. This suggests that
the search for an even more accurate model of societal preferences must continue.
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Chapter 6
Generalized Multi-Peaked Model
How is it possible to know what is best for a group of people when its members disagree with one another?
In contemporary society, people constantly search for a consensus that can satisfy everybody. A winner in
a presidential election, a choice of the optimal policy in a large business organization, or a decision on the
allocation of resources in a professional organization-all of these are examples of this search for consensus.
Because of the nature of these high-stake decisions, a variety of opinions are expressed in a group, yet only
one can become a group decision.
The area of theoretical Social Choice provides bearish answers, suggesting that a consensus may be
unobtainable and that any choice a group reaches may be impugnable. Even worse, the choice of the best
option may depend on the choice of an aggregation procedure. Nevertheless, analysis of real-world data
routinely argues against these theoretical predictions: the outcomes of voting procedures among actual
electorates agree remarkably well with one another. This contradiction has puzzled researchers for a decade.
To solve this puzzle, I propose a Generalized Multi-peaked model of electorates.
The Multi-peaked model explains agreement among outcomes of voting rules in real-world electorates, as
well as the potential for a mismatch among outcomes of various voting rules in popular artificial domains.
The Multi-peaked model can work equally well with popular theoretical domains and with real-world
data. First, my model includes two classes of artificial domains prevalent in the theoretical literature, as
special cases: Cultures of indifference and Sen’s value restriction. Second, the model explains and can
mimic variability in real-world data, thus shedding light on the underlying structure of the distribution of
preferences and on the possibility of consensus in a group.
Bridging the gap between theory and empirical findings in Social Choice presents a number of challenges:
of these, one of the most significant is that popular artificial distributions of group preferences are not
observed in real-world data. Therefore, predictions regarding the behavior of various voting rules in such
domains are not informative for real-life policy recommendations. On the other hand, knowledge of the
properties of these domains, accumulated during decades of intensive research, does provide valuable insight
into potential problems with election systems (Gehrlein and Lepelley, 2004, Sen, 1999). Developing more
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nuanced models that incorporate extensively studied artificial domains, along with studying the properties
of these models, facilitates a better understanding of the properties of real-life electorates.
As discussed in Popova (2013a) and Popova (2013b), two popular classes of artificial domains in theoret-
ical Social Choice are Cultures of Indifference and Sen’s value restriction. Cultures of Indifference (e.g., an
Impartial Culture) is undoubtedly the most heavily studied class of theoretical distributions. In this class,
preferences are balanced such that any two candidates are majority-tied at the population level. Thus, for
any two candidates, the number of voters who prefer candidate X to candidate Y is the same as the number
of voters who prefer Y to X. This assumption is too restrictive to be observed in real-world electorates.
The second extreme case of popular distribution in the theoretical literature satisfies Sen’s value restric-
tion. This case is dedicated to restriction on the domain of admissible electoral profiles. Value restriction
completely rules out some preferences and implies that not all of the possible rankings can appear on election
ballots. As a consequence, these assumptions are almost always violated in large-scale data sets. For this
reason, Sen’s value restriction, like the Cultures of Indifference, is not likely to be observed in real-world
electorates.
Even though both extreme cases are not realistic and should not be used for policy recommendations,
they do provide a valuable insight into the potential properties of electorates. When preferences satisfy
value restriction, we can think of them as a general agreement among the electorate. For example, if all
voters agree that some candidates are better than others, this agreement can be thought of in terms of a
common point of view on the merits of the candidates. On the other hand, in an electorate that satisfies
the assumption of an Impartial Culture, there is a major disagreement on the merits of the candidates, as
if there exists a maximal number of conflicting points of view that balance one another.
I suggest that what we observe in real-world electorates is something in between these two extreme
distributions. I model a real electorate by assuming that voters share a limited number of points of view
and, therefore, form groups on the basis of similar preferences. Thus, the distribution of preferences of the
electorate is a mixture of the preferences of these groups.
To facilitate the analysis of electoral preferences (profiles), I use the representation of profiles in the
Saari space. The Saari space is a space in which all possible pairwise comparisons of the candidates serve
as axes. Then, the preferences of an individual voter, as well as electoral preferences, can be mapped onto
points within this space. Moreover, I can then calculate the distance between any two points and use it
as a measure of similarity of preferences. Simulated electorates that satisfy the Impartial Culture or Single
Peakedness assumptions, or a linear combination of the two, occupy a particular region in the Saari space.
On the other hand, real-world electorates overwhelmingly do not belong to this region.
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To demonstrate that, I use the Saari decomposition and the Po´lya-Eggenberger urn model, described in
Popova (2013b). I generate 1, 000, 000 electorates using the Po´lya-Eggenberger urn model on a wide grid of
the homogeneity parameter, α. I fix the number of candidates at 5. The model, under each α, generates
electorates in different regions of the Saari space, which represents a space of all possible electoral profiles.
When a wide grid of α’s is used, I am able to cover the entire range of possible profiles in my simulations.
One notable property of these simulations is that the median of all points generated under a fixed α lies
on the diagonal of a diagram, which has the norm of the Transitive component of a profile on its horizontal
axis, and the norm of the Condorcet component on its vertical axis. Thus, the set of draws that one can
obtain using the Po´lya-Eggenberger model is symmetric around the diagonal of the diagram. I illustrate this
property in Figure 6.1 by plotting (in red) the median and the area that covers 90% of simulated electorates
generated under the Po´lya-Eggenberger urn model assumptions.
To compare theoretical predictions with real-world electorates, I plot the points corresponding to real-
world data sets with 5 or more1 candidates in Figure 6.1. While the draws from the Po´lya-Eggenberger model
are clearly centered around the diagonal, the dots representing the data are all well below the diagonal, largely
outside the likely location of draws generated from the Po´lya-Eggenberger model. Thus, it is highly unlikely
that a mixture of existing theoretical distributions of electorates would be a good description of real-world
populations.
This result provides strong motivation for a continued search for a better model of electorates. A necessary
property of this model would be to generate points in the same region of the Saari space to which the data
belong.
In this paper, I discuss the features of preferences that place real-world data sets in a particular region
of the Saari space, different from those predicted by popular theoretical models. The first feature is a small
number of points of view in real-world electorates. The second feature captures the structure of the proximity
of preferences for each group: The preferences within each group are similar but not identical.
The Multi-peaked model captures these two features by using elements of Distribution Based Cluster
Analysis and Kernel Density Estimation. Kernel Density Estimation is a fundamental data-smoothing
technique whereby inferences about the probability distribution in the population are made based on a
finite data sample. Similar to the standard Cluster Analysis approach, I define two main concepts: the
distance measure and the Kernel function. The key reason that makes existing methods not applicable to
1Areas that cover 90% of simulated electorates for 3 and 4 candidates cover virtually the whole area. I report them separately
in Section 6.3.5.
The maximum values of the Transitive and Condorcet components equal
√(K
2
)− 1
3
(K−1
2
)
and
√
1
3
(K−1
2
)
respectively, where
K is the number of candidates. To present real-world data sets with various numbers of candidates on the same diagram, I
rescale each component for each data set by dividing it by the respective maximum value.
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Figure 6.1: The Po´lya-Eggenberger model is unlikely to explain real-world electorates.
the problem at hand is that the support of the distribution (preferences of voters) is discrete and does not
possess a unique single shortest path between any two points.
I analyze 52 real-world data sets and find that I can fit the data within the Multi-peaked model with
a small number of points of view in the electorate. Furthermore, using Monte Carlo simulations I first
demonstrate that the model generates artificial electorates that belong to the same region of the Saari space as
those in the real data sets. Second, I calculate the probabilities of the Condorcet cycles and the probabilities
of disagreements of voting rules in electorates with various properties. Finally, the decomposition of an
electorate into groups with shared preferences allows me to analyze the reasons why outcomes of voting rules
agree or disagree with one another, as well as to provide deeper insights into the Social Choice conundrums.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 6.1 describes the theoretical framework. Section 6.2 describes the
methodology I use to analyze the data. Section 6.3 explains my simulation strategy. Section 6.4 discusses
the results and major findings. Section 6.5 draws conclusions.
6.1 Multi-Peaked Model
In this section, I propose a Multi-peaked model of electorates. First, I introduce the primitives and explain
the main assumptions of the model, which incorporate elements of Distribution Based Cluster analysis and
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Kernel Density estimation. Second, I illustrate the main assumptions of the model for linear and weak
orders. Third, I derive a probabilistic specification for a wide class of preferences. Finally, I augment the
model to accommodate partial rankings.
6.1.1 Primitives
.
I denote candidate A preferred to candidate B as A  B, candidate B preferred to candidate A as A ≺ B,
and a voter is indifferent between candidates A and B as A ∼ B. Each voter can provide a full ranking
(each candidate is ranked by a voter) or a partial ranking (only some candidates are ranked) of candidates.
A voter can assign the same rank to more than one candidate. Then for a set of 5 candidates A,B,C,D,
and E an example of a full ranking can be A  B ∼ C  D  E, and an example of a partial ranking
can be A  B ∼ E. When only complete preferences are considered, full rankings are represented by linear
orders. In this case, for K candidates there are K! full rankings and
(∑K
k=1
(
K
k
)
k!
)
partial rankings, where(
K
k
)
is the number of k-combinations from a set of K elements. For example, for 5 candidates there are 120
full rankings and 325 partial rankings.
Saari’s approach described in Popova (2013b) uses a representation of full rankings in the space of all
ordered pairs of K candidates. Consistently, I denote the Saari space by S = R(
K
2 ). In this space, each axis
represents an ordered pair of candidates. I use the same index o to number these axes.
Let F denote the set of full rankings2 and f ∈ F a full ranking from this set.3
Each full ranking f defines preferences for each pair of candidates. To construct a vector
# »
Vf in the Saari
space (which corresponds to the ranking f), we need the following algorithm:
For each ordered pair o = (k, k′) comparing candidates k and k′ ∈ K, the full ranking f ranks candidate
k above, below or on par with k′. In the first case, when candidate k is preferred to candidate k′ (k  k′),
I postulate that the oth element of the vector
# »
Vf is +1. In the second case, when candidate k
′ is preferred
to candidate k (k ≺ k′), I postulate that the oth element of the vector # »Vf is −1. The case of indifference is
represented by the oth element of the vector
# »
Vf equal to 0.
Modes.
To explain the observed variability of reported preferences, I assume that there are different points of
view on the relative merits of the candidates in the electorate. I call each such point of view a mode and
2A set of full rankings is defined for a fixed number of candidates.
3If each voter reports a full complete asymmetric transitive preference ranking (a linear order), F is equivalent to L, the set
of linear orders; otherwise L ⊂ F.
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denote it by m.4 I define the set of modes, M, by a set of M = |M| many full rankings, m ∈ F, on the set
of all candidates, K.
I denote the share of the electorate with the mode m as the proportion of voters, sm, who associate
themselves with point of view m. In other words, the probability that a voter associates herself with a mode
m (a voter has true preferences which coincide with this full ranking) is sm. By assumption, the shares of
voters that associate themselves with all modes sum up to 1:
∑
m∈M
sm = 1.
Even though I assume that there are only M points of view in the electorate, there still can be a vast
variability in the reported preferences. There are multiple interpretations for this variability. For example,
a voter may not be completely confident that she agrees with a particular point of view and thus slightly
deviates from it. Alternatively, a voter may also be inattentive during the process of submitting ballots, or
the format of the ballots may be confusing or may not elicit true preferences. Therefore, a voter is likely to
misreport the mode by which she associates herself. I assume that the closer the reported preferences to a
mode, the higher the probability of this type of report.
To analyze the variability of responses I propose a novel methodology that builds on elements of Distri-
bution Based Cluster Analysis and Kernel Density Estimation.
Similar to the standard Cluster Analysis approach, I need to define two main concepts: the distance
measure and the Kernel function. The key reason that makes existing methods not applicable here is that
the support of the distribution, F, is discrete and does not possess a unique natural ordering (i.e., does not
have a unique single shortest path between any two points).
6.1.2 Distance
.
I denote the measure of distance between two full rankings f, f ′ ∈ F by d(f, f ′). There are finitely many
pairwise combinations of full rankings for a fixed number of candidates; therefore, the distance can take on
only a finite set of values. To accommodate the fact that coordinates of the preferences of each voter in
the Saari space can only take values of −1, 0, or +1, I use the taxicab distance as my preferred measure of
4The concept of “points of view” as a common perception of the stimulus similarity was explored in Psychology by Eckart
and Young (1936) and Tucker and Messick (1963), but neither of these two methods accommodates the binary data.
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Table 6.1: Kendall tau calculation for two linear orders
l l′ Disagreement
A  B  C  D  E A  C  E  B  D between l and l′
A  B 3 3
A  C 3 3
A  D 3 3
A  E 3 3
B  C 3 B ≺ C 1
B  D 3 3
B  E 3 B ≺ E 1
C  D 3 3
C  E 3 3
D  E 3 D ≺ E 1
Distance measure d(l, l′) 3
distance:
d (f, f ′) =
1
2
‖ #»V f − #»V f ′‖1 = 1
2
∑
o=(i,j)
i,j∈K
|Vf,o − Vf ′,o| .
Kendall tau is the special case of the taxicab distance in the Saari space when the set F contains only linear
orders, F = L. Kendall tau is considered to be a good measure of the distance between two rankings made
by a human (see among others Lapata, 2006, Mallows, 1957). Kendall tau counts the number of pairwise
disagreements between any two linear orders. It is also interpreted in the literature as the minimum number
of switches of adjacent elements needed to transform one ranking into another. The minimum number of
switches needed to completely reverse an order in the ranking is
(
K
2
)
. Therefore, for any two linear orders,
the Kendall tau distance can only take a discrete value between zero and
(
K
2
)
. Thus, keeping in mind that
a mode is also a linear order, a distance between any mode, m, and any linear order, l ∈ L, can take on
values: {0, 1, 2, . . . , (K2 )}.
To provide an example of a Kendall tau calculation, let me consider two linear orders l and l′. Order l
is A  B  C  D  E and l′ is {A  C  E  B  D. To transform linear order l into linear order l′ we
need three switches; therefore, d(l, l′) = 3. Another easy way to compute Kendall tau is to count the number
of ordered pairs that differ between the two linear orders. This approach coincides with my definition of
taxicab distance in the Saari space. Table 6.1 presents an example of this calculation.
The taxicab measure of distance also works for wider classes of full rankings, such as weak orders. Weak
orders allow a voter to state indifference toward some of the candidates. Let me illustrate how to use my
earlier algorithm to construct the matrix of distances among all possible weak orders. To calculate the
distance between any two rankings I can use the algorithm for computing Kendall τ , where, in addition to
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Table 6.2: The distance measure calculation for weak orders
f f ′′ Disagreement
A  B  C  D  E A  C  E  B ∼ D between f and f ′′
(A  B) 3 3
(A  C) 3 3
(A  D) 3 3
(A  E) 3 3
(B  C) 3 (B ≺ C) 1
(B  D) 3 B ∼ D 0.5
(B  E) 3 (B ≺ E) 1
(C  D) 3 3
(C  E) 3 3
(D  E) 3 (D ≺ E) 1
Distance measure: d(f, f ′′) 3.5
Table 6.3: The Kernel vector for linear orders
d(m, l) 0 1 2 . . .
(
K
2
)
Fm(d(m, l)) 1 θm1 θ
m
2 . . . θ
m
(K2 )
coding the difference between the two binary relations A  B and A ≺ B as 1, I code the difference between
the two binary relations A  B and A ∼ B (or A ≺ B and A ∼ B) as 0.5.
To provide an example of a distance measure calculation, let me consider two orders: f = {A  B 
C  D  E} and f ′′ = {A  C  E  B ∼ D}, f, f ′′ ∈ F. Table 6.2 presents the calculation of the distance
between these two weak orders.
6.1.3 Kernel
.
Now that I have defined the distance measure and its support, I can specify the second main component
of the analysis, the Kernel function for a mode m, Fm. Usually a Kernel is a continuous function of distance;
for the discrete domain, a Kernel becomes a vector of parameters. The length of this vector is equal to the
number of values the distance can take, e.g.,
((
K
2
)
+ 1
)
for linear orders. I denote a parameter in the Kernel
for mode m and distance d by θmd . I assume that F
m(0) = 1 for all modes m.
Table 6.3 shows the correspondence of the Kernel parameters to the distance values for linear orders.
Similarly, instead of
((
K
2
)
+ 1
)
potential distances that I had for linear orders, I obtain
(
2
(
K
2
)
+ 1
)
po-
tential distances for weak orders. Therefore, the corresponding Kernel vector has
(
2
(
K
2
)
+ 1
)
θ parameters.
As earlier, I assume F (0) = 1. Then Table 6.3 transforms into Table 6.4 for weak orders.
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Table 6.4: The Kernel vector for weak orders
d(m, f) 0 0.5 1 1.5 . . .
(
K
2
)
Fm(d(m, f)) 1 θm1 θ
m
2 θ
m
3 . . . θ
m
2(K2 )
I assume that the probability that a voter reports a full ranking f ∈ F, conditional on her true preference
being mode m, is determined by the Kernel function Fm:
p (f |m) ∝ Fm (d (m, l)) .
Because the sum of probabilities p (f |m) across rankings f ∈ F must equal one, I introduce a normaliza-
tion:
p (f |m) = F
m (d (m, f))∑
f ′∈F
Fm (d (m, f ′))
. (6.1)
As previously defined, the probability of observing a voter with a mode m is sm; a voter reports ranking f ,
given that her true preference is m, with probability p(f |m). Thus, the probability that a voter, randomly
drawn from the electorate with M modes, reports a ranking f ∈ F is p (f). This is a weighted sum of
conditional probabilities, where weights are the shares of the modes in the electorate:
p (f) =
∑
m∈M
smp (f |m) . (6.2)
Substituting the conditional probability according to Equation 6.1, the probability that a voter reports
a ranking f becomes a function of the Kernel parameters and shares of the modes:
p (f) =
∑
m∈M
sm
Fm (d (m, f))∑
f ′∈F
Fm (d (m, f ′))
. (6.3)
6.1.4 Technical Assumptions
.
In order for the model to be capable of capturing features of real-world data, I need to make additional
technical assumptions. First, to accommodate ballots that contain only partial information about preferences
of the voter, I describe three models of partial rankings. Second, I introduce an additional “zero” mode that
represents a uniform distribution over all full rankings.
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Partial Rankings. Equation 6.3 defines the probability that a voter reports a full ranking f under the
assumption that all voters report full rankings. Now, let me incorporate another popular preference format,
the partial ranking, into the model, in order to reflect both types of reported preferences in the electorate:
full rankings and partial rankings. I assume that each voter still has a full ranking in her mind, but may
only report a part of it.
To incorporate partial rankings into the model, I need to make additional assumptions regarding the
nature of these preferences. There can be multiple reasons for voters to report only partial information
about their preferences: they may have simply not liked some of the candidates enough to rank them; or
they may have not possessed sufficient knowledge/information about some of the candidates; or, they may
have simply misread the ballots.
In this section, I describe three models of partial rankings: the Size Independent Linear model, the Weak
Order model, and the Zwicker model. All three models were originally proposed and described by Michel
Regenwetter and coauthors.
The first model is a variation of the Size Independent Linear Order model (SIM) (Falmagne and Regen-
wetter, 1996). The SIM model uses two assumptions. First, each voter chooses the length of the reported
ranking independently of her order, l. Second, her reported partial ranking always comes from the top part
of her order l. In other words, I assume that a voter truncates the bottom part of her order independently
from the choice of her linear order. Then, omitted information in her report is inferred statistically from the
distribution of responses over orders in the electorate.
Let me define the probability that a voter reports partial order pi. Let Π denote the set of partial orders
for K candidates. Here and later I use capital letter Π for the set and lowercase letter pi for a particular
partial ranking. Let |pi| denote the length of the partial ranking pi. The length |pi| can take values from 1 to
K. The partial order pi ∈ Π of length |pi| is the beginning of a full ranking f ∈ F if, and only if, the first |pi|
elements of f coincide with pi and have the same order. For notational convenience I denote this as f A pi.
I assume that the probability of an incomplete report of length |pi| is ρ|pi|. According to the SIM model,
the length |pi| of a report pi is chosen independently from the underlying ranking f . Therefore, the probability
that a voter reports an order pi of length |pi| is computed as follows:
p(pi) = ρ|pi|
∑
fApi
p (f) . (6.4)
Substituting p(f) from Equation 6.3, I obtain:
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p(pi) = ρ|pi|
∑
fApi
∑
m∈M
sm
Fm (d (m, f))∑
f ′∈F
Fm (d (m, f ′))
. (6.5)
For example, the partial ranking pi = {A  B  C} is the beginning of two linear orders, f = {A 
B  C  D  E} and f ′′′ = {A  B  C  E  D}. As before, I denote the population probabilities
of rankings f and f ′′′ as p(f) and p(f ′′′), respectively. The probability of reporting preferences regarding 3
candidates is ρ|pi|=3.
Then, the probability p(pi), of observing partial ranking pi = {A  B  C}, according to Equation 6.4 is
modeled as p(pi) = ρ3 × (p(f) + p(f ′′′)).
The second model of partial rankings is called the Weak Order model. It was originally introduced in
Regenwetter et al. (2009b). According to the Weak Order model, a voter prefers all candidates she did rank
to all unranked candidates. Additionally, the model assumes that all unranked candidates are tied at the
bottom of the preference.
The third model of partial rankings is called the Zwicker model. This model assumes that a voter only
has preferences among ranked candidates, and does not assume any preferences when one or both candidates
are unranked. The Zwicker model completes the set of pairwise comparisons by assuming that the voter is
indifferent to any unreported candidate or any other candidate-reported or unreported.
Because the Weak Order and Zwicker models complete partial rankings to rankings that specify prefer-
ences of a voter regarding each pair of candidates, and each of such rankings possesses unique coordinates in
the Saari space, in both of these models my distance measure is properly specified for all such full rankings.
The general formulation of my Multi-peaked model includes all three models of partial rankings as special
cases. Now that I have defined my Multi-peaked model for partial rankings, I can test my model on a variety
of real-world data sets.
“Zero” mode. To accommodate an Impartial Culture as a special case of the model, as well as to bet-
ter capture the distributions seen in the data, it is convenient to have a mode that represents a uniform
distribution over all full rankings. This may be done by selecting an arbitrary full ranking as the “zero”
mode and by assuming that the Kernel function is flat. That is, I assume that Kernel parameters satisfy
Fm1(d) = θm1d = 1 for all d. This assumption also agrees with the model proposed by Niemi (1969), who
describes an electorate as a mixture of an Impartial Culture distribution and a Single-peaked distribution.
Conditional on having a uniform “zero” mode, in order to distinguish large deviations in the remaining
modes from those generated by the “zero” mode, it is convenient to assume that the Kernel functions of all
other modes are truncated beyond some distance d¯. Therefore, I assume that Fm(d) = θmd = 0 for all d > d¯.
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In addition, for identification purposes, I assume that all Kernel functions are positive and monotonically
decrease with distance, i.e. 1 ≥ θm1 ≥ . . . ≥ θmd¯ ≥ 0. I further discuss identification in Section 6.4.
6.2 Parameter Estimation
I first describe the parameters of the model and then move on to the estimation procedure.
Parameters.
Conceptually, the model is completely defined by the set Π, by a cutoff d¯ and by the following list of
parameters:
1. The number of modes, M . This set has one free parameter.
2. The set of modes m = {m1, . . . ,mM}. Equivalently, the modes can be described by a vector of positions
of modes in the list of all full rankings L, where each position can take on values from 1 to L. This
set has M − 1 free parameters, since the position of the first mode does not play a role.
3. The vector of shares of each of M modes in the population, S = {s1, s2, . . . , sM}.
Because shares must sum up to one, this set has M − 1 free parameters.
4. The vector of Kernel parameters for each mode m, θm =
{
θm1 , θ
m
2 , . . . , θ
m
d¯
}
. Each Kernel vector has
d¯ free parameters. Because M − 1 modes have Kernel parameters, the total number of parameters is
(M − 1) d¯.
5. The vector of probabilities for lengths of incomplete reports from 1 to K, ρ = {ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρK}. Because
probabilities must sum up to one, this set has K − 1 free parameters.
Let me call the joint set of these parameters, Λ; then, for the general case the set of parameters is as
follows:
Λ = {M,m,S, θ2, . . . , θM , ρ}.
The number of free parameters in this parameter vector equals (M − 1)(d¯ + 2) + K. Recall that d¯
may take on values from 1 to
(
K
2
)
. For instance, for 5 candidates and 3 modes there can be as many as
2(
(
5
2
)
+ 2) + 5 = 29 free parameters. However, this is much less than K! − 1 + K − 1 = 123 parameters
present in the unrestricted model, which treats the probability of each linear order as a free parameter.
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Hence, although the number of free parameters in the Multi-peaked model increases with both the number
of modes, M , and the number of candidates, K, the speed of increase is much slower than K! — the speed
of increase in the number of degrees of freedom in the data.
The number of free parameters is significantly reduced both by choosing the number of modes and by
structuring the deviations from these modes. Hence, the Multi-peaked model achieves a significant increase
in parsimony even for a relatively large number of modes.
Estimation.
The data analyzed are generally presented through the numbers of voters npi, out of the total number
of voters N , who chose a partial ranking pi. To fit the model to the data, I need to compute the likelihood
of the data, conditional on the model. The likelihood of observing the data is described by a multinomial
distribution:
f (npi|Λ) = N !
npi1 !npi2 ! . . .
p(pi1)
npi1p(pi2)
npi2 . . . =
N !∏
pi∈Π
npi!
∏
pi∈Π
p (pi)
npi ,
where the probability p (pi) is computed as described in equation (6.5).
The log likelihood is then written as follows:
L (npi|Λ) = c (npi) +
∑
pi∈Π
npi log p (pi) . (6.6)
I can maximize this log-likelihood and estimate the parameters of the model. I can ignore the constant,
c (npi), since it only depends on the data. For example, for a model with 5 candidates and one mode I have
the following free parameters: m2, s2, θ
1
1, . . . , θ
1
d¯
, and ρ2, . . . , ρ5. Thus, I need to estimate d¯+ 6 parameters
in this model.
Even though the number of parameters is much smaller than the number of empirical cells, it does
not imply that all of the parameters are identifiable. In order for the algorithm to converge, additional
constraints on the form of the Kernels may be required. In Section 6.4, I discuss whether my choice of
constraints described in Section 6.3 is sufficient for identification.
As was previously noted, a change in the number of modes implies a change in the dimensionality of the
parameter vector Λ. Therefore, to apply Maximum Likelihood approach I need to separately maximize the
log-likelihood function for each number of modes. To perform the model selection, i.e., to choose the optimal
number of modes (and, consequently, the optimal number of parameters), I use the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC). BIC penalizes for the number of parameters and prevents model over-fitting. I select the
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number of modes that corresponds to the minimum BIC value. The BIC is calculated as follows:
BIC
(
npi|λˆ
)
= −2L
(
npi|λˆ
)
+ |Λ| logN, (6.7)
where |Λ| is the number of free parameters in the model.
To test the null hypothesis of an Impartial Culture, I need to compare the model that best fits the data
with the model containing a “zero” uniform mode only. Because the “zero” mode is always included in
the model, the Impartial Culture is nested within the Multi-peaked model for any number of modes. The
likelihood ratio test can be used to test whether the Multi-peaked model describes the data better than the
Impartial Culture. This test is the standard χ2 test of the uniform distribution.
6.3 Analysis of Multi-Peaked Electorates
To demonstrate that the estimation procedure outlined in Section 6.2 is capable of robustly recovering the
true parameters of the model and to discuss identifiability of the model, I perform a model recovery exercise.
First, I describe the main assumptions about the distributions of parameters. Second, I report the
performance of the estimation procedure for a variety of setups, including the Impartial Culture, Single
Peakedness, and the case of a Condorcet cycle. Third, I calculate the rates of agreement on a single best
option among three commonly used voting rules (Condorcet, Borda, and Plurality) for various parameter
specifications. Finally, I apply the Saari decomposition to artificial profiles generated from the Multi-peaked
model for various parameter specifications.
I find that, in electorates generated from the Multi-peaked model, the rates of agreement on a single best
option are high. This is consistent with observations taken from real-world data sets.
Furthermore, I find that, when I shut down the Kernel functions, the decompositions of the corresponding
vectors into the Transitive and Condorcet components become symmetric around the diagonal, similar to the
Po´lya-Eggenberger model (Figure 6.1). However, when Kernel vectors are assumed to have positive values
only and a value of a parameter in Kernel vectors decline with distance, the decomposition yields points
that are below the diagonal in the area where various voting rules have high rates of agreement. Thus, I
demonstrate that the Multi-peaked model predicts the distributions of voters that are in line with those
observed in real-world data sets: The area that covers 90% of electorates generated under the Multi-peaked
model assumptions is located below the diagonal and covers all points that correspond to real-world data
sets in Figure 6.1.
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6.3.1 Distributions of Parameters
.
I consider the number of candidates, K, from the list {3, 4, 5}. I assume that the set L contains all linear
orders for a fixed number of candidates. Thus, its dimension, L, is set to K!. I restrict the analysis to the
small number of candidates and to the set of linear orders due to computational constraints. I assume that
each artificial electorate contains N = 10, 000 voters.
I vary the number of modes M from 1 to 10. The modes themselves are drawn uniformly from the set
L. Shares of the population that support each mode, sm, are drawn uniformly from the unit M -dimensional
simplex. Generating a point from an M -dimensional simplex is equivalent to sampling M − 1 points from
the unit line and then using the intervals between adjacent points as values for the shares.
To meet the requirement that the Kernel vector is monotonically decreasing, i.e. 1 ≥ θm1 ≥ . . . ≥ θmd¯ ≥ 0,
I draw Kernel parameters, θm from the uniform product distribution. The uniform product distribution uses
a ‘multiplicative innovation’ Xd which is distributed uniformly on the unit interval, to recursively calculate
a set of random variables. I determine the starting value of θm0 to be 1. Then Kernel parameters that are
non-negative and monotonically decreasing with distance are computed recursively using the formula:
θmd = θ
m
d−1 ∗Xd, Xd ∼ U [0, 1], ∀d ∈ {1, . . . , d¯}.
I only consider linear orders in the Monte Carlo simulations. Thus, I set Π = L, ρ = {0, . . . , 0, 1}. For
each number of modes and each number of candidates I generate 5,000 artificial electorates.
Now that I have defined the distribution of parameters, I can simulate electorates under the assumptions
of the Multi-peaked model and its special cases, and analyze properties of these electorates.
6.3.2 Model Recovery
.
In this section, I demonstrate that the estimation procedure robustly recovers the true properties of
artificially-generated profiles. First, by using the Po´lya-Eggenberger urn model, I generate 100 profiles
under the assumptions of an Impartial Culture (α = 0) and Single Peakedness (α = 100K!) for 4 candidates
and 5000 voters.
When I apply my estimation procedure to the data generated from an Impartial Culture, the BIC is
minimized under a single uniform mode in 100% of the simulations.
When I apply my estimation procedure to the data generated from a Single-peaked distribution (Po´lya-
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Eggenberger urn model with a high homogeneity parameter), the BIC is minimized under 1 mode with a
degenerate Kernel in 95% of the simulations, and additional modes with degenerate Kernels are identified
with a share below 15% in all remaining cases.
Second, to test whether the estimation procedure correctly identifies cases with voting paradoxes, I gen-
erate 100 draws from a Multi-peaked model with three cyclical modes (in addition to the uniform “zero”
mode). When I apply my estimation procedure to this artificial data, which by construction possesses a
Condorcet cycle, the procedure robustly identifies all 3 cyclical modes and recovers the true Kernel parame-
ters in 100% of simulations. As shown in Figure 6.3, the estimation procedure often identifies an additional
mode; this occurrence, nevertheless, never exceeds 7%. This does not prevent the procedure from correctly
identifying the Condorcet cycle.
Figures 6.2-6.3 illustrate the typical fit of the model for artificial electorates that contain a Condorcet
cycle with 3 and 4 candidates, respectively. The top panels of both figures report model fit. The horizontal
axes list all possible linear orders, sorted by the distance from the first mode identified by the model.5
The vertical axis in the top panel represents the probability, p(f), that a voter, randomly drawn from the
electorate with M modes, reports a ranking f .
The bottom panels of Figures 6.2-6.3 illustrate the contribution of each mode to the model fit. The
vertical axis represents weighted conditional probabilities in which weights are the shares of the modes in
the electorate. Because of the structure of the horizontal axis (the first mode captured by the model is
located at 1 on the horizontal axis), the contribution of the first mode (A  B  C in Figure 6.2 and
A  B  C ∼ D in Figure 6.3) gradually decreases with the increase in distance from the first mode.
I report the shares of each mode, including the “zero” uniform mode, in the legend. The Condorcet rule
provides us with a cycle in the simulated electorate, and the modes estimated by the model also form a
Condorcet cycle.
Having established that the estimation procedure works well for these extreme special cases, I now turn
to establishing that this particular procedure is also good at recovering the true preference structure in more
complex situations. To do that, I generate 1, 000 draws from the Multi-peaked model with 4 candidates
and 4 modes, and 100 draws from the model with 5 candidates6 and 7 modes, where all the remaining
parameters are drawn as described earlier. I run the estimation procedure on each of the draws and compare
the estimated parameters to the true parameters used to generate the draws.
5The particular order of linear orders is not important for the purposes of the analysis. I locate the linear order that
corresponds to the first mode at 1; the rest of the linear orders are sorted by their distance from the first mode. In a case in
which there is more than one linear order at the same distance, I sort them lexicographically. In a case in which only linear
orders are present in the simulated electorate, F is equivalent to L.
6Due to computational and memory constraints I restrict the number of candidates in Monte Carlo simulations to no larger
than 5.
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Figure 6.2: Identifying a Condorcet cycle in the artificial data with 3 candidates.
“Unfrm” stands for
a “zero” mode with a uniform distribution over all full rankings. Candidates involved in the Condorcet cycle are separated by commas.
Figure 6.3: Identifying a Condorcet cycle in the artificial data with 4 candidates.
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In all cases, the estimation procedure successfully recovered modes which have at least a 5% share in
the electorate. The procedure also gave relatively precise estimates of the share parameters and the Kernel
parameters. I illustrate the precision of the estimates of the Kernels and shares in Figures 6.4-6.7.
Figures 6.4-6.7 show scatter-plots with the true parameters on the horizontal axis and the estimated
parameters on the vertical axis. In addition to the scatter-plot, the Figures show the median, the 15th, and
the 85th percentiles of respective distributions. The diagonal of each Figure corresponds to the cases where
estimates coincide with true parameters.
Figures 6.4-6.7 demonstrate that the estimates of all parameters are unbiased, and that the standard
errors are remarkably small. Thus, the estimation procedure successfully recovers the true parameters for a
wide variety of cases one may encounter in empirical work.
6.3.3 Saari Decomposition of Multi-Peaked Electorates
.
Following the logic of the motivation for this paper, it is instructive to see which regions of the Saari space
are the most likely outcomes of draws from the Multi-peaked model. To explore this question, I compute
the components of the Saari decomposition for 50, 000 draws from the Multi-peaked model for each of 3, 4,
5, and 6 candidates and report them in Figures 6.8-6.11 respectively.
Similar to Figure 6.1, in Figures 6.8-6.11 red shaded areas cover 90% draws from the Po´lya-Eggenberger
urn model. Additionally, I plot, in blue, the 90% regions for draws produced by the Multi-peaked model. I
plot points corresponding to the Saari decompositions of real-world electorates as black crosses.
Figures 6.8-6.11 indicate that the Multi-peaked model predicts electorates that largely belong below the
diagonal of the diagram.
Moreover, for the most of cases, the data points belong to the same regions of the Saari space as those
predicted by the Multi-peaked model. This is in contrast to the symmetric regions predicted by the Po´lya-
Eggenberger urn model.
The conclusion from this finding is that the Multi-peaked model shares common features with the way
real-world electorates are structured, which makes its outcome quantitatively similar to the data. The
Multi-peaked model possesses two features: a restricted number of groups with a “typical” point of view in
the population (the restricted number of modes) and a diversity of opinions within each group (the Kernel
function). How exactly do these features contribute to the model and its predictions? To answer this
question, I remove each of the two main features of the Multi-peaked model one at a time to observe the
effect on the ability of the model to capture the structure of real-world electorates, and to position these
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Figure 6.4: True vs. estimated share parameters, 4 Candidates, 4 modes.
Figure 6.5: True vs. estimated Kernel parameters, 4 candidates, 4 modes.
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Figure 6.6: True vs. estimated share parameters, 5 candidates, 7 modes.
Figure 6.7: True vs. estimated Kernel parameters, 5 candidates, 7 modes.
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electorates below the diagonal.
The first assumption of the Multi-peaked model is that the number of modes is restricted. To remove this
assumption, I can assume either a single non-uniform mode or a very large number of modes. My simulations
show that in the first case, the 90% regions remain largely unchanged. In the second case, they approach
the origin. In both cases, the 90% regions remain largely below the diagonal. Thus, this assumption is not
the one responsible for the location being below the diagonal.
The second assumption of the Multi-peaked model is that each mode is endowed with a Kernel function.
This assumption postulates that if a particular ranking of alternatives is supported by a noticeable part of
the electorate, then those rankings that differ from the baseline ranking only slightly stand out as well.
To remove the Kernel assumption, I shut down the Kernel functions by assuming θmd = 0 for all d > 0. In
this case, the simulated 90% regions become virtually indistinguishable from those generated by the Po´lya-
Eggenberger model. This is not very surprising, given that the simulation is equivalent to drawing from a
mixture of Po´lya-Eggenberger models.
However, the consequences of this exercise are immensely important. Recall that, when an electorate is
below the diagonal, it possesses a significantly larger probability that voting rules would agree on a single
most preferable candidate and on the social order of the candidates. Thus, the exercise demonstrates that
it is not the number of points of view, per se, that is potentially responsible for the high agreement rates
observed in the data. It is, rather, the tendency of people to express small symmetric deviations from
prevailing points of view that is likely responsible for the high rates of agreement. I demonstrate that this
is indeed the case when I turn to the analysis of real-world electorates. I outline the mathematical principle
behind this result in Section 6.3.4.
6.3.4 Uncovering the Effect of a Kernel on the Saari Decomposition
In Section 6.4, I established that the presence of a Kernel around a point of view increases the ratio of
the Transitive and the Condorcet components of a preference profile. Here I explain the reason for this
phenomenon.
Note that since the overall preference profile is a weighted sum of groups of people with different points
of view, the profile in the Saari space is a weighted sum of vectors qm, each representing one of the groups,
m. Thus, if I can establish that introducing a Kernel to group 1 increases the ratio of components of the
Saari decomposition, qT1 /q
C
1 , then, holding all the other groups fixed, it follows that the ratio of components
should increase for the entire profile. In what follows, I will outline the proof in general terms and then give
examples in parentheses.
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Figure 6.8: Multi-peaked vs. Po´lya-Eggenberger model for 3 candidates.
Figure 6.9: Multi-peaked vs. Po´lya-Eggenberger model for 4 candidates.
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Figure 6.10: Multi-peaked vs. Po´lya-Eggenberger model for 5 candidates.
Figure 6.11: Multi-peaked vs. Po´lya-Eggenberger model for 6 candidates.
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Table 6.5: Components of ∆q1/δ
K Transitive Condorcet Ratio
3 0.58 0.82
√
1/2=0.71
4 0.41 0.91
√
1/5=0.45
5 0.32 0.95
√
1/9=0.33
6 0.26 0.97
√
1/14=0.27
7 0.22 0.98
√
1/20=0.22
... ... ... ...
K
√
2
K(K−1)
√
(K−2)(K+1)
K(K−1)
√
2
(K−2)(K+1)
Without loss of generality, I can start with a unanimous group, q1, for which the ranking coincides with
the order of candidates (e.g., for K=4, everybody in the group has a preference A  B  C  D). Thus,
I can assume that all components of q1 equal 1 (e.g., q1 = [1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1]). How would vector q1 change if
I introduced a Kernel around the prevailing point of view? By introducing a Kernel I force equal shares of
voters in the group to shift toward the rankings that differ from the main ranking by a single switch (e.g.,
B  A  C  D, A  C  B  D and A  B  D  C). If the Kernel parameter is θ, this would
imply that K−1 elements of the vector q1, corresponding to switches of adjacent candidates, would decrease
from 1 to 1− δ = 1+(K−3)θ1+(K−1)θ establishing a new profile q′1 (e.g., q′1 = [1− δ, 1, 1, 1− δ, 1, 1− δ]).
To establish the main result, it is sufficient to show that the change in the profile, ∆q1 = (q1− q′1), which
results from the introduction of a Kernel, is dominated by the Condorcet component. In turn, in order to
simplify the analysis, it is worth noting that the normalized vector ∆q1/δ is one that contains only zeros and
ones, with ones corresponding to switches of adjacent elements in the original ranking (e.g. AB,BC,CD:
∆q1/δ = [1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1]). The sizes of the Condorcet and Transitive components are easy to compute for
this vector, as they depend only on the number of candidates, K. Table 6.5 shows the values of the two
components of this vector for 3 to 7 candidates. The relative size of the Condorcet component, column 3 in
Table 6.5, keeps increasing along with the number of candidates.
Therefore, the introduction of a Kernel changes a profile by subtracting a vector in which the Condorcet
component dominates the Transitive component. Thus, the ratio of the Transitive to Condorcet component
of a profile with a Kernel will be larger than that of the original unanimous profile. Hence, an introduction
of a Kernel moves the profile downward in the diagram used in Figures 6.1 and 6.8-6.11.
An illustration of this result for the case of 3 candidates is provided in Figure 6.12. In this case, the
mode ABC has a Kernel with parameters [1, θ, 0, 0]. The Kernel shifts the weight away from point ABC
toward points BAC and ACB. Effectively, the mode with a Kernel introduced is represented by the black
point on the median of the red triangle. This point is closer to the Transitive hyperplane (drawn in blue)
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than the mode ABC itself. For 3 candidates, when θ = 0.5, the black dot will be exactly on the transitive
hyperplane, while the mode ABC is always far from the hyperplane.
Figure 6.12: Illustration: Introduction of a Kernel shifts the electorate toward the transitive hyperplane.
6.3.5 Rates of Agreement among Voting Rules in Multi-Peaked Electorates
.
Given that the Multi-peaked model generates electorates in the same region of the Saari space to which
the real-world electorates largely belong, it is instructive to compare the rates of agreement among three
voting rules (Condorcet, Borda, and Plurality), in simulated electorates and in real-world data sets. Table 6.6
reports rates of agreement between single best options and between social orders7 for three voting rules for
electorates with 5 candidates and 1, 000 voters. I vary the number of modes from 1 to 9. In each case, the
rates are averaged across 10, 000 artificial electorates. The last line reports the averaged rates of agreement
for 24 real-world data sets with 5 candidates.
When the Multi-peaked model assumes a uniform mode (line 1 in Table 6.6), the results coincide with
those for an Impartial Culture: consequently, agreement among rules is unlikely.
7The resulting order of all candidates by the given voting rule is called the social order according to that voting rule.
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Table 6.6: Averaged rates of agreement for 5 candidates in artificial and real-world electorates.
Number of Single Best Option Social Order
Modes C.-B. C.-P. B.-P. C.-B. C.-P. B.-P.
Uniform 0.76 0.51 0.55 0.22 0.05 0.09
1 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.90 0.59 0.60
2 0.92 0.93 0.86 0.72 0.33 0.35
3 0.89 0.88 0.81 0.62 0.24 0.27
4 0.88 0.86 0.79 0.57 0.22 0.24
5 0.88 0.84 0.77 0.55 0.20 0.23
6 0.87 0.82 0.75 0.53 0.18 0.21
7 0.86 0.81 0.74 0.51 0.19 0.21
8 0.86 0.80 0.74 0.51 0.17 0.20
9 0.86 0.78 0.73 0.49 0.16 0.19
Data 0.83 0.83 0.67 0.78 0.13 0.17
Note: “C.” stands for the Condorcet rule, “B.” stands for the Borda rule, “P.” stands for the Plurality rule.
However, agreement is almost certain for 1 mode, which is analogous to the case of Single-peaked prefer-
ences. Agreement rates decrease slowly as the number of modes increases from 2 to 9. Agreement remains
quite likely for the Multi-peaked model even for 9 modes. The rates of agreement in the data are broadly
consistent with the number of modes between 5 and 9. As we shall see in the next section, the average
number of modes the model captures in the data using the estimation procedure is 8.
6.4 Applications to Real-World Data
I analyzed 52 real-world data sets, including 40 data sets from the Inter-university Consortium for Political
and Social Research (ICPSR) and 12 data sets from American Psychological Association presidential elec-
tions for years 1998-2009. ICPSR sources are summarized in Popova (2013b), Section 5.2.3. The detailed
description of American Psychological Association ballots can be found in Popov et al. (2014).
For each data set, by applying the estimation procedure, I computed the number of modes, the shares
of groups supporting each mode, and the Kernel parameters. I summarize the average values of selected
parameters in Table 6.7.
The first key finding is that the number of modes is relatively small. For instance, for 5 candidates, the
median data set contains only 8 points of view, while there are at least 120 ways to rank options.
The second finding concerns the size of the residual uniform component of the electorate. On average,
only between 1 and 6 percent of an electorate reported random preferences unaffected by the prevailing
points of view in the electorate. These numbers also reflects the fact that the model fits the data well with
a small number of modes.
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Table 6.7: Summary of results averaged across 52 real-world data sets.
# # Average Average Average Agreement on
K Data Modes szero Single Best Option
Sets |M| C.-B. C.-P. B.-P.
3 7 3 0.01 1.00 1.00 1.00
4 21 5 0.04 0.76 0.90 0.71
5 24 8 0.06 0.83 0.83 0.67
Note: “C.” stands for the Condorcet rule, “B.” stands for the Borda rule, “P.” stands for the Plurality rule.
The third finding is that the median size of the Saari ratio is well above 2 for all data sets, indicating
that agreement among voting rules is likely for most data sets. Indeed, as shown in the last three columns
of the Table 6.8, the rates of agreement between Condorcet, Borda, and Plurality rules are remarkably high.
Next, I illustrate the fit of some of the data sets. I chose 3 typical data sets, for 3, 4 and 5 candidates.
These are shown in Figures 6.13,6.14, and 6.15. Similarly to Figure 6.1, each of these Figures shows the
fit of the model to the data in the top panel. The bottom panel of each Figure shows the contribution of
each mode to the electoral profile. I list the rankings of alternatives corresponding to each mode, and its
shares, in the bottom panel. In addition, I compute social orders produced by the three rules (Condorcet,
Borda, Plurality), first using all of the data, and then shutting down the Kernel functions, i.e., under the
assumption that voters do not deviate from the mode. This will be useful later for a counterfactual exercise.
All three Figures illustrate that the model fits the data with a limited number of modes quite well.
Furthermore, the modes do capture a dominant share of electoral preferences.
In Figure 6.16, I illustrate the fact that modes alone do not give good predictions for the outcomes
of the rules and for the agreement among them. In this Figure, the electoral ballots from the American
Psychological Association presidential election of 2005 have a notable feature: Although the Condorcet and
Borda rules provide full social orders and agree on them, the points of view prevailing in the electorate form
a Condorcet cycle. This example is a clear illustration of the fact that Kernel functions play an important
role in the agreement among voting rules and the rarity of Condorcet cycles. Although the deep beliefs of
the electorate are in strong conflict with each other, the fact that voters tend to make small deviations from
deep beliefs leads to agreement among voting rules. If these small but systematic deviations were absent,
the electorate would be a rare example of a Condorcet cycle for 5 candidates.
To further document this development, I apply the procedure that shuts down the Kernel functions for
all modes in the electorate to all real-world data sets. I report the results of this procedure in Table 6.8.
Table 6.8 shows, for each number of candidates (3, 4, and 5), the rates of agreement on a single best
option and on social orders for the three rules (Condorcet, Borda, Plurality). In each case the rates of
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Figure 6.13: Typical Electorate with 3 candidates: Canada, 1979.
Figure 6.14: Typical Electorate with 4 candidates: Mexico, 2000.
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Figure 6.15: Typical Electorate with 5 candidates: APA, 2004.
Figure 6.16: Presence of a Kernel Removes a Cycle: APA, 2005.
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Table 6.8: Averaged rates of agreement on a single best option and on a social order for 5 candidates.
Type of Single Best Social Order Cond. Median
Electorate C.-B. C.-P. B.-P. C.-B. C.-P. B.-P. Cycles |qT |/|qC |
3 candidates, 7 data sets
IC, 999 voters 0.85 0.73 0.76 0.74 0.52 0.57 0.087 3.36
IC, 10 voters 0.89 0.79 0.75 0.64 0.36 0.39 0.011 3.74
Modes only 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.57 0.57 0 4.42
Modes and Kernels 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.86 0.86 0 17.25
4 candidates, 21 data sets
IC, 999 voters 0.78 0.59 0.63 0.45 0.19 0.25 0.254 2.27
IC, 10 voters 0.86 0.69 0.66 0.42 0.11 0.13 0.043 2.24
Modes only 0.76 0.81 0.76 0.71 0.29 0.24 0.048 2.35
Modes and Kernels 0.76 0.90 0.71 0.67 0.43 0.43 0 6.15
5 candidates, 24 data sets
IC, 999 voters 0.75 0.51 0.55 0.23 0.04 0.08 0.473 1.951
IC, 10 voters 0.85 0.61 0.58 0.25 0.02 0.02 0.102 1.943
Modes 0.83 0.83 0.69 0.39 0.09 0.04 0.125 2.63
Modes and Kernels 0.83 0.83 0.67 0.78 0.13 0.17 0 9.08
Note: “C.” stands for the Condorcet rule, “B.” stands for the Borda rule, “P.” stands for the Plurality rule. “IC” stands for an
Impartial Culture.
agreement are reported for 3 types of electorates: 1) artificial data sets drawing 999 or 10 voters from
an Impartial Culture; 2) real-world data sets for which the Kernel functions have been shut down so that
the model features only assumption about modes; 3) the real-world data sets themselves.8 The rightmost
columns also report the frequencies of Condorcet cycles and the median values of Saari ratios.
In Table 6.8 I demonstrate three points. First, shutting down the Kernel functions by removing the
variability within each group in real-world electorates generally leads to a reduction in the rates of agreement
on a single best options and social orders. Second, it leads to a significant reduction in the Saari ratio. Third,
it results in a number of Condorcet cycles that is generally consistent with the number we would expect
to see if the points of view themselves were drawn from an Impartial Culture. However, we observe no
Condorcet cycles when we preserve the variability of opinions in electoral preference profiles.
Thus, I illustrate that the Kernel functions bear all the responsibility for the high rates of agreement
among rules and for the complete absence of paradoxes in real-world data. To show the portrait of our
newfound hero, I plot averaged9 Kernel functions across all data sets in Figure 6.17.
8Under the assumptions of the Weak Order model for partial rankings.
9I average across all modes and across all data sets with the same number of candidates.
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Figure 6.17: Average Kernels for 3, 4, and 5 candidates.
6.5 Conclusion
This paper uncovers potentially the main reason for high rates of agreement among voting rules when
applied to real-world data sets. It also explains the absence of any direct evidence of Condorcet cycles in
real-world electorates. The reason is twofold. First, a relatively small number of points of view can capture
the preferences of a considerably large part of an electorate. Second, preferences that only slightly deviate
from these typical points of view also, stand out as well.
By using the Saari decomposition and the Po´lya-Eggenberger urn model I demonstrate that the mixture
of the popular theoretical distributions (an Impartial Culture and an approximation of Single Peakedness)
does not capture the properties of real-world electorates. Significantly, real-world electorates overwhelmingly
fall outside of the area predicted by the theoretical distributions in the Saari space.
I propose a Multi-peaked model of electorates and show that its predictions are consistent with the
theoretical literature on Social Choice with new empirical evidence. I model a real electorate by assuming
that, first, voters share a limited number of points of view and, therefore, form groups on the basis of similar
preferences. Thus, the distribution of preferences of the electorate is a mixture of the preferences of these
groups. Second, within a group, voters deviate slightly from a typical point of view and thereby provide a
variety of opinions.
I capture these two assumptions by introducing modes, i.e., true/typical points of view of a group, and
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Kernel functions, i.e., deviations from the modes, into the model.
Removing the Kernel functions from real-world electorates must lead to a reduction in the rates of
agreement on single best options and social orders, and to a higher frequency of Condorcet cycles. However,
we observe no Condorcet cycles when small deviations from the modes are incorporated into the analysis,
i.e., when the electoral preference profiles preserve the entire variability of opinions. Thus, I illustrate that
Kernel functions bear all the responsibility for the high rates of agreement among rules, as well as the rarity
of Social Choice paradoxes in real-world data.
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